

SUPPRESSING COMMUNIST-BANDITRY IN CHINA

"CHINA TO-DAY" SERIES

EDITED BY

T'ANG LEANG-LI

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1. SUPPRESSING COMMUNIST-BANDITRY IN CHINA
(Also in German)
2. CHINA'S PROBLEMS AND THEIR SOLUTION*
By WANG CHING-WEI.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS


	<i>Page</i>
CHAPTER I.— INTRODUCTORY	I
Government's Disastrous Heritage—p.1	
Communism and the Land Problem—p.3	
Difference Between the Kuo-Min Tang and Communist Party—p.4	
CHAPTER II.— ORIGIN OF THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT (1919-24)	8
Evolution of Marxist Ideas in China—p.8	
Russo-Chinese Relations—p.10	
Communism Repudiated—p.11	
Russian Influence at Canton—p.12	
The Beginning of Banditry—p.13	
The Russian Orientation—p.14	
Communism Admitted Impractical for China—p.17	
Borodin Accepts Three People's Principles—p.19	
CHAPTER III.— PERIOD OF COMMUNIST TOLERATION (1924-27)	20
Plans for Extending Activities—p.20	
Curbing Communist Influence—p.21	
Communist Seizures of Land—p.22	
Borodin's Denial of Responsibility—p.23	
Attacks on Foreigners—p.24	
CHAPTER IV.— PERIOD OF COMMUNIST PROSCRIPTION (1927-34)	25
Increased Communist Intrigues—p.25	
Stalin's Instructions to Chinese Communist Leaders—p.27	
Preparations for Expulsion from Kuo-Min Tang—p.28	
Communist Conspiracy Revealed—p.29	
Formal Decree Against Communist Party—p.30	
Terrorism in Kiangsi—p.31	
Suborning Chinese Troops—p.33	
Canton Seized by Communist—p.34	
Red Army Organized—p.38	
The "Game With Insurrection"—p.39	
CHAPTER V.— MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST COMMUNIST-BANDITS	40
General Chiang Takes Control—p.41	
Effect of Manchurian Invasion—p.41	
Foreign Observers on Kiangsi Front—p.42	

	<i>Page</i>
Rural Militia Forces—p.43	
The 1933 Campaign Reviewed—p.44	
Recent Military Operations—p.46	
Rehabilitation Work in Recovered Areas—p.52	
Anti-Communist Propaganda Campaign—p.53	
CHAPTER VI.— A MISSIONARY'S IMPRESSIONS OF THE SITUATION ..	55
Chinese—A Peace-Loving People—p.55	
Blunder of Western Powers—p.56	
Communist Outrages—p.56	
Reign of Terror in Kiangsi—p.58	
Government's Sincerity Recognized—p.58	
CHAPTER VII.— FOREIGN COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES	59
Secret Organizations Revealed—p.60	
Activities of the "Noulens" Couple—p.61	
Propaganda Among Industrial Workers—p.61	
Communist "Cells" in Chinese Army—p.64	
Inciting Chinese and Foreign Troops to Mutiny—p.66	
Recent Communist Activities in Shanghai—p.68	
CHAPTER VIII.— COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION IN CHINA	70
League of Communist Youths—p.71	
The Red Armies and Militia—p.73	
Tactics Laid Down in Military Manuals—p.74	
Chain-Gangs Making Roads—p.76	
How Funds are Obtained—p.77	
Administration of Sovietized Areas—p.77	
Organizing Class War—p.80	
Anti-Communist Reactions—p.81	
CHAPTER IX.— COMMUNISM AND THE LABOUR MOVEMENT	83
Red Trade Unions in Shanghai—p.84	
Conflict with Chinese Social Ideals—p.85	
Inherent Aversion to Communism—p.86	
Industrial Workers in Minority—p.88	
Opposition to Dictatorship of Proletariat—p.88	
Government's Determination to Restore Order—p.88	
CHAPTER X.— LAND POLICY OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT	90
Mr. Wang Ching-Wei's Exposition—p.90	
Evolution in Solving Economic Problems—p.90	
False Comparisons with France and Russia—p.91	
Communist Massacre of the Innocents—p.93	
General Chiang Kai-Shih's Exposure of Communist Policy—p.93	
Kuo-Min Tang Policy Explained—p.95	

APPENDICES

Page

(1) EMERGENCY LAW FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF CRIMES AGAINST THE SAFETY OF THE REPUBLIC	97
(2) STRENGTH OF THE RED ARMIES IN THE FIELD	99
(3) PROGRAMME OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REHABILITATION IN CONNECTION WITH THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE COMMUNISTS ..	101
Political Rehabilitation—p.101	
Enforcement of Relief Measures—p.102	
Political Measures after the Recovery of Sovietized Regions—p.103	
Restoration of Rural Economics—p.105	
Establishment of Rural Rehabilitation Committees—p.106	
Disposal of Farming Rights—p.107	
Regulations of Land Tax, Land Rent, and Farmers' Debts—p.109	



GENERAL CHIANG KAI-SHIH

SUPPRESSING COMMUNIST-BANDITRY IN CHINA

CHAPTER I INTRODUCTORY

BEFORE the Government of the Republic of China can make any real progress with its programme of national reconstruction, it is obvious that peace must be established in the country. There are two factors which make for unrest—the attitude and actions of Japan, and the activities in many parts of the country of large groups of armed men, some of whom are Communists, some bandits pure and simple, and others a mixture of both elements. In the following pages an account is given of the history of the Communist movement in China, together with some details of the measures taken by the Government to suppress Red activities and make good the tremendous damage which has been done by these and other bandits.

A DISASTROUS HERITAGE

Much has been heard during the past two years about the alleged inability of the National Government of China to exercise its authority and maintain peace and order within its territory. It should be remembered, however, that for more than half a century before the establishment of the Republic in 1912 there had been a steady weakening of central authority and a tendency toward provincial autonomy, and this legacy of defiance of Central Government control was inherited by the Kuo-Min Tang, and has been the most serious obstacle to its progress with the work of national administration. Moreover, the tendency for certain provincial governments to defy the authority of the Central Government was also accompanied by the rise to power of military commanders whose personal ambitions have repeatedly led to serious conflict either with jealous rivals for power or with the forces of the Government. In such an atmosphere—not, be it noted, created by the establishment of the Republic, but inherited from the Imperial regime which preceded it—risings against authority are as easy to organise as they are hard to suppress, and full allowance must be made for this state of affairs in reviewing the campaign undertaken by the Government for the suppression of Communist and bandit movements.

As will be seen later, the Communist movement in China is quite unlike the usual run of "Red" activities as followed in other countries. Nowhere in Europe, America, or even in Asia—outside the Republic of China—does the problem of dealing with Communism take the peculiar form it has assumed in this country. The issue is not the straight one of Marxism versus Socialism—it is complicated by a score of other factors, including foreign fomentation of rebellion against the Chinese Government, with the result that efforts to suppress the movement to sovietise the Republic meet with difficulties which are perhaps not fully realized by those who impatiently criticize the men responsible for conducting the military operations against Communist-bandits in different parts of the country. General Chiang Kai-Shih has said that the problem of suppressing Communism in China is only three-tenths military and seven-tenths administrative, and it is the object of this survey to elaborate that point, to explain how the movement started, and what is being done to bring it to an end.

MILLIONS SACRIFICED

More than six million sacrificed, and thousands of square miles of cultivated land laid waste, with farmhouses and live-stock destroyed, is the tragic result of the enforcement of their agrarian policy in one province of China by the Communists—a motley gathering of ex-soldiers, bandits, starving peasants, and pressed men. What has happened in Kiangsi is merely a melancholy repetition of events in Hunan and Hupeh, and an indication of what would happen in other parts of the Republic if the Red influence were not effectively checked. Although of recent years the activities of the Communists have been centred upon the peasant population, determined efforts have been made at different times to establish "cells" in the Chinese army, and to foment unrest in the ranks, especially among those Government troops engaged in operations for the suppression of banditry. The Communists have also endeavoured to take advantage of labour disputes in Shanghai and other important industrial centres, and generally to create trouble between employers and employed. Evidence in regard to these activities will be referred to in detail later, but it is among the ignorant peasants that the Communists have been most active and most successful, and it is their operations in remote country districts which have caused the Government most anxiety and where they have done the most destruction. For years the National Government has been engaged in guerilla warfare in an effort to suppress the Communist movement, but owing to other distractions (including the Japanese advance into Manchuria and the invasion of Shanghai) and domestic political difficulties, the

National Government has not been able to conduct the anti-Communist operations with sufficient concentration to dislodge the Reds from the strong position they have established in Kiangsi. Operations which promised to be highly successful in the autumn of 1931 had to be suspended owing to grave Sino-Japanese developments in Manchuria.

During the summer of 1933 elaborate preparations were made for another "big push" against the Communists, and General Chiang Kai-Shih told a British journalist that he expected the Red armies in Kiangsi would be destroyed by the end of the winter. Unfortunately for the plans of the Chinese Government, its attention and energy again had to be turned in another direction in November, as a result of an open revolt against its authority by a group of political and military leaders in Fukien. These men, while renouncing their affiliation with the Kuo-Min Tang, denied having any formal connection with the Communist party, but one of the main planks in their platform was "enforcement of the agrarian policy,"—which happens also to be one of the principal items on the Communist programme, and for that matter is also in the forefront of the Government's plans for national reconstruction.

COMMUNISM AND THE LAND PROBLEM.

Before entering upon a detailed account of the history of the Communist movement in China, it is advisable to outline the principal aspects of the land problem, because it is due to the Red concentration on this one of many pressing social questions in China that the Communist movement has attracted a certain amount of sympathy in some quarters.

Dr. Sun Yat-Sen, in one of his addresses as leader of the Kuo-Min Tang, outlined an agrarian policy, and that policy is being followed by the present Government in Nanking. The late Party Leader's plan was to apply revolutionary methods only to political problems, and gradually solve economic questions by peacefully deliberative measures instead of resorting to drastic ones. In other words, Dr. Sun Yat-Sen believed in the "inevitability of gradualness," realising that resort to swifter measures would be likely to bring about the total collapse of the social structure of the nation. Mr. Wang Ching-Wei, President of the Executive Yuan, in December, 1933, made a public statement in which he explained the reasons which compelled the Government to take action against the Communists and others who professed a desire to carry out a more effective agrarian policy than that which formed part of the Government's plans for national reconstruction. Mr. Wang declared that their only method of enforcing these principles was by massacre—first inciting peasants to murder their landlords, and then stirring-up strife among the peasants themselves—between the few openly pro-

fessing Communism and the many who follow the Red leaders without actually accepting their political principles.

About the same time (December, 1933) General Chiang Kai-Shih, in a lengthy despatch addressed to Mr. Wang Ching-Wei, enlarged upon the same topic, showing that the so-called agrarian policy of the Reds was not a political policy at all, but simply part of the strategy employed to attract popular support for the Communist party. The General pointed out that the Kuo-Min Tang was pledged to a land policy which aimed at equalisation of ownership, the ultimate object being to make land available to all tillers of the soil, and recalled that in the regulations issued from his Headquarters in 1932 plans were made for effecting the re-distribution of land by peaceful means, and without creating or appealing to class-strife. These regulations recognised private ownership of land, and protected those rights, but subject to two conditions—(1) that landowners must give all persons in the village capable of tilling the soil an opportunity to work on their farms, and (2) that the maximum land holdings be limited, and those holding larger areas be subject to graduated taxes, the revenue from which should be employed in financing agricultural enterprises. The establishment of co-operative societies was also encouraged, and when land comes into the market for sale, these societies are given priority in acquiring such property—a scheme which is designed gradually to give the co-operative bodies control of all farms in the village. Details of these plans for collective and co-operative farming will be found elsewhere in this booklet, the scheme being mentioned here merely to show what is being done by the National Government to meet the peculiar circumstances created in rural districts as a result of Communist propaganda and control.

THE KUO-MIN TANG AND THE COMMUNIST PARTY

There is just one other point which should be made clear before proceeding to a study of the rise of the Communist movement in China—a point upon which there is sometimes serious misapprehension. A sharp distinction must be made between what was known as the Left Wing of the Kuo-Min Tang and the Communists, who are often confused, especially by foreign observers. From January 1924, until June, 1927, there was close co-operation between the so-called Left, i.e. the dominant group in the Kuo-Min Tang of the time, and the Communist Party, the Left during that period including not only Wang Ching-Wei and his group, but also such prominent members Tai Chi-Tao, Chiang Kai-Shih, Sung Tse-Wen (T. V. Soong), and a host of others who have no distinct political colour, the "Right" being the so-called "Old Comrades" of the Western Hills group and a few others. But

even during the period of co-operation, which lasted until April, 1927, there has never been a fusion, but merely an entente for certain definite purposes. Outwardly, there is a similarity of aim and methods: they both want to overthrow foreign imperialism and feudal militarism in China through the awakening of the people. The similarity is, however, only superficial. The anti-imperialism of the Kuo-Min Tang aims at securing for China national liberty and international equality, by the universal application of the principle of national self-determination. The Chinese Communist Party, however, aims at the substitution of Red domination for White Imperialism; instead of national self-determination it aims at the supremacy of the Communist International. China, or any other nation, is to be merely a pawn in the game of Moscow—a pawn whose interests may be sacrificed, whenever Communist tactics demand. The Kuo-Min Tang wants to live in peace with all other nations; it is opposed to the imperialist interpretation of the Sino-Foreign treaties and desires the abolition of all instruments which hamper Chinese national self-expression, but as its published manifestoes ever since its Tung-Meng Hui days show, it is not anti-foreign as such. The Chinese Communist Party desires to involve China in as many international complications as possible by inflicting injuries on foreign lives and properties, so as to create the atmosphere for a new world war. The Kuo-Min Tang will have none of these complications, being primarily interested in the salvation of the nation, and realising that armed conflict would only result in universal chaos and confusion. It relies for the realisation of its international programme on the awakened conscience of the enlightened West, on the abolition of the secrecy inherent in traditional Chinese diplomacy, and on strengthening the nationalist spirit by the peaceful organisation of the masses. While disputing the foreign interpretation of the so-called Unequal Treaties and repudiating the special privileges derived from abuse of the extraterritorial system, it proposes, by negotiation, to arrive at an honourable settlement.

FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES.

With regard to the very aim of the Revolution, there exists a fundamental difference between the attitude of the then dominant "Left" and the Chinese Communist Party. The Kuo-Min Tang pursues a revolutionary policy because it wants to lead the people to a better political and economic order. The Chinese Communist Party sees in the Chinese Revolution merely a part of the World Revolution; to the furtherance of the latter, the existence and welfare of the Chinese people are merely incidental and secondary. The national-revolutionary policy of awaken-

ing the Chinese masses is to make them understand the intimate relation between the revolutionary policy of the Kuo-Min Tang and the national welfare, to secure to them their proper status in the Chinese social system. To the Communists, the awakening of the masses is merely a part of their policy of the class-struggle. For their real aim is not to co-operate with the genuinely revolutionary elements in China in furtherance of the interests of the people, but to work for the supremacy of their own Party, which, they realise, is not possible in an atmosphere of social peace and prosperity. The realisation that the Chinese Communist Party, instead of working for the success of the National Revolution on the basis of the Three People's Principles, are actively striving to undermine the very basis of the revolution, the welfare of the people—in order to establish a spurious Communism which is not only alien to the spirit of the Chinese people but also in contradiction with the domestic policy of the Soviet Government—finally led to the split between the Kuo-Min Tang and the Communists, and their active suppression.

In spite of the break between the "Left" and the Communist International, there has never been any essential change in the policy of the Kuo-Min Tang towards Soviet Russia as set down by Sun Yat-Sen in 1924. To quote Mr. Wang Ching-Wei in a letter written on September 2, 1929, "Dr. Sun's aim was to establish an alliance between China and the nation which had finished its revolutionary work so that they might stand together in the fight against Imperialism. I still uphold this idea. Unfortunately, Russia aimed at undermining and disintegrating the Kuo-Min Tang, working through the Chinese Communists. She did not want the Kuo-Min Tang to take charge of Chinese affairs alone. The resolution taken on December 10, 1927, deciding on the severance of diplomatic relations with Russia, was a matter of great regret. But the Kuo-Min Tang was forced to that action, in view of the fact that the Soviet Consulate at Canton had in effect become the military headquarters of the Chinese Communist Party, which was aiming at the overthrow of the Kuo-Min Tang. From the revolutionary point of view, a friendly relationship between Russia and China, based on a revolutionary understanding, is greatly desired. But this relationship is only possible if Russia treats China and the Kuo-Min Tang as friends and equals, not as subordinate instruments."

For nearly three years and a half—from July, 1929 to December, 1932—there was no diplomatic intercourse between China and Russia, and during that period, and perhaps largely because of that estrangement, a situation developed in Manchuria which was disastrous to Chinese prestige and which led to Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations

as the result of that body refusing to recognize the "independent" government set up in the Three Eastern Provinces by the force of Japan's arms. Both China and Russia suffered considerably in various ways from the rupture of diplomatic relations which followed the break between the "Left" Wing of the Kuo-Min Tang and the Third International, but it is satisfactory to note that since the resumption of friendly relations between the National Government and Soviet Russia there has been no cause for further complaint about Russian policy in regard to the internal affairs of China, and the "friendly relationship" mentioned by Mr. Wang Ching-Wei, based upon a revolutionary understanding, has been established so far as a policy of non-interference in domestic politics is concerned.

CHAPTER II

ORIGIN OF THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT (1919-24)

Communism in China, as a political movement, owes its origin to the agitation among the Peking University students which arose in 1919 as a reaction to the Treaty of Versailles and aimed at the regeneration of China by the rebirth of the ancient Chinese civilisation and the emancipation of Chinese thought from the traditional shackles of Confucian formalism. Politically, this movement found an expression in a boycott movement against the Japanese—the May Fourth Movement. Culturally, it endeavoured to establish a new synthesis between the ancient Chinese and modern Western civilisations on an intellectual and spiritual foundation through the introduction of modern research methods—the so-called New Culture Movement with which the name of Professor Hu Shih is so prominently associated—laying a new emphasis on personality which sought expression in democratic movements, in the desire for freedom from social tyrannies, in the popularisation of education, in the efforts to elevate the spoken language to the status of a literary medium. A host of new publications came into being, all advocating the rejuvenation of China.

Among these new publications was *The Weekly Critic*, founded by Chen Tu-Hsiu, a professor in the National University of Peking, who was attracted to Marxist theories and who together with Li Ta-Chao, a fellow-professor in the University, gathered around them a few young men and formed a society for the study of Marxism, with *The Weekly Critic* as their organ. This society became the nucleus of Communism in China. They were joined by several anarchists and trade unionists, and later in May 1920, organised a group at Shanghai with *The New Youth* as its organ.

RUSSIAN INTEREST.

In the meantime, the Soviet Government had been watching very closely the evolution of Marxist ideas in China. On July 25, 1919 it issued a manifesto addressed to both the Chinese nation and the Chinese Government in which it renounced all the advantages, privileges and concessions unjustly extorted from China by the former Czarist regime, and represented the Soviets as being "the only allies and brothers of the Chinese in their struggle for freedom." It sent a representative of the



BOMBING PLANES ON THEIR WAY TO A COMMUNIST STRONGHOLD.
Photo by H. S. Wong.




Photo by H. S. Wong.

GOVERNMENT MILITARY PLANES IN FORMATION.

Far Eastern Secretariat of the Executive Committee of the Comintern, a certain Virtinsky to the Chen Tu-Hsiu group, and under his influence the anarchist and trade-unionist elements were eliminated from the group which now took on a purely Communist colour. Two daily newspapers were published at Shanghai, *The Labour* and *The Employee*, and a school of foreign languages was organized. From this school several students were afterwards sent to the Far Eastern Institute at Moscow, while the others were scattered in the interior of the country to act as propaganda agents.

In May 1921, the Chen Tu-Hsiu group called a general conference at Shanghai. It was at this conference that the Chinese Communist Party was formed. Their principal leaders were Chen Tu-Hsiu (Shanghai), Li Ta-Chao (Peking), Tan Ping-Shan (Canton), with whom were associated Tsai Shih-Siang and Chang Tai-Lai who were at that time in France. The propaganda was specially directed to the workmen of Shanghai, where Soviet syndicates were formed. In addition the Young Men's Socialist Union was established as a result of the efforts of Chang Tai-Lai, who had meanwhile returned from France. A representative of the Chinese Communist Party was despatched to the Congress of the Far Eastern Proletarians which was convened at Moscow under the auspices of the Comintern. It was there that the affiliation of the Communist Party with the Kuo-Min Tang was for the first time contemplated. Moscow was favourably inclined to the proposal, its object being to exploit the national-revolutionary movement under Dr. Sun Yat-Sen for the purpose of Communist propaganda in the interior.

China was at that moment split between the North and South the North continuing in the reactionary and semi-feudalistic politics of Yuan Shih-Kai and of those who succeeded him in the Presidency of the Government of Peking, while the South, represented especially by the province of Kwangtung, rallied to the revolutionary programme of the Kuo-Ming Tang which, in April 1921, with the aid of a number of politicians who shared its ideas without being officially members, elected Dr. Sun President of the Republic and so organized a rival Government at Canton which, after a great deal of trouble and many trials succeeded in 1927-1928, as National Government of China, in bringing the whole of China under its authority and flag.

AN UNUSUAL PROPOSAL.

At the second Congress of the Chinese Communist Party held at Shanghai in June 1922—the party had a little over three hundred members at that time—the official delegate of the Comintern now proposed a formal alliance with the Kuo-Ming Tang, in order, as he said, to present

a "united democratic front." This proposition was a distinct departure from the proletarian stand which was always strictly followed by the Communist International. The Kuo-Ming Tang consisted at that time largely of intellectuals, representatives of the liberal professions, officials and students, of what, in Soviet terminology, was the "bourgeois" class against which the "class struggle" is mainly directed.¹ In the view of the pure or irreconcilable elements, the proposal to combine with the Kuo-Ming Tang was thus tantamount to covenanting with the enemy.

Nevertheless, the proposition was voted upon in spite of the opposition of Chen Tu-Hsiu who fought strongly against it, and was passed only as a mark of respect for the assistance which the Comintern had given. The Communist overtures to Dr. Sun Yat-Sen, the President of The Kuo-Min Tang were not favourably received. Dr. Sun's ideal was to regenerate China by the combined efforts of her entire population and for the benefit of all, without making any distinction between the classes which composed the nation. He was opposed to the doctrine of the "class struggle" and to the monopoly of political power exercised by one class over the others. He had no sympathy for the dictatorship of the proletariat. When, therefore, the Communists approached him, his reply was that any Chinese who believed in the principles of the Kuo-Ming Tang did not contemplate any alliance with other parties. The proposition of allowing the Communists individually to join the Kuo-Ming Tang was subsequently discussed by the Third Congress of the Communist Party at Canton in June 1923, without however arriving at any decision.

RUSSO-CHINESE RELATIONS.

The Soviet Government had meanwhile, during the autumn of 1922, despatched M. Joffe on a mission to the Far East with the object of obtaining official recognition of the Governments of China and Japan. Addressing the Chinese people, M. Joffe thus constantly referred to the most friendly sentiments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics *vis-à-vis* the Chinese nation, but when pressed by the Peking authorities with regard to the promises contained in the manifesto of July 25th, 1919 confirmed by the Russian note of September 27th, 1920 notably with regard to Mongolia and the Chinese Eastern Railway, he could only give evasive answers. Meeting with no success at Peking M. Joffe

¹In October 1926, after the Communists joined the Kuo-Min Tang, the relative strengths of the various groups composing the Kuo-Min Tang were greatly modified, but the intellectuals continued to be largely represented. The membership of the Kuo-Min Tang was then composed of the following:

Labourers	 29 %	Soldiers	 23 %	Farmers	 7.5%
Professional men	25 %	Students	 10.5%	Merchants	 4.3%

then went to Shanghai intending to sail for Japan. It was there that the historic interview with Dr. Sun Yat-Sen took place, as a result of which the following joint declaration was issued on January 26th, 1923:

"Dr. Sun Yat-Sen holds that the Communist order or even the Soviet system cannot be actually introduced China, because there do not exist here the conditions for the successful establishment of either Communism or Sovietism. This opinion is entirely shared by M. Joffe who is further of the opinion that China's paramount and most pressing problem is to achieve her national unification and attain full national independence, and regarding this great task, he has assured Dr. Sun Yat-Sen that China has the warmest sympathy of the Russian people and can count upon the support of Russia."

Then followed three paragraphs in which Dr. Sun Yat-Sen took note of the pledge made by M. Joffe in the name of the Russian Government promising to conclude new treaties with China on the basis of the renunciation of the the former Czarist privileges, and to settle the questions of the Chinese Eastern Railway and Outer Mongolia to the satisfaction of China.

COMMUNISM REPUDIATED.

The declaration of January 26th, 1923 is particularly important in that it defined China's stand *vis-à-vis* the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, a stand from which the National Government has never departed, that is to say, while repudiating the Communist order of society and the Soviet system of government as infeasible for China, it recognised the need of establishing friendly relations between these two countries, the concurrence of M. Joffe in the views expressed by Dr. Sun Yat-Sen being regarded as tantamount to a formal pledge by Soviet Russia to abstain from all Communist propaganda in China.

But the Joffe Mission was a practical failure in so far as the official recognition of the Soviet Government was concerned. Thus M. Karakhan was sent to China and took up a more decided attitude towards the Peking Government than his predecessor indicating that Russia was prepared to co-operate with China in all possible ways with a view to putting an end to the foreign encroachments and achieving the objects of her national aspirations.

Karakhan succeeded in securing the official recognition by China of the Soviet Government, a recognition, however, which was conditioned by Sun-Joffe Declaration of January 1923, confirmed in Article 6 by the "Agreement On General Principles for the Settlement of the Questions between the Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics" of May 31st, 1924, to the following effect:

"The Governments of the two Contracting Parties mutually pledge themselves not to permit within their respective territories the existence and/or activities of any organization or groups whose aim is to struggle by acts of violence against the Governments of either Contracting Party.

"The Governments of the two Contracting Parties further pledge themselves not to engage in propaganda directed against the political and social systems of either Contracting Party."

The liberal attitude adopted by Russia during the negotiations in renouncing her right to consular jurisdiction, a portion of her rights in the Chinese Eastern Railway, and the entire amount of her share of the Boxer Indemnity, and of other privileges, could not but produce a profound impression on China and won for her considerable popularity, even if what she actually renounced fell short of the promises of some of her earlier manifestoes.

In spite of all this, however, it had never been Dr. Sun's idea to rely exclusively on Russia for the realization of his national-revolutionary programme. For soon after his interview with Joffe, he made inquiries through his personal agents in various political and diplomatic quarters in order to find out whether he could not also rely on their sympathy and support. The answers were not particularly encouraging, and so there was no alternative but to accept the offer of assistance made by Moscow. It was then that Borodin and a number of other Russian advisers—both civil and military—came to Canton in the autumn of 1923 and undertook, under the direction of Dr. Sun, the internal reorganization of the Kuo-Ming Tang and the Cantonese army.

RUSSIAN INFLUENCE AT CANTON.

In view of the close association which at one time existed between Chinese and Russian political workers, it is worth while to look back a little in order to get a clearer understanding of the conditions in China at the time it was decided to accept Russian assistance. When the reorganisation of the Kuo-Min Tang was being considered by Sun Yat-Sen in 1923, the Chinese Republic, of which he was the Father, had already been in existence for over ten years. At the time of its establishment it had raised high hopes among the progressively-minded people of China. A new era of peace and prosperity was expected to follow the period of official corruption and national humiliation associated with the Manchu regime, which it supplanted. An objective survey of the situation, however, showed that the Republic was only a name, that China was ruled by militarists, some of whom were more rapacious and corrupt than the worst Manchu bureaucrat. Under the monarchy

there was at least some system of official responsibility; the Central Government, weak though it was, was effective and relatively stable. Ten years after the establishment of the Republic which was to give China a strong democratic government, the Central Government at Peking had become a shadow of its former self; its writ had no authority outside the massive and ancient walls of the city and often very little within; at frequent intervals there was no Cabinet, only a Minister being kept at the Foreign Office to act as the official letter-box of the foreign Powers in their dealings with China. On June 4, 1922, Wu Pei-Fu expelled Hsu Shih-Chang, and restored Li Yuan-Hung to the Peking Presidency, but on June 13, 1923, already Li in turn was expelled as a result of a dispute over the disposal of the receipts from the Peking Octroi. Parliament then openly sold itself to Wu, and elected his old chief, Tsao Kun, to the Presidency. The permanent Constitution, which had gone through its first reading in 1913, its second in 1917, and its third under Li's second Presidency, was promulgated on October 10, 1923, but at the time of its promulgation was already a dead letter and only of historical interest.

THE BEGINNINGS OF BANDITRY.

China was divided up into fiefs under the different war lords and super-tuchuns. In the North Wu Pei-Fu and Tsao Kun were predominant and besides Wu and Tsao there were Chang Tso-Lin in Manchuria and Lu Yung-Hsiang in Chekiang, both antagonistic to them. In the South, the provinces of Szechuan, Hunan, Yunnan and Kweichow had the reputation of being revolutionary provinces, but, in reality, were under the control of militarists who were as eager of military adventuring as their colleagues in the North. The situation in Kwangtung and Kwangsi was even worse than in the other provinces. Bandits and pirates had free play with the lives and properties of the populace. Commerce, industry, and education were stagnant. The whole system of national economy was in disorder; the suffering of the people was intense; the political and intellectual leaders were despondent as never before.

The mission of the Kuo-Min-Tang and of the Chinese Revolution as interpreted by Sun Yat-Sen was to achieve the fundamental reconstruction of China in its international, political and economic aspects, but everything seemed to be against it. There were the same internal troubles in the Party as in 1913. Many were members of the Party without an understanding or a belief in the principles the Party stood for. A great part of the members were old style intellectuals, officials, and militarists who bargained and negotiated with feudal lords and

politicians, and sought to get into a place of power on the basis of the reputation of Sun Yat-Sen, whom they made a habit of betraying. There was no unity of purpose, there was no concerted action. Too much stress had been laid by Sun Yat-Sen on military action, and too little on political propaganda. In spite of his manifest concern for the masses, Sun had little opportunity to consult or take them into his confidence. His forced affiliations with elements basically opposed to his ideals had resulted in compromises which were little conducive to his political standing in the country. Internal weaknesses manifested themselves on occasions, and rebellion on the part of some of his military subordinates, the most notorious of whom was Chen Chiung-Ming.

Added to the internal difficulties were foreign obstacles. Ever since the foundation of the Republic, the Powers and foreign agents in China had shown a hostile attitude towards the Chinese revolutionaries, and obstructed every move in the direction of the emancipation of the Chinese people. The revolutionaries' aim to re-establish the sovereignty of the people both in the internal and international sphere, was given an anti-foreign meaning. Every effort was made to strengthen the hands of reaction in China and to crush the forces working for the establishment of a genuine Republic. In 1913 Yuan Shih-Kai obtained an illegal loan of £25 millions on the eve of making war on the Kuo-Min Tang. Almost simultaneously Great Britain and Russia invaded Tibet and Mongolia. In 1915 Japan forced China to acquiesce in the Twenty-One Demands, with the subsequent sanction of the Powers. The independent provinces of China were forced to contribute to their Peking enemies by withholding, with an insignificant exception, their *pro rata* share in the Customs Surplus, which was under British control. An informal alliance was established between native militarism and foreign imperialism, both aiming at the permanent enslavement of the people of China. Sun Yat-Sen, who had always advocated co-operation with the Western Powers, and solicited their support in his struggle against the Peking militarists, at last began to realise that the fight of the Kuo-Min Tang should be two-fold, internally against militarism, and externally against imperialism. To liberate China it was necessary that both should be overthrown, and to achieve this aim a well-organised Party based on popular support was a first necessity.

THE RUSSIAN ORIENTATION

Another factor in hastening the reorganisation of the Party on a popular basis was Sun Yat-Sen's disappointment with the results of the Versailles Peace Conference, and his consequent relations with Soviet Russia, then an outcast in Europe. At the time of China's

entering the Great War on the side of the Allied Powers, Sun Yat-Sen was opposed to participation, and so sent a telegram to Lloyd George, begging him not to involve China in the war. His reason in advocating the maintenance of neutrality was that China could not possibly benefit from joining the Allies, in whatever way the War was settled. If Germany won the War, the position for China would be worse. If the Allies were victorious, China would be left in the same position as she was in 1917. Dr. Sun clearly saw that the Allies were only fighting for their own interests, and not for the cause of humanity as a whole; they would certainly put no pressure on Japan to cancel the Twenty-One Demands, nor consent to the abolition of extraterritoriality, or the restoration of tariff autonomy. He approved the resolution of the Special Parliament at Canton, declaring war on Germany, in order to present a united diplomatic front at the Versailles Conference, but much against his better judgment; he approved merely because he did not want to act unconstitutionally. And the result of the Versailles Conference, which went entirely against China, only proved the essential rightness of Sun's views.

Meanwhile, Sun Yat-Sen viewed with keen interest the experiments being carried out in Russia after the success of the Revolution in 1917. Early in 1918 he had sent, through many intermediaries, a congratulatory message to Lenin, expressing his sympathy with the struggle of the Russian people against Tsarist and Capitalist oppression. He had been informed that Lenin was giving his attention to the oppressed peoples of the East, and had the intention of presenting a united front with them against the Imperialist nations of the West. On September 27, 1920, Karahan declared, on behalf of the Soviet Government: "void of force all the treaties concluded with China by the former Government, renounced all seizures of Chinese territories, without compensation and for ever, all that had been predatorily seized from her by the Tsar's Government and the Russian bourgeoisie." In 1921 Lenin sent one of his secretaries to China, who first met Wu Pei-Fu in the North and then went South to see Sun Yat-Sen at Kweilin, who asked him many questions about the Russian Revolution and the New Economic Policy.

Lenin's representative had during his stay in China secretly organised the Chinese Communist Party, and on his return to Moscow recommended that the Third International enter into relations both with Sun Yat-Sen and Wu Pei-Fu. He reported that the only person he met in China who had principles and a programme was Dr. Sun, and the only effective Party the Kuo-Min Tang, while the man with the strongest military force was Wu, but Wu knew nothing about political prin-


ciples. Moscow accepted the report and made connections with both Sun and Wu, so as to secure protection for the Chinese Communist Party. On February 7, 1923, however, Wu massacred many of the workers who were participating in the strike on the Peking-Hankow Railway, which was organised by the Communist Party. For this reason Moscow broke with Wu, instructing the Communist Party to have relations with Sun only.

Many members of the Chinese Communist Party had by that time joined the Kuo-Min Tang, keeping their membership of the Communist Party secret. Li Tao-Chao, a professor of the Peking National University, was the first Communist who joined the Kuo-Min Tang as a Communist. Li met Sun at Shanghai just after Chen Chiung-Ming's rebellion. He was introduced by Chang Chi, who had also become a Professor at the Peking University. In the interview with Dr. Sun, Li said that he was a member of the Communist Party, but would like to join the Kuo-Min Tang on the basis of the Three People's Principles with the object of working for the National Revolution. He did not propose to give up his Communist membership, but promised to follow loyally Dr. Sun's instructions. Dr. Sun Yat-Sen agreed, and Li Ta-Chao's admission inaugurated the general policy of admitting Communists into the Kuo-Min Tang.


A RUSSO-CHINESE "ENTENTE".

In December, 1922, at Shanghai, Adolf Joffe, the Soviet Special Envoy, had an interview with Sun Yat-Sen, as a result of which (as already briefly mentioned) a joint manifesto was issued on January 26, 1923, which became the foundation of the Kuo-Min Tang-Soviet Entente. In this manifesto it was agreed that the Communistic order or even the Soviet System could not be introduced into China, and that China's most pressing problem was to achieve unification and attain full national independence. Regarding this great task Mr. Joffe assured Dr. Sun Yat-Sen that China had the warmest sympathy of the Russian people and could count on the support of Russia. The manifesto went on:—

"In order to clarify the situation, Dr. Sun Yat-Sen has requested Mr. Joffe for a reaffirmation of the principles defined in the Russian Note to the Chinese Government dated September 27, 1920. Mr. Joffe has accordingly reaffirmed these principles and categorically declared to Sun Yat-Sen that the Russian Government is ready and willing to enter into negotiations with China on the basis of the renunciation by Russia of all the treaties and exactions which the Tsardom imposed on China, including the treaty or treaties and agreements relating to



REFUGEES RETURNING UNDER MILITARY ESCORT.



WORTHLESS BANK-NOTES ISSUED BY THE COMMUNISTS.



AWAITING TRANSPORTATION TO RECOVERED AREAS.



TROOPS HALT ON THE ROAD FOR A MEAL.

the Chinese Eastern Railway (the management of which being the subject of a specific reference in Article 7 of the said Note).

"Recognising that the Chinese Eastern Railway questions can be satisfactorily settled only at a competent Russian-Chinese Conference, Dr. Sun Yat-Sen is of the opinion that the realities of the situation point to the desirability of a *modus vivendi* in the matter of the present management of the railway. And he agrees with M. Joffe that the existing railway management should be temporarily recognised, pending agreement between the Chinese and Russian Governments, without prejudice, however, to the true rights and special interests of either party. At the same time, Dr. Sun Yat-Sen considers that General Chang Tso-Lin should be consulted on the point.

"Mr. Joffe has categorically declared to Dr. Sun Yat-Sen (who has fully satisfied himself as to this) that it is not and never has been the intention of the present Russian Government to pursue an Imperialistic policy in Outer Mongolia or to cause it to secede from China. Dr. Sun Yat-Sen, therefore, does not view an immediate evacuation of Russian troops from Outer Mongolia as either imperative or in the real interest of China, the more so on account of the inability of the present Government at Peking to prevent such evacuation being followed by a recrudescence of intrigue and hostile activities by White Guardists against Russia and the creation of a graver situation than that which now exists."

COMMUNISM ADMITTED IMPRACTICAL FOR CHINA.

According to the Sun-Joffe manifesto, Russia pledged herself to assist the Kuo-Min Tang in its fight against Imperialism and in the accomplishment of the National Revolution, while undertaking not to make any propaganda in China for the Communist order of society, which it acknowledged to be impracticable in China. In a conversation with Liao Chung-Kai, who had at Sun's request accompanied Joffe to the hot-springs at Tennawuni, in Japan, to discuss in greater detail the Russian purpose, Joffe admitted that what was in operation in Russia was not Communism. Liao asked him whether Communism could be realised in Russia in ten years' time. Joffe said "No." "In twenty years?" "Perhaps" said Joffe. "Well," said Liao to Chen Kung-Po, a young student who was to play an important role in Chinese revolutionary politics some years later, "what is the use of dreaming about a Utopia which might or might not be realised, when we are all dead. Let us all be revolutionaries today, and work for the accomplishment of the National Revolution on the basis of the Three People's Principles. These we can realise within our lifetime. We must, however, unite

with all the revolutionary forces available, and agree on an immediate common aim, no matter what our ultimate ideals are."

In March, 1923, Liao returned to Canton to report to Sun on his conversations with Joffre. Dr. Sun became more and more convinced of the necessity of working hand in hand with Russia in the common struggle against Imperialism. He thus sent Chiang Kai-Shih on a mission to Moscow to study the situation on the spot. Chiang stayed in Russia for six months, during which time he had frequent interviews with Trotsky and Stalin, who explained to him the organisation of the Communist Party of Russia, of the Red Army System, of the political and economic system. Chiang reported favourably on the Russian system, and his report made the reorganisation of the Kuo-Min Tang inevitable, although Sun Yat-Sen's right and left hands, Wang Ching-Wei and Hu Han-Min, then at Shanghai, were still in ignorance of the impending developments.

BORODIN'S ARRIVAL AT CANTON.

In October, 1923, Borodin arrived at Canton with a letter of introduction from Karahan, the Soviet Ambassador at Peking. In this letter Karahan expressed his regret that diplomatic affairs prevented his meeting Sun personally, and recommended Borodin as his representative.

"You can trust Borodin as you may trust me," wrote Karahan. Borodin had a great and varied experience as an organiser; he had been Adviser to Kemal Pasha and had done valuable work in the Turkish struggle for independence. "I have come here to put myself at the disposal of the Chinese National Revolution. Your aim is to fight foreign Imperialism, which is also our aim. As to Communism, China is not in a position to discuss it as conditions are not suitable," he said to Sun Yat-Sen. Referring to the policy of Lenin and the Third International, Borodin said, "In the West, in Europe and America, one is justified in propagating the idea of Communism and in preaching the necessity of the class war. In the Orient, notably in China, however, our policy is to promote the National Revolution, and we have instructed the Chinese Communist Party to concentrate on this rather than on Communism. We have also considered the question whether the success of the Chinese National Revolution would mean the success of Chinese Communism and have come to the conclusion that, since the Kuo-Min Tang in its Third Principle of Livelihood is opposed to capitalism, the ultimate aims of the Kuo-Min Tang and the Third International are not in conflict. As to the methods to be

adopted, we must be careful to think out only those which are suitable to the social conditions of China."

THREE PEOPLE'S PRINCIPLES ACCEPTED.

On the subject of the Kuo-Min Tang, Borodin said that he was strongly in favour of the Three People's Principles, because they met the demands of the Chinese Revolution. "All revolutionaries in China, including members of the Communist Party, should strive to carry out these principles under the banner of the Kuo-Min Tang and under your direction. But," he added, "there are very serious shortcomings with the Kuo-Min Tang. In the first place, the Kuo-Min Tang organisation is very incomplete, and there is no discipline worth speaking of. Secondly, there are many impure elements in the Kuo-Min Tang, corrupt bureaucrats and adventurers. Then the Kuo-Min Tang lacks a popular basis in the form of the organisation of the masses. These things have all to be rectified before the Kuo-Min Tang can be an effective revolutionary weapon." Sun Yat-Sen concurred with Borodin's views, which were subsequently frequently repeated in his speeches, and, as already mentioned, appointed him adviser to the Kuo-Min Tang, with the special task of assisting Dr. Sun in its reorganisation.

The presence of these representatives of the Comintern and of the Soviet Government could not fail to produce a favourable effect on the Communist Movement in China. The principle of the individual acceptance, on the part of the Communists, of the Kuo-Min Tang ideology was now brought up for discussion during the First National Congress of the Kuo-Min Tang in January 1924, and favourably voted upon. That was the beginning of the period of toleration for Communism in China.

The Kuo-Min Tang tactic of not officially absorbing the Communists as a Party had, however, the disadvantage of allowing the Communist Party with its various committees and groups to subsist as independent organs separate from, and outside the control of, the Kuo-Min Tang, as will be seen later led to an impossible situation which eventually culminated in a complete rupture between the Kuo-Min Tang and the Communists.

CHAPTER III

THE PERIOD OF TOLERATION (1924-27)

At the time of the admittance of the Communists into the Kuo-Min Tang, the Communist Party had only about two thousand members, while the Red Trade Unions only some sixty thousand members, which indicated that the movement was then confined only to the intellectuals and the labourers, and had not yet penetrated the countryside. Supported by the Russian advisers, at the instructions of the Comintern, however, the Communists under the leadership of Chen Tu-Hsiu now proceeded to establish their supremacy in the ranks of the Kuo-Min Tang. Their plan was (a) to win over to the Communist doctrine the largest possible number of Kuo-Min Tang members, (b) to weaken the Kuo-Min Tang by carefully cultivating doubt as regards the efficacy of its doctrines, and by provoking conflicts among its members, (c) to work especially among the lower ranks of the Kuo-Min Tang so as to capture control of the Central Committees.

Starting from their original centres at Shanghai and Canton, the Communists had now extended their propaganda to the whole country, forming numerous local groups everywhere. China was divided up into three regions, central, north and south China. The central group was composed of six sub-divisions; the north, four; and the south, six. They were, however, no homogeneous Party, but consisted of various cliques and groups. There was the group of the Old Comrades, directed by Chen Tu-Hsiu and Chang Kuo-Tao, the group of French returned comrades under Li Li-Shan and Chang Pei-Keng, the group of Russian returned comrades, etc. Others were purely local such as the Chekiang and Hunan-Hupeh groups. Still others corresponded to affinities of ideas, of classes or of professions—the group of extremists, of trade unionists, of militarists, of farmers, and of officials.

Regional organization remained very loose and the groups themselves could not agree either upon a common programme or upon a method to be followed. They were divided and quarrelled on many questions as regards principles and personnel. Nevertheless certain groups exerted considerable influence, as, for instance, the extremists of the south, whose leader, Chang Yi-Mien, Secretary-General

of the Kwangtung and Kwangsi regions, was supported by the all-powerful Borodin.¹

CURBING COMMUNIST INFLUENCE.

The importance the Communists had attained in the councils of the Government and their energetic attempts to propagate their ideas and develop their own separate organization did not take long to cause uneasiness in the ranks of the Kuo-Min Tang. Thus at the Second National Congress of the Party, held in January 1926 at Canton, it was decided to limit—in conformity with the ruling of Dr. Sun Yat-Sen to the effect that the Communists could be admitted into the Party only as auxiliaries and not as principals, since the Party was socialistic and not Communist—the maximum number of Communist members, in the committees and councils to one-third of the total figure.

As a counter-measure, the Communist International of Moscow, through its representatives in the Kuo-Min Tang, thus proposed towards the end of 1926: (a) that the nationalization of land should be effected by a general law and not in virtue of decrees issued for each individual case specifically, (b) to reorganize the Kuo-Min Tang on a new basis—a report by Tan Ping-Shan had informed the Comintern that the strong organization of the Kuo-Min Tang hardly left any liberty of action to the Communists, (c) to dismiss military leaders hostile to Communism, (d) to specially arm 20,000 Communists and 50,000 workers and farmers, (e) to refrain from nationalizing the land belonging to workers, farmers, and soldiers.

They had no success, however, for the demands of the International were for the greater part so repugnant to the principles of the Kuo-Min Tang as to stand no chance of adoption whatsoever.

In the meantime, the Kuo-Min Tang campaign against the Northern militarists was being prepared. The Communists however did what they could to delay it, feeling as they did that the success of the enterprise would consolidate the already powerful position of the Kuo-Min Tang and make impossible their future capture of power. But with the expedition already in full swing, they could only attempt to sabotage it. When the National-Revolutionary Army arrived at the Yangtse Valley, occupied Hankow, Wuchang and Hanyang, and marched towards the east for the occupation of Shanghai, to effect a junction with the other revolutionary forces coming directly from the

¹The documents seized by the British Government in the search effected in the office of the commercial representative of the Soviet Union at London (Arcos House) and published, in translation, on May 26th, 1927, in the White Paper do not leave any doubt as to the fact that Borodin was a regular agent of the Soviet Government to which he was responsible for all his actions.

south, the Communists at Canton insisted that it "should not advance too rapidly," and that it "should slow down its too rapid progress." They went as far as to suspend the work in the arsenal at Canton in order to create a crisis by a shortage of munitions. When, however, the seat of the National Government was eventually established at Wuhan, they came in great numbers for the purpose of exercising a dominating influence over the new regime. On the other hand, General Chiang Kai-Shih, Commander-in-Chief of the revolutionary armies in the field, and some other personalities whom the Communists had been in the habit of defying, left Wuhan for Nanchang from where they led the operations which soon ended in the capture of Nanking and the Shanghai region.

In order not to compromise the success of that campaign, however, the Kuo-Min Tang leaders were obliged to leave a sufficient amount of freedom of action to the Communist leaders of Hunan and Hupeh, the majority of whom took advantage of the situation and adopted a series of measures of a purely Communist character, contrary to the programme of Dr. Sun. The National Revolution threatened to degenerate into a kind of Sovietism with all its attendant excesses.

How far the Communists, however, were able to make use of their opportunities could be seen from the increase of the membership of the Communist Party, which in the early days of 1927 was said to have amounted to 90,000. In addition, there was the Party of Communist Youths with over 60,000 members, the "Red" trade-unionists with 3,000,000 members, and the "Red" farmer's unions with 10,000,000 members.

COMMUNIST SEIZURES OF LAND.

The remarkable spread of Communist influence among the farming population calls for a few words of explanation, in order that past and present conditions in the country districts may be more clearly understood. In the Political Council the Communist members had proposed formally to adopt the policy of confiscation of farm lands, and to put this plan into practice, as an experiment, in Hunan first. Owing to Mr. Wang Ching-Wei's vehement objections these proposals were turned down by the majority of the members. They had already given out in the countryside such slogans as "Down with the Landlords," "All land-owners are rowdies and all gentry are criminals," and had instigated bands of vagabonds and vagrants to seize any land they could get hold of, erroneously calling their policy "Give Land to the Cultivators." In order to understand the agrarian problem in China, an analysis of the social groupings in the countryside is necessary. As elsewhere, the

rural population in China consists, briefly speaking, of landlords, farmers, and vagrants without any occupation. Owing to the peculiar character of the Chinese family system, both the very rich and the very poor are to be found in one family, the rich members being landlords and the poor leading a vagrant life. There is an obligation on the part of the richer members of the family to support their poorer brothers, who, however, only get a bare livelihood. It is these poor brethren of the landlords who mainly compose the class of the vagabonds, but having much the same ideas and outlook as their richer brothers. The Communist agrarian policy, however, works solely in the interests of these vagabonds, not of the peasant-cultivators, the farmers, for the latter are on the whole unable to read or to understand the meaning of the Communist agitation. The vagabonds, on the other hand, are more literate, being gentry-to-be, and to them the policy of land-seizure had a special appeal. Not so to the majority of *bona fide* farmers, who cannot gain anything by it, but who are bound to suffer on account of the disorganisation of the whole system.

Mr. Wang Ching-Wei at once realised that the policy of land-seizure was a dangerous thing to play with, since from the gentry of Hunan and Hupeh the majority of the subaltern officers of the Second, Sixth, and Eighth armies (those under Tan Yen-Kai, Cheng Chien and Tang Sheng-Chih) were drawn. "Direct action" in the economic sphere had been ruled out by Sun Yat-Sen and the National Congresses of the Kuo-Min Tang, who, instead, prescribed definite political and legislative methods in the provision of land for the poorer peasantry. One of the first questions Mr. Wang asked Borodin on his arrival in Canton was, therefore, "Since your proposals relating to the policy of confiscation had never been brought before the First and Second National Congresses, on what grounds do you justify this policy of land-seizure in Hunan?" Borodin denied that he was responsible for the movement, but mentioned his colleague M. N. Roy, an Indian Communist, as the instigator of all the troubles, stating that Roy had the complete confidence of Stalin, even more so than himself. Tan Ping-Shan, the Communist member of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuo-Min Tang, expressed the same opinion, although, strangely enough, it was he who was responsible for bringing Roy over from Moscow. Mr. Wang then asked Borodin what he proposed to do about it. Borodin could only answer to the effect that the only way was to modify the movement. This, however, was utterly useless advice, for already on May 21, 1927, riots had broken out among the Wuhan forces at Changsha, the capital of Hunan, as a result of the unauthorised policy of

land-seizure of the Communists, working through the Provincial Kuo-Min Tang and Provincial Government. The insurrection of military forces, which Mr. Wang had foreseen, had now occurred. While Mr. Wang, in the Political Council, held that the Wuhan officers should be held responsible for tolerating the revolt against the Provincial Government, he also held that those who were responsible for the policy of confiscation should be equally taken to task. He opposed the proposal of Borodin and the Communists that the Central Executive Committee should order an attack on the revolting army and the punishment of the guilty officers, on the ground that they had been acting under grave provocation. Instead, Tang Sheng-Chih was sent to Changsha to investigate the affair and restore peace.

ATTACKS ON FOREIGNERS.

In the matter of relations with the foreigners the Communists in Hunan had also started to make trouble. Foreigners were openly molested and their properties endangered, and in this the Communists and vagabonds were encouraged by the Hunan Provincial authorities, who were going beyond their authority. Mr. Wang took the matter to the Political Council, and as a result an instruction on foreign affairs was issued, to the effect that local authorities should realise that the Kuo-Min Tang was anti-Imperialist, but not anti-foreign, and that therefore the lives and properties of foreigners should be safeguarded, and that under no circumstances should foreigners be attacked without provocation.



TINY BABIES BROUGHT INTO SAFETY.



FEEDING THE CHILDREN OF REFUGEES.



ORPHANS OF BANDIT VICTIMS BEING FED.



RETURN OF TROOPS AFTER RAID ON COMMUNISTS.

CHAPTER IV

THE PERIOD OF PROSCRIPTION (1927-34).

Communist intrigues were now becoming so numerous and extensive that it became increasingly evident that drastic action would have to be taken at the earliest opportunity. Having established its authority firmly in the Yangtse Valley, the National Government decided to put an end to the conspiracies which threatened to undermine its authority and neutralise the results of a successful military campaign. There was ample evidence that the Communists admitted into the Party were not observing Kuo-Min Tang discipline, and were insisting that their doctrines should dominate the Government. It was equally clear that, in spite of formal engagements made by Joffe and assurances from Moscow, the Russian advisers (who had in other respects rendered useful service) were working under the direction of the Comintern for the organization of a strong Communist Party within the ranks of the Kuo-Min Tang which would one day serve as the framework of a Soviet Government.

Members of the Kuo-Min Tang also realized the grave danger of the spreading of Communist ideas in China. In April, 1927, a veteran member, Mr. Wu Tze-Hui, addressed to the Central Executive Committee a petition in which he vigorously denounced the Communist Party along with its Russian advisers and the Committees of Wuhan. His action was supported by 119 similar petitions from various associations in Shanghai, and at an extraordinary meeting of the Central Executive Committee the decision to expel the Communists was reached.

This decision was soon put into execution. A new Government was established at Nanking on April 18th, 1927, and a proclamation was immediately issued condemning Communism and ordering the immediate "purification" of the Army and the Civil Service. A series of manifestoes on the subject were addressed to the workers, the Revolutionary Army, the people, and members of the Kuo-Min Tang. The following extracts from the manifesto addressed to the people show very clearly the position of the Government at Nanking and the continuity of its views:

"1. The Revolutionary Party wishes to emancipate the Chinese people as a whole, that is to say, all classes, including farmers, workers, merchants and soldiers. It does not wish that any one class should

dominate the others, and particularly it does not desire a dictatorship of the proletariat.

"2. The Revolutionary Party wishes to assure every Chinese of entire liberty of thought and action. It will not, therefore, admit a super-Government under Borodin. It only admits a Government of a liberated China enjoying full measure of freedom.

"3. The Revolutionary Party wishes to ensure the welfare and progress of the entire nation. It cannot, therefore, allow 390 millions of Chinese citizens to be treated at will by 10 million Communists (supposing there are as many). Dr. Sun admitted the Communists into the Party as collaborators and the Russians as friends. If the Communists wish to dominate us and the Russians desire to ill-treat us, that means the end of their activity."

On July 15th a majority of the members of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuo-Min Tang, who had remained at Wuhan, passed a resolution expelling from the Party all Communists, and sending Borodin with the other Russian advisers back to Russia. A number of notorious Communists were arrested. The Kuo-Min Tang found itself again in agreement, which soon brought about a union of the elements remaining at Wuhan with those at Nanking and the National Government was thus definitely established at Nanking. The story of the events which led to the definite rupture between the Kuo-Min Tang and the Communist Party is of such interest and importance that it is worth telling in some detail.

The anti-Communist riots at Changsha in Hunan on May 21, 1927, indicated that the time had arrived for the Kuo-Min Tang and the Communist Party to separate. It became increasingly clear that Joffe's declaration of January 26, 1923, and Li Ta-Chao's undertaking at the First National Congress, had come to be regarded by the Communists as obsolete. The aim of the Kuo-Min Tang was to lead the National Revolution to the goal of the Three People's Principles. This was accepted by the Communists as a basis for co-operation, and in so doing they definitely made themselves subordinate to the Kuo-Min Tang, and recognised thereby the sole right of the latter to govern China. This would in due course result either in the transformation of the Communist Party into a section of the Kuo-Min Tang, which was Sun Yat-Sen's aim, or in its extermination as a political force. Events however showed that the Communists had changed their mind. They now wanted to lead the National Revolution to the goal of Communism, and either transform the Kuo-Min Tang into the Communist Party or destroy it as a governing Party. On Mr. Wang's arrival at Wuhan on April 10, the Communist slogan was, "Welcome Wang to overthrow Chiang." Since April 19, the date of the inauguration of the Expedition

against Chang Tso-Lin, however, there were no more cries of welcome, but all kinds of intrigues to destroy the authority of Mr. Wang and the Kuo-Min Tang. After the Changsha riots, the Communists began to attack Wang and the Kuo-Min Tang openly.

STALIN'S INSTRUCTIONS.

Relations between members of the National Government and Borodin became strained, for his position since the Changsha riots had become merely that of an honoured guest, no longer that of a trusted adviser. On June 1, 1927, M. N. Roy, the other representative of the Communist International, invited Mr. Wang to meet him for an important conversation. The former went to Roy's flat, and there Roy told him, "There is a telegram from Stalin addressed to Borodin and me. Has Borodin shown it to you?" Mr. Wang said, "No." Roy continued, "Borodin does not like to show you this telegram, which is a secret resolution by the Moscow Bureau. I, on the other hand, think that it is most advisable that you should know what it is about, as I am quite sure that you would approve of it. Here it is; have a look at it." Roy then handed to Mr. Wang the original Russian text and its Chinese translation. In this telegram Stalin instructed the Chinese Communist Party, through Borodin and Roy, to push forward the policy of land-seizure all over the Wuhan territories, and, while leaving the possessions of the Wuhan officers and soldiers alone, so as not to arouse their opposition, on no condition to give way to the Kuo-Min Tang on the agrarian question. They should further aim at reconstructing the Central Executive Committee of the Kuo-Min Tang and its different organs, with a view to increasing the proportion of reliable, (*i.e.* Communist) labour and peasant leaders on these bodies. The Communist Party should also build up a regular army, 20,000 men strong, and consisting only of Communists, besides choosing 50,000 peasants and labourers to form peasant and workers' detachments, to be used against the loyal Kuo-Min Tang forces. They were further to put pressure on the Kuo-Min Tang leaders to organise revolutionary courts for the sole purpose of dealing with the anti-Communist officers.

Mr. Wang, of course, was astonished on learning Stalin's new attitude towards the Kuo-Min Tang, although the telegram went far to explain the change which had come about in the relationship between the Communists and the Kuo-Min Tang. Mr. Wang at once told Roy that on no account could the Kuo-Min Tang accept the conditions contained in the resolution. They argued about it for some time, but without any result. About to leave, Mr. Wang asked Roy whether he would let him have a copy of the translation. Roy hesitated a

moment and then said, "Yes, I will send you a copy of it tomorrow, as there are one or two verbal alterations to be made." Mr. Wang received the promised copy next day, and Roy remarked to him:—"I am glad that I have shown you the telegram, which you can take as an ultimatum. If you accept the tenor of the telegram and grant facilities for its execution, the Communist International will continue to co-operate with you. If not, it will have nothing to do with the Kuo-Min Tang." Mr. Wang replied:—"The conditions for co-operation between the Kuo-Min Tang and the Third International laid down by Joffe and Borodin in 1923 were entirely different from those presented in your ultimatum. It is not for us to refuse your conditions, for it is you who had violated the agreement." Roy then made a statement to the effect that he did not agree with the old conditions and with the policy of Borodin, whereupon Mr. Wang said he was not interested in the new conditions. "We only care for the conditions we have agreed on before."

For handling over the telegram to Mr. Wang, Roy was severely taken to task by Borodin, who was thereby put in a still more difficult position *vis-à-vis* the Kuo-Min Tang leaders. Borodin at once cabled to Stalin and requested him to withdraw Roy. The latter's idea was that the so-called Left Wing, the then dominant group of the Kuo-Min Tang could only survive when in alliance with the Communists, as otherwise they would be crushed by the Right. They should, therefore, be informed of Stalin's cable. Borodin, however, realised that the Kuo-Min Tang was much stronger than Roy thought, and knew that if they saw the resolution they would at once sever their relations with the Communists. He had, therefore, suppressed the resolution, and was naturally annoyed when he learnt about Roy's recklessness in making it known to Mr. Wang. A majority of the Chinese Communists sided with Borodin, being also of the opinion that the time for overt action had not come yet, and they drove Roy back to Russia.

PREPARATIONS FOR EXPULSION

On June 4, Mr. Wang went to Chengchow with the other members of the Presidium of the Government Council, for the purpose of informing the more important military commanders about the contemplated *coup d'état* of the Communist Party, ordering their immediate return to Wuhan and instructing them to disarm the Communists in their armies.

On their return to Wuhan on June 13, they at once got to work, preparing for the immediate expulsion of the Communists from the Kuo-Min Tang. The question of separation from the Communists was a

complicated one, owing to differences of opinion existing among the Kuo-Min Tang members of the Central Executive Committee. Some, like Madame Sun, while opposed to Communist dominance of the Kuo-Min Tang and favouring ultimate termination of the Communist alliance, held that the moment for actual separation had not arrived yet, since military operations were still in progress. In Mr. Wang's opinion, however, they were under-estimating the strength of the Communists; not only in the labour and peasant movements, but also among the troops, especially in the Fourth Army under Chang Fa-Kuei, they possessed considerable influence. If the Kuo-Min Tang waited for their expulsion until the military question was settled—which would mean renewed laurels for the Communist soldiers—the Communists would become so entrenched in the National-Revolutionary Army that it would be impossible to expel them without courting defeat. Mr. Wang's opinion was supported by the majority, and after a series of secret meetings in Mr. Wang's residence lasting for some ten days, the decision was finally taken to take immediate measures for the expulsion of the Communists. The decision of the Presidium was kept secret for the time being, and not formally communicated to the Political Council.

COMMUNIST CONSPIRACY REVEALED.

Tang Sheng-Chih had on his return to Wuhan immediately gone to Hunan in order to investigate the anti-Communist riots in Changsha. He was Chairman of the Hunan Provincial Government, and technically responsible for the affairs of the province. The result of his investigations confirmed the existence of a Communist conspiracy against the Kuo-Min Tang. He found that the revolting officers had been acting under grave provocation, and advised the immediate expulsion of the Communists from the Party. Being informed of the secret decision of the Presidium, he at once dismissed all the officers under his immediate command who were known to have Communist affiliations. There were not very many of them, as his policy had always been to reserve all the important posts in his army for pure Kuo-Min Tang members. The expulsion of Communists from Chang Fa-Kuei's armies was more difficult. Chang was a first-class Commander, loyal to the Party and outspoken in nature, but he had little political sense, which made it easy for the Communists to penetrate his armies. Chang's army group consisted of three armies. The Commander of the Fourth Army was Huang Chi-Hsiang; of the Eleventh, Chu Hua-Yeh; of the Twentieth, Ho Lung. Ho Lung had some time previously secretly joined the Communist Party, but Chang was ignorant of the fact.

One of the divisional Generals of the Eleventh army was also a Communist, Yeh Ting, and so were many of the subordinate officers, with the result that Chang's army group had become a Communist stronghold. This situation was brought about by Teng Yen-Ta, a deputy member of the Central Executive Committee, who had been a member of the staff of the Whangpoa Military Academy in 1924. In 1925 he went to Germany for the purpose of study. When in 1926 he returned to Canton, he was made Educational Director of the Academy and Chief of the Political Training Department. In March, 1927, he became a member of the Presidium of the Military Council, and concurrently President of the Wuhan Military Academy. Teng Yen-Ta was officially a member of the Kuo-Min Tang, but followed the precepts, and accepted the policies, of the Communist Party. Chang Fa-Kuei put great trust in Teng Yen-Ta, and had accepted all his nominees for the different vacancies. These nominees were mostly Teng's Communist friends. When the secret decision at the unofficial meeting to expel the Communists was taken, Teng immediately resigned his posts, closed the Wuhan Military Academy, and went to Moscow, but his nominees in Chang Fa-Kuei's army groups remained, and as there were so many of them, it was impossible for Chang to expel them wholesale without provoking a rebellion.

FORMAL DECREE AGAINST THE COMMUNIST PARTY.

On July 15, 1927, after about a full month of preparation, Mr. Wang formally proposed in the Political Council the expulsion of the Communists from the Kuo-Min Tang. This meeting was not attended by the Communist members, and those Kuo-Min Tang members who disagreed with the secret decision also stayed away. A quorum was nevertheless obtained, and Mr. Wang's motion was carried unanimously. At this meeting Borodin's resignation, which had been sent in several weeks before, was accepted. Borodin had wanted to resign earlier, as his position had been made impossible by the open attacks by the Communists on the Kuo-Min Tang, but his wife was being detained by Chang Chung-Chang's men, and as his departure under those circumstances might induce Chang Chung-Chang to play with her life, he had been asked to remain at his post for the time being. On July 12 Madame Borodin was released, and Borodin was, therefore, also allowed to depart.

Regarding the Communist Party, the Central Executive Committee proposed to recognise it as a political, as distinct from a governing, Party, with its individual members fully enjoying the rights of citizen-

ship, provided they did not interfere with the affairs of the Kuo-Min Tang.

Borodin left Hankow with full honours. He first went to Lushan, in Kiangsi, for a vacation, although afterwards it was found that he had secret conferences with the Communists there, who were preparing for an insurrection. Borodin then returned to Wuhan and on July 27 took the Hankow-Peking Railway to Loyang, where he stayed for three days as Feng Yu-Hsiang's guest, and then through Mongolia proceeded to Russia.

The intention of the Central Executive Committee to grant full protection to Communists as citizens proved, however, impracticable, for they continued their attacks on the Kuo-Min Tang. On the 16th July documents were found, dated July 13, to the effect that the Central Commission of the Chinese Communist Party had decided to withdraw their members from the National Government, but to instruct Communists not to resign from the Kuo-Min Tang. They were to establish their own secret nuclei in the Kuo-Min Tang, and utilise every opportunity to incite disorders to discredit and destroy that Party. Circulars found on July 20 issued by the Young Communist League were to the same effect, only the language used was more violent. Mr. Wang thereupon wrote an article on July 21, declaring that the Kuo-Min Tang was being attacked from two sides, by corrupt reactionaries and by Communists, who, henceforth, had thus to be regarded as the twin enemies of the National Revolution.

TERRORISM IN KIANGSI.

The dismissal of Communist members from their positions in the Government and the Army proceeded at full speed, for the Central Executive Committee realised that the Kuo-Min Tang armies were being in danger of being utilised as tools by the Communists. Those who for some reason had not yet been dismissed were closely watched. Suddenly, however, the Twentieth Army, under Ho Lung, and Yeh Ting's Division of the Eleventh Army withdrew to Nanchang, in Kiangsi, and on July 30 declared their independence in the name of a Revolutionary Committee. The Communists then started a reign of terror, looting the banks and exchange-shops, and setting whole sections of the town on fire. They only stopped their depredations when Chu Pei-Teh arrived with his army and defeated them. Chang Fa-Kuei, who was technically responsible for Ho Lung and Yeh Ting, felt very guilty about the affair, as he had been delaying the expulsion of the Communists from his armies. He therefore sent all his available troops to Nanchang to crush Ho Lung and Yeh Ting, and pursued them into

Kwangtung. Mr. Wang, who was at that time in Kiukiang, at once returned to Wuhan and proposed that the Political Council adopt most drastic measures against the Communist Party, making it an illegal organisation. The revolt was suppressed about August 5. He then proposed in the Central Executive Committee his own impeachment for having neglected taking appropriate measures against the Communists before it was too late, for although only a member of the Presidium, Mr. Wang felt he was really personally responsible for the whole affair, as force of circumstances had made him the sole *de facto* leader in Wuhan. No notice was taken of his self-condemnation, but the Central Executive Committee proceeded to adopt measures which changed the policy of peaceful separation with the Communist Party into a policy of repression, in defence of their very existence.


CURIOUS COMMUNIST REACTION.

It was curious, however, that the Communists thus expelled did not wish to admit that they had ceased to be members of the Kuo-Min Tang. At the 8th Plenary Conference of the Executive Committee of the Comintern, which lasted from May 19th to 30th, 1927, the following resolution was adopted:

"The Executive Committee is of opinion that the policy of uniting the Chinese Communist Party with the Chinese national bourgeoisie is a proper step to take. The independence of the Communist Party cannot be attained by being isolated from the non-proletarian working classes, particularly the farming class. Consequently, the Executive Committee resolutely rejects the idea of separation of the Chinese Communist Party from the Kuo-Min Tang, or any policy which calculates to establish that eventuality."¹

Consequently, on July 13th, 1927, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party issued a manifesto declaring it had withdrawn its representatives from the National Government, but would continue to collaborate with the truly revolutionary elements of the Kuo-Min Tang. The May 1927 resolution was confirmed and amplified by the Executive Committee of the Comintern in a document dated July 14th, in which the Government of Wuhan was denounced for having, in spite of reiterated advice of the Comintern, betrayed the cause of the agrarian revolution and "sabotaged" the campaign against the Govern-

¹In a very curious letter written from Prinkipo, February 9th, 1931, and published by the *Nouvelle Revue Française*, April 1st, L. Trotsky, speaking of the action of Borodin and of the Russian advisers of Canton, reproaches the leaders of Moscow of having "hanged" the revolution of the Chinese proletariat in compelling them to come to terms with the bourgeoisie of the Kuo-Min Tang.



PREPARING NEW AERODROME AT NANCHANG.



TROOPS AT PEASANTS' DEMONSTRATION.



COMFORTS FOR THE TROOPS.



GOVERNMENT TROOPS RETURNING FROM THE FRONT.

ment at Nanking, represented as the great enemy of Chinese Communism.¹

SUBORNING CHINESE TROOPS.

The official separation of the two parties took place only after the *coup d'état* of Canton and the rupture of relations between the National Government and the U.S.S.R. in December, 1927 (which will be referred to presently), and friction between the Communists and their former allies who were now adversaries, soon broke out. The influence exerted by Borodin and the Communist elements during the days of their ascendancy had unfortunately left their traces on the army. As it was the troops upon whom the Comintern relied for the realization of its policy, it took special care to influence the army, so that many units were won over to Soviet doctrines, these units consisting of doubtful elements in different parts of the country which it was impossible to disband owing to lack of funds.

The Communist International quickly saw and seized opportunity of utilizing the army in order to create difficulties for a Government which had openly declared itself against Communism. Agents were secretly sent to China to establish relations with Li Li-Shan, Chu En-Lai, Chang Kuo-Tao, etc. who constituted themselves into a Provisional Central Political Bureau, and immediately decided to start direct action against the Government and co-ordinate the strength of the Red elements among the army.

The "doubtful" elements referred to above had been kept at the rear during the march from Canton to the Yangtse, and their leaders were concentrated in Kiangsi between Kiukiang and Nanchang. In the latter city also were the troops of General Yeh Ting, infected with Communist ideas, and the 20th Army, with ideas equally radical, commanded by General Ho Lung. On July 30th, 1927, these troops revolted together with those of Chu Teh, summoned to the assistance of the "doubtful" elements. The mutineers usurped the powers of the provincial government, and plundered and killed the innocent peasantry. Their leaders, with the representatives of the Communist groups of other provinces, then proceeded to hold a kind of plenary conference and attempted to arrive at a general plan of action; but before they could reach a decision the Government forces surprised and dispersed them, and they were obliged to flee southwards. From the region east of Kwangtung, they attempted a march upon Swatow in the hope

¹An English translation of the document is found in the appendix of Yakhontoff's book, *Russia and the Soviet Union in the Far East*, New York, 1931, p. 410.

of securing an outlet to the sea where they would be able to receive aid from the Comintern, but this move was checked.

About this time the Communists began attempting the establishment of local Soviet Governments in different parts of the country. They cast eyes first on Canton, where they counted upon the support of the working class. They formed Soviet groups at Haifong and Lofong,¹ and convened at Haifong on November 7th, 1927 the first "Congress of Soviet Workers, Farmers, Soldiers and Urban Proletarians." This Congress decided upon the creation of a "Soviet Government of Haifong" which was soon established with the support of the Communist groups of Canton and of Hassis, U.S.S.R. Consul in that city.

CANTON SEIZED BY COMMUNISTS.

An organization under the direction of Hassis, with Heinz Neumann, delegate of the Comintern and member of the German Communist Party, and a member of the Chinese Communist Party, Huang Ping, previously Secretary-General of the Pan-Chinese Trade Unionist Federation, prepared an insurrection which broke out on December 11th, and made them masters of the city of Canton within a few hours. A Soviet Government was at once established and for three days Canton went through an orgy of massacre and plunder until the approach of the Government troops compelled the forces of disorder to make precipitate retreat. The city was reoccupied by the regular forces on December 13th, but this brief insurrection had claimed 15,000 victims and inflicted upon the population material losses estimated at more than 50 million dollars. The Russian Consul Hassis was killed during the fighting, and authenticated documents were found on the spot showing the part taken in the affair by the official agents of the Soviet Government. A decree was promptly issued by the National Government on December 14th cancelling the *exequaturs* of all Russian Consuls throughout the country.²

The Canton incident was of so serious a nature that it will be found of interest to explain some of its political ramifications, as an effort

¹These Soviets, directed by Feng Pai, have acquired notoriety through the atrocities inflicted upon the population of that region.

²The Government at Peking also complained of Russian interference in the internal affairs of China, forbidden by the declaration of May 31st, 1924, referred to above. A search conducted in localities adjacent to the Russian Embassy at Peking on April 6th, 1927 resulted in the discovery of documents irrefutably establishing proof of aid in money and munitions given by the Government of the Soviets to certain Chinese political parties, whereupon the Soviet Government by way of protest recalled the entire staff of the Embassy at Peking, leaving in China only Consular Agents.

was made to make certain leaders of the Kuo-Min Tang not only responsible for that disastrous affair, but to accuse them of direct participation in the plot organised by the Communists in Canton. Rumours had been rife in Shanghai, that Chang Fa-Kuei and Chen Kung-Po, the civilian head of Kwangtung, had turned Communist. These rumours did not affect the public greatly, but what Mr. Wang was concerned about was that in order to meet the three-cornered attack of the Kwangsi group, Chang Fa-Kuei had left Canton unguarded, thus giving rise to a situation which would certainly be utilised by the Canton Communists to effect a *coup d'état*. On November 7 the Russian Consul at Canton had, from the Consular motor-car, distributed handbills carrying the inscription, "Down with the Kuo-Min Tang." Arrested by the authorities, he pleaded diplomatic immunity, and was released. Advices continued to reach Mr. Wang from Canton that the Russians and the Chinese Communists there were carrying on open propaganda. In order to meet the situation, Mr. Wang asked members of the Central Committees to his residence, and they decided to instruct Mr. Wang's wife, Chen Pi-Chun, to go to Canton for the purpose of seeing Chang Fa-Kuei and Chen Kung-Po, and advising them to pay special attention to the activities of the Communists. In due course Chen Pi-Chun met the commander of the Eleventh Army and the chief of the Canton Police, and from the latter gathered that the Communists were utilising every means to make connections with the army, with a view to carrying out an armed insurrection. As they used the Russian Consulate as their headquarters, it was not possible to effect their arrest. She then conveyed Mr. Wang's warning to Chang Fa-Kuei and Chen Kung-Po, and returned to Shanghai to report. Meanwhile, Mr. Wang had received information that Russian Consular officers, taking advantage of their diplomatic privileges, had been smuggling arms into the Consulate, using for that purpose British steamers and the Consular motor-boat. Mr. Wang ordered an immediate search of the Russian Consulate and the arrest of all Communist leaders at Canton. In the telegram which he sent to Chang Fa-Kuei and Chen Kung-Po he also expressed the opinion that Huang Chi-Hsiang, commander of the Fourth Army, had been very careless in allowing the Communists to penetrate into Canton, and called for an investigation into his case and, if necessary, also his punishment.

On December 10, Chiang Kai-Shih proposed the severance of diplomatic relations with Russia on the ground that the Russian Consulates had ceased to be what they purported to be, but had become Communist centres of intrigue. Mr. Wang had already ordered a search

of the Canton Russian Consulate, and was waiting for a report, but consented to take immediate action regarding severance of relations as a precautionary measure against eventual Communist outrages.

While Chang Fa-Kuei and Chen Kung-Po were discussing at Canton how to give effect to Mr. Wang's telegram, and to find ways and means of searching the Russian Consulate, came the Canton insurrection of December 11. News of the impending arrest of the Communists had leaked out, and in order to avoid arrest they decided to act at once, instead of waiting till December 15, as originally planned. They had at their disposal only one regiment of 1,000 men, a specially trained regiment in Huang Chi-Hsiang's army. On the second day the Communists were reinforced by an army of some 800 bandits, who, however, stayed in Canton only for eight hours, during which time they plundered the banks and exchange-shops, and left Canton after taking what they wanted. Their leader, Yuen Hsia-Cho, was a notorious bandit. The Communists also armed the rickshaw men, released the prison inmates, whom they provided with arms, and also imported into Canton other bandit bands, which they described as peasant regiments.

As Chang Fa-Kuei's main troops were in the West and South on military duty, the Communists soon secured control of Canton. Chang Fa-Kuei and Chen Kung-Po retreated to Honam Island, where Li Fu-Lin put his troops at their disposal, meanwhile patrolling Canton River with gunboats. Orders were immediately given to the troops in the South and the West to attack Canton, and serious fighting took place on the 12th and 13th. On December 14th Canton city was recaptured from the Communists and bandits, many of whom were arrested and executed on the spot. Fires had meanwhile been started at ten different points by the rebels, and whole streets were destroyed. The anger of the population against them was beyond measure, and no doubt in the quelling of the rebellion many innocent persons were sacrificed.

After the rebellion was crushed Chang Fa-Kuei and Chen Kung-Po submitted themselves to the local Political Council for punishment, accepting full responsibility for the insurrection, and turned over the control of Canton to General Huang Shao-Hsiung.

The Canton insurrection, of course, was fully utilised by the reactionaries for propaganda purposes. The chief of the Shanghai garrison had already negotiated with the authorities of the foreign Settlements in Shanghai for the extradition of Left members of the Central Executive Committee on the grounds that they were Communists. Those

living in the International Settlement were visited by the police, but no harm was done to them personally; those in the French Concession were left unmolested. On December 13th Mr. Wang and his group decided to issue a manifesto explaining the real situation at Canton and the events leading to the crisis, strenuously repudiating the suggestion that Chen Kung-Po and Chang Fa-Kuei were Communists. When the news of the re-capture of Canton and the driving-out of the Communists by Chang Fa-Kuei arrived at Shanghai on the 14th, people at once accepted Mr. Wang's manifesto at its face value.

Subsequent offensive operations by the authorities of Canton and Swatow in February 1928, drove the Communists from Haifong and Lofong and put an end to the "Government of Hailofong." The excesses perpetrated at Canton and Hailofong made a deep impression on the population, and even some of the Communists themselves, such as Tan Ping-Shan and Chang Pei-Yung, were disgusted and retired from the movement.

THE COMMUNISTS CHANGE THEIR PLANS.

During a conference of the Comintern held in February 1928, the Moscow leaders—after criticizing the faults committed by the Chinese Communist Party—appointed Shang Chung-Fa, Secretary-General of the Chinese Central Committee and Li Li-Shan permanent members. The experience of Canton having proved that the Party could not seize political power by revolutionary methods in the form of armed insurrection, it was decided to abandon the policy of force and confine all efforts in future to organization of the industrial and farming classes.

This change of policy was approved by the 6th World Congress of the Communist International, held at Moscow from August 17th to September 1st, 1928. In an appeal addressed to the "Workers and all Labouring People of China," praising the heroism of the comrades who had fallen in the Canton *coup d'état*, the Congress added: "under the cross-fire of Imperialist artillery and the mad terror of the Chinese Government, you are reorganizing your ranks, mobilizing forces, enlisting new elements for the preparation of the forthcoming onslaught upon the position still in the hands of the enemy."¹

In detailed resolutions, the Congress instructed the Communist Party to sever relations immediately with the feudal and bourgeois elements. It condemned the Kuo-Min Tang, whose ideas were considered anti-revolutionary, and emphasized that the Communist movement had developed in an irregular manner "in different provinces of China and

¹Yakhontoff: *Russia and the Soviet Union in the Far East*, p. 422.

amidst various vicissitudes." "It is necessary to fight energetically against the *putschisme* of certain sections of the working class, against unorganized and unprepared activities in the cities and countries, against the game with insurrection." The declaration concluded: "The Executive Committee of the Comintern considers that the principal object of the Party and of the Sovietized districts is to start an agrarian revolution and organize the Red detachments which will be transformed gradually into a Red National Army."

The 6th Congress of the Communist Party of China, which was held almost at the same time at Moscow under the auspices of the Third International, decided upon the following programme of ten articles:

1. To destroy the power of the Imperialists.
2. To confiscate the capital of the banks and foreign enterprises.
3. To overthrow the Government established by the Kuo-Min Tang.
4. To unify China but leave to the population the right of self-determination.
5. To organize the Soviet workers, farmers and soldiers.
6. To establish an 8-hour working day and institute a system of social insurance.
7. To confiscate land belonging to the landlords.
8. To improve the living conditions of soldiers.
9. To replace existing taxes by a special progress tax.
10. To become allies of the proletariat of the whole world and of the U.S.S.R.

RED ARMY ORGANIZED.

About this time there was a renewal of internal dissension in China, and Li Li-Shan and Shang Chung-Fa were enabled, after a year of continuous effort, once more to establish the influence of the Communist Party and organize a considerable Red army to sovietize extensive areas.

The activity of the Communists in industrial and administrative centres though not to be ignored, did not produce the same results as in the interior. The Party knew well enough how to gain influence among intellectuals and student elements, but it could not, in spite of repeated efforts, bring the working masses under its control, because of preventive or repressive measures enforced by the authorities, and also because of the resistance offered by trade unions organized under the guidance of the Kuo-Min Tang.

In the interior, however, the success of the Communists was much more pronounced. It is scarcely necessary to go into details describing the series of local military operations and political events which marked that success, but in the next section are described some of its characteristics and what it generally accomplished.

COMMUNIST DIFFERENCES.

This success, however, was not sustained. After bringing certain provincial militia under its influence and extending the Sovietized areas, some of the leaders of the Communist Party, with Li Li-Shan at their head, thought the moment had come for the overthrow of the National Government by a series of organized uprisings and armed insurrections in the cities, as a prelude to a general offensive by the Red Armies. The situation called for active revolutionary measures, and propaganda work in the unions became less necessary. The question was no longer one of the instruction of the masses, but how to enlist them in active service.

This view was altogether contrary to that of the Third International. The "game with insurrection" was precisely what was so strongly condemned during the 6th Congress at Moscow. But Li Li-Shan was at the headquarters of the Red armies in the interior, and out of touch with the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, which was established in Shanghai and was the faithful executive organ of the Third International. He thought that he was strong enough to act alone. The Central Committee protested, and Li responded by creating at Wuhan a dissenting "Central Committee of Action." When Moscow intervened, it was too late. Full reports concerning the plans of Li Li-Shan and his followers were received by the National Government. It was easier to suppress insurrectionary tendencies, because they were more tangible than pure propaganda, and the Government without delay adopted necessary measures to cope with the situation. These measures found the Communist Party disorganized as a result of the dissenting views of Li Li-Shan, and the movement started by him in Wuhan was checked.

Shang Chung-Fa, Secretary-General of the Party, was then sent to Hupeh to unify the Party, while Li Li-Shan was summoned to Moscow to answer for his conduct; and in conformity with instructions from the Comintern, the Central Committee of Shanghai proceeded, in the winter of 1930, with the "purification" of all its organs. After expelling some 25 per cent of the followers of Li Li-Shan—the others having accepted the "general line of conduct" of the Comintern—and numerous influential members suspected of having reached an understanding with reactionaries of all types, the orthodox members of the Central Committee on January 15th, 1931, convened the 4th Plenary Conference, which severely condemned the policy of Li Li-Shan and proceeded with the reorganization of the Party and its auxiliary organizations, acting on the instructions of the Third International.


CHAPTER V

MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST COMMUNIST-BANDITS.


Having given an account of the origin of the Communist movement in China, and traced the course of events from the time when friendly relations existed between the Kuo-Min Tang and the Communist Party down to the complete parting of the ways, attention can be given to the measures taken by the National Government for the suppression of a movement which is regarded as opposed to the interests of the Chinese people. The National Government had, on October 10, 1928, promulgated the Law on the Organisation of the National Government¹ and was devoting its energy to the consolidation of its political and administrative foundations. Some months had to be spent in readjusting the national forces, whose strength and equipment after the campaign against the Communists in 1927 and whose exhaustion as a result of the march upon Peking in 1928 had to be made good. Other internal political complications also arose in the autumn of 1929 and were prolonged into the early months of the following year, so that it was not until the latter part of 1930 that the Government could seriously resume the struggle against Communism. At the 4th Plenary Conference of the Kuo-Min Tang, held at Nanking from November 12th to 18th, 1930, it was unanimously decided to suppress both Communists and bandits completely, and to despatch Government forces against the Red Army in order to exterminate it and reoccupy the Sovietized areas.

The first expedition, however, ended in failure. General Chang Hui-Tsan, who commanded the 18th division, having achieved success in Kiangsi, was unwise enough to leave his base and was surrounded by the Red Army. He paid with his life for the mistake he made, and the 50th division, which followed him, was extricated only after considerable loss. In February 1931, the Minister of War, Ho Ying-Chin, took command of three divisions and went into the mountainous regions of Kiangsi to disperse the Red Army. The configuration of the territory, however, afforded excellent natural defence, and the clever strategy employed by the Reds (described later) prevented him from attaining any real success, so the situation remained unchanged.


¹Often, but erroneously, called "Organic Law of China."



COTTON TOWEL MAKING AT REFORMATORY.



BANDIT PRISONERS AWAITING TRIAL.



BARBERS AT WORK ON PRISONERS.



PRISONERS WORKING IN VEGETABLE GARDEN.

GENERAL CHIANG TAKES CONTROL.

In the beginning of June, the Commander-in-chief of land, sea, and air forces, General Chiang Kai-Shih, personally assumed direction of operations against the Communists. He appointed General Ho Ying-Chin in command of the front line, with the Chairman of Kiangsi Province, Lu Ti-Ping, in command of the reserves. At the same time a political committee was established to reorganize and rehabilitate the areas devastated by the Soviets as they were recovered.

These plans were crowned with considerable success. After a series of desperate battles the Commander-in-Chief drove the Reds back to their political centre at Tunku, encircled them, and on July 17th captured the city. All the Communist establishments, including military schools, banks, and bureaux, were destroyed. Three days later he occupied another city under Soviet control, Shih-cheng, and the Communists fled into the mountains or retreated towards Fukien and Juichin.

After an interval of some weeks, the campaign was resumed in September, when the neighbourhood of Tunku was cleared. The 3rd, 4th, 5th, 7th, 8th, and 12th corps of the Red Army tried to reach Yufu by way of Shengkuo, seat of the Soviet Government of the province. The 19th Route Army intercepted them at Kaochinchow, where the Red forces lost more than 2,000 men and 3 commanders. The left wing of the Government forces reached the suburbs of Huichang, in the south-eastern extremity of Kiangsi, while the 18th Route Army on September 13th entered Juichin, an important centre under Communist control.

EFFECT OF MANCHURIAN INVASION.

Seeking refuge in the remote region between Shengkuo and Huichang, around the Ta-king mountains, the Communist forces were on the verge of being encircled and annihilated when a new crisis arose in Manchuria, following Japan's occupation of Mukden. The Government was obliged to transfer troops to other localities in order to face eventualities which might happen and which, in fact, did happen. The Reds, thus made bold, launched a counter-offensive, with the result that conquered regions had to be evacuated and the gains realized in the course of the campaign were almost completely lost.

One lesson was, however, learned:—that with well-organized forces carefully conducted, it was possible to reach Communist centres even in the most inaccessible parts of the interior. In other words, it was shown that well co-ordinated military action encircling the centres of the Communists, if sustained for a considerable length of time, would have ended in the annihilation of the Red armies.

Japan's invasion of Manchuria in September, 1931, brought about

a situation which naturally compelled the Chinese Government to turn its attention from enemies within to the enemy without. It was quite impossible for General Chiang Kai-Shih to concentrate his forces upon anti-Communist suppression with a powerful foreign aggressor threatening the very existence of the Republic, and for nearly two years nothing in the nature of a "big push" against the Red forces could be undertaken. There was a virtual war in progress between Japan and China, and until some arrangement could be made for a cessation of hostilities on a front which extended from far north of Peiping down to Shanghai the Communists had time to pull their scattered forces together and make plans for starting more trouble, which plans were naturally swiftly put into effect. Eventually, in the summer of 1933, it was possible for the Government to turn its attention once more to the work which had to be abandoned as a result of Japan's occupation of Manchuria, and General Chiang Kai-Shih planned an extensive campaign to be started the following autumn—which was, and is still going on though again the Government's plans were interfered with by an attempt to set up an independent "People's Government" in Fukien. For two months forces which would otherwise have been employed in the anti-Communist operations had to be diverted in another direction for other purposes, but in spite of this distraction it was possible to continue—on a restricted scale—the operations against the Reds which were originally planned.

FOREIGN OBSERVERS ON KIANGSI FRONT.

Foreign journalists who have been recently permitted to visit that part of Kiangsi where the Government forces are engaged in operations against the Communist-bandit armies have given some interesting impressions of front-line fighting as they saw it. Nanchang is the centre through which probably more than two million men have passed during 1933—most of them by motor-transport. There is an army of men engaged on road-building numbering 20,000, and during the last three years about 700 miles of new roads have been constructed, for the success of the operations against the Communists and bandits depends very largely upon the ability of the army to strike swiftly. The groups which the Government is engaged in suppressing move usually at night, though in bad weather they take to the roads in the daytime. In making an attack, the Communist-bandit forces invariably appear very suddenly, and disappear as quickly, especially when they know that the troops are within a few miles of them. Months of experience "on the run" has made them experts at taking cover, and even the keen eyes of observers in scouting-planes have been cleverly deceived by the

simple device of wearing a large wreath of twigs and leaves. With this camouflage on their heads, and by sitting perfectly still when an aeroplane is sighted and is passing overhead, many gangs of bandits have escaped detection for the time being. This trick is said to have been introduced by one of the Red commanders, Chu Teh, who for some time was a student in German military colleges, and when first employed was very successful.

Scouting from the air is constantly going on, and when bandit activities have been reported and the scouts have not been able to locate the groups, attacks from the air upon near-by woods are usually effective, as the bandits seek cover in the forests after making a raid.

CHAIN OF BLOCKHOUSES.

An effective measure in anti-Communist operations is the building of a long chain of blockhouses, most of which are erected on the tops of hills and at such convenient distances from each other that the occupants of one can go to the assistance of another if necessary. These blockhouses are in constant communication both by day and night, and serve as little fortresses and observation-posts. The presence or movement of suspicious groups can be "spotted" and reported, and the necessary measures taken to investigate and act accordingly. In the neighbourhood of Nancheng (not to be confused with the capital of Kiangsi, Nanchang) there are many miles of these blockhouses, representing the front line of operations against the Reds in that territory. So successful were the results of this system that in January, 1934, General Chiang issued three sets of regulations in connection with the establishment and maintenance of blockhouses, and the extension of their influence in the former bandit-areas as peace-preserving institutions among the peasantry.

One set of regulations lays down regulations for the protection of the blockhouses and the roads which they command, together with rules for the maintenance in full working order of telegraphs and telephones, and the protection of bridges and sign-posts against destruction. Instructions are also given for meeting any surprise attack by bandits, the general purport of these regulations being to ensure that all regular means of communication established after the troops have cleared an area are effectively maintained, and any attempt at wanton damage or interference prevented.

RURAL MILITIA FORCES.

Another set of regulations provides for the establishment of an organisation for training a militia force among the peasants, able to assist the regular forces in maintaining order in territory recovered from

Communist control. In addition to these semi-military duties for the preservation of peace by a disciplined body of volunteers, the Peoples' Commissions are also called upon to carry out such local reforms as are necessary in regard to rural administration, in order to remove any just grievances which may exist and which would give ground for further agitation by Communists or their sympathisers. An educational campaign among the peasantry is to be carried out, stressing the faults and follies of Communist policy, and generally the Peoples' Commissions are to co-operate with the local authorities in solving problems of rural economy and administration, and assist in measures of social service.

The third set of regulations issued by General Chiang deals with measures for the defence of the territory recovered from the Communists, and specifies the authority and responsibility of the military officer in charge of operations in a given locality. These duties include the construction and maintenance of blockhouses, organisation and training of the people's militia, control of suppressive measures against Communist activities, rehabilitation of recovered territory, registration of households and population, patrol-work and searching for Communist agitators and propaganda, dispersing groups of outlaws and vagabonds, safeguarding aerodromes, military depots, and all lines of communication, censorship of publications, care of sick and wounded troops and destitute victims of banditry, and generally supervising the financial and administrative measures taken by the authorities and by co-operative effort to relieve distress and re-establish normal conditions in agricultural communities.

Similar measures were taken in January by the Kwangtung authorities, when the Commander of the 1st Army Corps issued instructions to all local governments in Southern Kiangsi to organise, within two months, a county militia to assist the regular forces in the suppression of Communist-bandits. This militia is also to serve as a reserve for the regular army.

THE 1933 CAMPAIGN.

In January, 1934, a meeting was held at Nanchang of Government officials and leading members of the Kuo-Min Tang at which General Hsiung Shih-Hui, Chairman of the Kiangsi Provincial Government, submitted a report on the military operations against the Communists in that province carried out during 1933, and indicated what was proposed to be done during the present year.

Reference was made by the speaker to the fact that the operations in Kiangsi were being closely watched by foreign Powers, some of whom appeared to be rather sceptical as to the ability of the Government to

suppress the Communist movement. An apparent tendency to regard aggression from without as being of more importance than rebellion within seemed to have given the impression that the Communist menace was getting out of hand, but with the adoption of the policy of settling internal troubles before dealing with foreign aggression, and with General Chiang Kai-Shih taking personal command of operations against the bandits, the scepticism of some foreign observers had been overcome, and the efforts of the Government to deal with this problem had been watched with more sympathy and understanding.

General Hsiung said that since the opening of the "big push" in October, 1933, the Government forces had fought and won a dozen decisive victories, and in each of these engagements the Communists had lost more than 1,000 men, thereby sustaining a serious weakening of strength on the eastern front. At the moment when the Government forces were making rapid progress along the whole front, the rebellion in Fukien broke out, and this had the inevitable effect of checking further operations against the Communist forces. Now that this trouble had been satisfactorily dealt with, it would be possible to renew the drive which had been so disastrously interrupted, and the Government has every hope of being able to continue its operations and conclude them successfully without further distractions.

TRIBUTE TO CO-OPERATION.

The Chairman of the Kiangsi Provincial Government, in the course of his review of the operations of 1933, paid tribute to the effective manner in which the people had co-operated with the military authorities. Local defence forces at strategic points had been strengthened, and at Nanchang particularly the People's Anti-Bandit Association took a most active part in organising the "Iron-Shoulder Corps" for assisting the regular forces in transport and other manual work, and in helping the Red Cross and similar services, raising no less than \$1,000,000 as a contribution to the cost of these activities. The construction of several large aerodromes, and the repairing and making of roads, were other activities which showed how anxious the people were to assist the military authorities in their campaign against the Communists. General Hsiung said there was still much to be done before it could be said that the Red menace in Kiangsi has been finally disposed of, and in recognising the assistance given by the people during the past year he hoped that during the months to come their co-operation would be no less enthusiastic.

An extensive educational campaign must be carried out among the peasantry with the object of explaining how to protect themselves against Communist efforts to mislead them, and the men who carried out this

work must be properly trained for their duties. Military training and organisation among the people must be further developed, in order that they may have sufficient means at their disposal for self-protection in an emergency. There was a difficulty in this connection in regard to funds—the cost of the People's Peace Preservation Corps in the whole province was between five and six million dollars annually. But if this sum were raised the various surtaxes imposed in different districts—amounting to about \$10,000,000 per annum—could be abolished, and thus relieve the burden of taxation falling upon the people of Kiangsi.

COMMUNIST LOSSES IN 1933.

According to estimates made by the military authorities, the fighting in Kiangsi during 1933 resulted in very heavy losses being sustained by the Communist-bandit forces which came into conflict with the Government troops. In January it was reported that about 8,000 men were killed in fighting at Kinku, and in March a body of 6,000 was surrounded and disarmed, about 2,000 being made prisoner, while in another heavy engagement in Lo-an and Taiho districts 4,000 bandits were killed. In October 7,000 men were killed in the fighting at Tsechi, and in November there were two engagements in which the Communists are estimated to have lost 2,000 and 3,000 men, while in December 500 were killed and 3,000 wounded near Lichuen, 1,000 bandits were killed in fighting in northwest Fukien, and about 800 died in an attack on the western outskirts of Nanchang, which was repelled by combined infantry and air forces. During the year a number of Red military leaders were killed, and in addition to the heavy losses sustained by the Communists in the many heavy engagements with Government troops, there must be taken into account the daily casualties in minor clashes along the long front.

RECENT OPERATIONS.

In order to give an idea of the extent of the operations which are being carried on by the Government forces, a selection has been made of some of the more important engagements reported during the month of January, 1934. It must be understood that this is not a complete review of the campaign, but a selection from the despatches received from various points along the anti-Communist front to show the unrelenting pressure which is being exercised by the various military commanders carrying out General Chiang Kai-Shih's campaign for the suppression of Communism in those provinces where bandit forces are still causing trouble. A strict economic blockade has been established which is expected materially to assist the military operations outlined in the following despatches:—

General Liu Hsiang, Commander-in-Chief of the Szechuan Bandit-suppression forces, succeeded in repulsing the Communist forces under the notorious Ho Lung and recaptured the city of Kienking, near the Szechuan-Hupei border, the bandits retreating to Talupa and Lungping.

The recapture of Ilung, an important city in northern Szechuan about 120 miles north of Chungking, was also reported. The main forces of the bandits had been concentrating at Nankiang, northern Szechuan, preparing to invade Chaohua and Kwengyuan, the garrison posts of the last Route Army but the Government forces recaptured Chaohua and Chienko. The 4th and 5th Route Army recaptured Folousih, a strategic point leading to Tungkiang and Pachung, which were held by the Communists, who, having sustained heavy losses, were attempting to retreat northwards.

The main forces of the 3rd Communist Division in southern Hupei and the "independent" Division in northern Kiangsi were defeated by Government troops according to a telegram received on January 20 at the Hankow Pacification Headquarters.

The commander of the 3rd Column of the Western Route Bandit-suppression forces reported that 2,000 bandits were slain and from 500 to 600 captured, the Government troops also seizing 400 rifles during different encounters. The remaining bandits escaped to Tationfan, Tzechinshan and Tsaichiashih, where they were being surrounded by the Government forces.

With the recapture of Ilung, an important city in northern Szechuan about 120 miles north of Chungking, the Szechuan Bandit-Suppression forces were mobilized on January 22 with instructions to converge on Pachung, Nankiang and Tungkiang, the last three strongholds of the Communists in this area.

The 2nd Route Army cleared up the remaining bandit forces along the Langchung-Pachung Highway as a preliminary to attacking Changchih, an important point south of Nankiang, the capture of which would eventually lead to the fall of Nankiang. Repeated defeats at the hands of the Szechuan troops had reduced Communist forces to 10,000 men, most of whom were concentrated at Pachung.

Meanwhile the 5th Route Army was assailing Kiangliki and pushing on towards Kiangkow, a strategic point about 30 miles south-east of Pachung, and the 4th Route Army was launching an attack on Kiangkow.

In a telegram to General Liu Hsiang, General Chiang Kai-Shih, President of the Military Affairs Commission, instructed that co-operative measures be instituted in the newly recaptured areas in Szechuan to eliminate any causes likely to lead to a revival of banditry.

The 2nd Column attached to the Western Route Bandit-Suppression Forces occupied Fengting Shan, a mountain in Wantsai district, western Kiangsi. This point is of strategic importance, having been used as a base of operations by the Communists under the notorious leader Kung Ho-Chung. Advancing from Pingpoling, the Hunan forces launched a heavy attack on the outlaws and recaptured the position after 24 hours of sanguinary fighting.

The lairs of the bandits under Kung Ho-Chung, in southern Hupeh, were also surrounded, and during encounters at Tzechin Shan and Tachiaopu, 1200 Communists were killed and 800 rifles seized by Government troops.

The retreating bandits under Wu Huan-Hsien were scattered by the 44th Division on the Honan-Hupeh border, and fled eastward with the Government troops in hot pursuit.

General Chan Chi-Cheng, attached to the Western Route Bandit-suppression forces, arrived at Hankow from southern Hupeh on January 22 and reported that the Communists forces under Chang Tao had been virtually destroyed, but additional troops were needed to round up the remnants. Rehabilitation of the recaptured areas was being carried out in three stages, namely, pacification of the people, construction of highways, and promotion of mass education.

Acting under instructions from the Provisional Headquarters of the Chairman of the Military Affairs Commission, the Hankow Pacification Headquarters decided to erect defences along the Hupeh-Szechuan border in order to enforce an economic blockade of the bandit-infested areas and check the advance Communists from Szechuan.

General Chiang Kai-Shih, Chairman of the Military Affairs Commission, has been devoting special attention to the welfare of inhabitants of former bandit-infested areas. In instructions sent to the Provincial Governments of Honan, Hupeh, and Anhwei, General Chiang ordered exemption from all farm-taxes in districts which have been recaptured from the bandits, in order to alleviate the sufferings of the people. The Hupeh Provincial Immigration Bureau was also instructed to devise plans for granting free land to immigrants in eastern Hupeh.

In order to facilitate bandit-suppression operations, General Chiang also ordered the Hupeh Provincial Government to complete the construction of all highways as soon as possible.

To prevent the possible incursion of Communists from Kiangsi into Kwangtung, General Chen Chi-Tang, the Commander of the Kwangtung Provincial Forces ordered troops to proceed from southern Kiangsi to Pingho, southern Fukien. The 5th Kwangtung Division had been



GROUP OF ANTI-BANDIT VOLUNTEERS.



ANTI-BANDIT VOLUNTEERS ON PARADE.



INSPECTION OF ANTI-BANDIT VOLUNTEERS.



RUINS OF CHANGSHA PROVINCIAL HALL.

already despatched to western Fukien. The 1st Independent Kwangtung Division was instructed to concentrate at Wuping and Shanghang, south-western Fukien, all these units being placed under General Li Yang-Ching, Commander of the 3rd Kwangtung Army.

With the recapture of various bandit-infested areas in western Kiangsi and the occupation of several Communist lairs at Kaotsun, the Headquarters of the Western Route Bandit-suppression Forces (for the provinces of Kiangsi, Kwangtung, Fukien, Hunan and Hupeh) were removed eastwards from Pingsiang to Yuanchow (Ichun). Rehabilitation measures were being formulated for relief in the recaptured areas.

THREE PROVINCES CLEARED.

General Tsao Hao-Sen, Administrative Vice-Minister of War, arrived at Nanking from Hankow on January 19, and stated that the Communist forces in the provinces of Hupeh, Honan, and Anhwei were practically disposed of. In the mountainous regions around Lihuang, on the border of the three provinces, small bands of outlaws were still at large, but these were being rounded up by the Government troops. Those in Szechuan had sustained heavy losses at the hands of the forces under General Liu Hsiang, and troops had been detailed along the Hupeh-Szechuan border to prevent the Communists fleeing eastward.

The bandits under Hsu Hsiang-Chien launched a counter-attack on the Szechuan Bandit-suppression forces at Tapoo, northern Szechuan, but were repulsed by the 3rd Route Army. Taking advantage of the heavy snow, the Szechuan troops recaptured Machialiang and Lungwangshan, and were pressing on Tungkiang and Pachung, two Communist strongholds in northern Szechuan.

The 5th Route Army launched another attack on the Communists at Matukwan, northern Szechuan. The bandits put up a stubborn resistance, but the Government troops after hard fighting succeeded in advancing to Lungtowom, seven miles from Matukwan.

According to a telegram from the Vice-Commander of the 3rd Route Army, the Communists plan to make a final stand against the Szechuan units, and if they fail to stem the advance of the Government forces will retreat north-eastwards to Wanyuan, near the Szechuan-Shensi-Hupeh border, and then make for their old retreat in western Hupeh. Later it was learnt that bandits were attempting a general retreat to their last remaining strongholds at Tungkiang, Pachung, and Nankiang, northern Szechuan, in view of the continued pressure of the combined Government units.

The 1st Route Army occupied Miaoerhtien and launched an attack on the Communists at Wangtsangpa, 100 miles west of Nankiang. The

2nd Route Army recaptured Kwanmensih, and the 3rd, 4th Route Armies were advancing swiftly, with the 5th Route Army, preparing to cross the Pa Shui River en route to Tungkiang.

General Hsu Yuan-Chuan, Commander-in-Chief of the Bandit-suppression forces for the Hupeh-Hunan border, arrived at Hankow from Shasi, western Hupeh, and reported that the Communist Division and the "special" corps under the notorious Ho Lung had been routed at Lichuan, western Hupeh, near the Hupeh-Szechuan border.

The city of Ilung, 120 miles north of Chungking, was recaptured, and the Communists suffered heavy casualties, retreating to Chin-chengyen.

It was reported that the bandit forces under Hsu Hsiang-Chen had been reinforced by 20,000 men, and were planning to launch a counter-attack on the 5th Bandit-suppression Army, at Suanhan and Suting, two important cities in northeastern Szechuan, about 60 miles north-west of Wangsien. The Communists were apparently attempting to return to Hupeh in order to establish contact with the brigands in that province. Upon receipt of this report the Commander of the Szechuan Bandit-suppression forces ordered the 5th Route Army to launch a second general offensive which was opened at Matukwan, Chihki, and the southern borders of Tungkiang and Pachung, Communist strongholds in northern Szechuan.

Lienhua, an important city in western Kiangsi about 50 miles south of Pingsiang, was recaptured by the Western Route Bandit-suppression forces.

The Communist forces sustained heavy losses in various encounters with Government troops at Hsiaoshih, Shengkow, Tzuki, Hsiungtsun and Tehsingwan, in eastern Kiangsi. In view of the excellent morale of the Government forces, and the strict enforcement of the economic blockade, numbers of Communists were reported to have surrendered to the Government units.

COMMUNIST FORCES GREATLY WEAKENED.

Reports received from eastern Kiangsi about the middle of January, 1934, indicated that as a result of the intensive operations maintained by the Government forces the strength of the Communist-bandits had been reduced by about 70 per cent. Moreover, their losses in man-power and scarcity of supplies through the economic blockade made it more difficult for them to engage in large-scale operations, and they were consequently breaking-up into small gangs, who confine their activities to raids upon villages and guerilla-fighting with the regular troops, with an occasional attack on a blockhouse. It was believed that the men

at the head of the Communist organization were becoming seriously alarmed at the loss of morale among their followers, and it was reported that many bitter quarrels had occurred among rival leaders of the armed bands roaming about in the mountainous country in the east of the province.

Meanwhile important strategic positions in western Kiangsi had been captured by the Government forces, and the Communists repulsed with heavy losses in spite of the fact that they were led by one of the chief lieutenants of Kung Ho-Chung, the prime mover in bandit activities in this part of the country. The arrest of a person described as "Minister of Land of the Soviet Home Affairs Department" interrupted plans which had been made at Juikin (the so-called capital of the Soviet Government) for causing further trouble to the authorities.

ORGANIZED MASSACRES.

It was also reported in January that the Communists, exasperated by the fact that tens of thousands of peasants had fled from the districts formerly under Soviet control into areas where the Government has established rural rehabilitation operations, have resumed their terrorist tactics. A force known as the "Supervisory Massacre Corps" has been formed, whose duty it is to ascertain where groups of farmers and peasants are planning to leave a Sovietized area and seek refuge either in territory which has been recovered by the Government troops or in relief-camps for refugees, and then proceed to massacre these unfortunate people, as a warning to others similarly inclined to abandon any idea of seeking the Government's protection. It is reported that several instances of raids by this "Massacre Corps" have occurred in southern Kiangsi.

Nevertheless, the Government's plans for helping the unhappy victims of the Communist regime are being pushed on, and with considerable success. In Western Kiangsi rehabilitation work is going on in several areas which were recently in the hands of the Communist forces, and where the distress and suffering is acute. Valuable rice-lands have been abandoned, houses destroyed, together with farming implements and livestock, and wide and wanton destruction carried out, but the work of restoring order and reviving agricultural industry goes steadily on. At Lichuen, a mountainous district on the Kiangsi-Fukien border, about 5,000 families have returned to their homes since the recovery of this territory from the Communists about a month previously. This represents a population of about 15,000, and of this total about 5,000 young men have joined the local militia and been trained sufficiently to take over the duties of local defence, thus enabling the regular

troops to move forward in pursuit of the Communists. Relief-work is being provided for the returning peasantry by employing some of them on road-construction and the building of block-houses while others are trying to get their fields and homes in order again.

REHABILITATION WORK IN RECOVERED AREAS.

It has been the policy of the Government, from the very start of these operations, to fortify all positions taken from the bandits and so prevent them from breaking through the gradually-tightening line which it is intended to draw around them. Foreign journalists who were taken over this territory during the latter part of 1933 were surprised to see the enormous amount of work which has to be done in the matter of erecting barbed-wire entanglements, digging trenches, making dug-outs and nests for machine-guns. Transport, too, includes motor-buses, lorries, mules, and men—all loaded with food, clothing, ammunition, and other supplies, and occasionally a motor-ambulance is seen on the road with the familiar Red Cross flags, and of course many armoured-cars with the usual equipment for exchanging fire which is found on such vehicles.

The operations which started last autumn, and which it was hoped would have marked the beginning of the end of the Red regime in Kiangsi, were begun after long and careful preparation. As already mentioned, the plans of the Military Affairs Commission were completely upset by the rising in Fukien against the Government, which necessitated attention being given to a new and entirely unexpected problem which called for military action. The citation of a few figures may be the most simple and effective way of showing the tremendous scale in which the Government's plans were worked out originally, and in due course will be fully resumed. First of all, a training-camp was established by General Chiang at Lushan, where 20,000 young men went through a course of instruction specially designed to make them acquainted with the difficulties of military operations in hilly country, and of actions fought in restricted surroundings, such as deep, wooded valleys. Meanwhile a huge aerodrome was built at Nanchang (where the Chairman of the Military Commission had his headquarters), with a dozen other depots at various places along the front line, where landings could be made for re-fuelling and other purposes. A radio station was also set up at Nanchang, which through a network of field-stations was able to send and receive messages from all points in the area. Meanwhile a force said to amount in all to 300,000 men, with 150 military aeroplanes, had been steadily mobilised, and all necessary details worked out in regard to transport, Red Cross hospitals and emergency-

stations, and by the end of September there was a line of blockhouses and fortifications about 100 miles long, extending from Lichuen to the Kan River. In spite of the fact that General Chiang Kai-Shih's plans were seriously interfered with by the rebellion in Fukien, operations in Kiangsi against the Communist-bandits were continued, though naturally not with the energy and effectiveness which would have been possible had the Government's attention and energy not been distracted by the "independence" movement started in Foochow. It may be mentioned that Sir Miles Lampson, the retiring British Minister to China, flew to Nanchang in December, to pay a farewell call upon General Chiang, who gave a banquet in honour of the departing diplomat, at which he expressed gratitude for the efforts made to maintain close Anglo-Chinese friendship.

Other distinguished foreign visitors to Nanchang toward the end of 1933 were Dr. Rajchman and Dr. Borcic, technical experts sent to China by the League of Nations, whose services were requested to assist in the preparation of plans for the reconstruction of districts which have been devastated by the Communist-bandits. It has been the policy of the National Government to carry on rehabilitation work simultaneously with military operations, and in addition to this an elaborate publicity campaign has been organised with the object of making clear to the people living in the areas formerly under the influence of the Red leaders what the Government wished to accomplish in their interests. Dramatic performances and cinema-shows (seen for the first time by tens of thousands) demonstrated the points which the authorities wished to bring home to the people, and speeches and handbills, posters and cartoons, were all utilised for propaganda purposes by the Government through a specially-organised publicity corps whose duty it is to explain why action is being taken to suppress the Communist movement.

In addition to these purely propaganda activities, directed at undoing the work done by the Reds and preventing their influence being secretly continued, a Rural Co-operative Committee is concentrating upon the practical work of economic reconstruction. This committee works in conjunction with the Reconstruction Department of the Kiangsi Provincial Government, carrying out rehabilitation work in accordance with plans laid down by the Military Affairs Commission. At a meeting held in December last Mr. Yen Chiun, Chairman of the Rural Co-operative Committee, submitted a report to the Chairman of the Kiangsi Provincial Government, General Hsiung Shih-Hui, in which it was stated that no less than 700 villages had taken part in the co-

operative movement, over 300 societies having been organised with nearly 12,000 members. Savings and trust services had been established to relieve the difficulties of farmers, some of whom had rice but no money, and loans to the amount of about \$75,000 had been advanced. Control of food production and distribution is another branch of the committee's activities, and the provincial government has secured a loan of \$500,000 to finance these operations.

CHAPTER VI

A MISSIONARY'S IMPRESSIONS OF THE SITUATION.

Not many foreigners have an opportunity of obtaining first-hand information relating to conditions in the interior of China, but religious workers of all nations and denominations establish themselves in different parts of the country, hundreds and even thousands of miles from the busy trading centres on the coast, and thus come into direct contact with actual conditions. This being so, it is interesting to quote the views of a British missionary worker who had "exceptional and most unenviable opportunities" of studying Communism at first-hand in Central China. As a keen and unprejudiced observer, this gentleman was recently invited by the "*Straits Times*," a British newspaper published in Singapore, to put before the Chinese population of Malaya "the causes and effects of Communism in China as he had seen them, and his view of the future of this movement of anarchy and brutality among the Chinese nation." His views are quoted below without comment, and the reader may be left to compare the opinions of this British eyewitness with what has been already written on the origin and development of the Communist movement:—

A PEACE-LOVING PEOPLE.

"As a race the Chinese are a peaceful, orderly and law-abiding people, industrious, frugal and contented to live cheerfully on a very simple scale. There are no large estates and no great landowners, there are no large corporations and no modern factories except in the foreign settlements. Ninety per cent. of the population is living in rural areas and depends upon agriculture, tilling the fields belonging to the clan. In the towns and cities most manufacturing is done in small shops with primitive types of tools.

"Thus the Communist programme, which is aimed at destroying the capitalist class and the breaking up of large private estates, is rather inapplicable to Chinese conditions. Furthermore the small landholder in China looks upon his bit of land as something almost sacred, for it may have been in possession of his clan for many generations, and the graves of his forefathers have made it for him more than a means of producing food. It is plain that any attempt to "nationalise" land would meet with the bitterest opposition of the masses of Chinese farmers. If other reasons had not existed, Communism would never have got a foothold in China.

PHASES OF REVOLUTION.

"But we must remember the fact that since 1911 China has been in a process of revolution which has passed through various phases but is not yet finished. From 1911 to 1926 the Chinese people suffered fearfully under the exactions and abuses of what might be called a feudal oligarchy. Various military leaders by means of mercenaries gained control of the provinces and played war and politics, combining in various shifting alliances and fighting each other for the power to tax the great, illiterate, inarticulate and suffering masses. Mutinies of unpaid troops were frequent, cities were burned and looted and the countryside devastated by the ill-disciplined hordes of armed riff-raff with a fury that one would not have expected even from a foreign enemy. It was no wonder that the great masses of oppressed people were ready to welcome any movement that promised relief.

BLUNDER OF WESTERN POWERS.

"The National-Revolutionary Party organisation that worked for the overthrow of the military cliques was being slowly built up in Canton. Thither all elements that were hostile to the Peking Government betook themselves. But the Nationalist leaders felt need of outside help and sought it in the West but without success. It is within the range of possibility that if the Western Powers had stepped in then and given the help asked for, China would have been spared all the agony of the Communist struggle, anti-foreign outbreaks would have been avoided, and China would be much farther on the road to real democratic government. The least what could have been done would have been withdrawal of recognition of the Peking faction.

"Instead of that, Western Governments continued the fiction of recognising this militarist group as a Government even though its authority did not extend much beyond the walls of Peking. Russia, on the other hand, was not so meticulously careful of diplomatic amenities and the revolutionary leaders were able to get from there the help they needed in the shape of funds, supplies, advisers, officers and propagandists. Thus when the National-Revolutionary armies began their victorious sweep in 1926 terms had been made which gave to the Red agents a free hand to propagandise behind the advancing lines in return for the help which had been given. Necessity makes strange bedfellows, so that temporarily Nationalism and Communism, which are poles apart in theory, united for the overthrow of the old, dominating militarist leaders in the North. The common people, welcoming the advancing Southern forces as deliverers, provided labour and supplies and spies and proved also that that party which can win and hold the sympathy of the masses is certain to win.

COMMUNIST OUTRAGES.

"There was a sudden turn of affairs in the early months of 1927 when friction started between the Kuo-Min Tang and the Communist Party. The Nanking affair on March 24, in which certain Red units suddenly staged a well-organised but brutal attack upon defenceless and inoffensive foreigners, resulted in a general exodus of Westerners




Photo by H. S. Wong.

FERRYING RED CROSS TRUCKS FROM NANCHANG TO FRONT-LINES.



Photo by H. S. Wong.
AERIAL VIEW OF NANCHANG CITY, GENERAL CHIANG'S HEADQUARTERS.

from the Yangtse valley. It is probable that the aim of the Red leaders was to provoke foreign intervention, perhaps looking toward an international conflict and also to discredit the Nationalist group and to seize power entirely. This resulted in a complete break and a conflict began between the Red faction and the Nationalist group and this is still going on.

"The Nanking Government has been in a difficult position, for the Northern military element was never completely beaten and while there was a temporary compromise it could not last. Two of the outstanding military men of the North, Feng Yu-Hsiang and Yen Shi-Shan, dissatisfied with the results of a parley held to scheme out ways of reducing the armies, rose against the Nanking group because they felt that they were being unfairly discriminated against. A severe and long-drawn-out conflict followed with heavy losses on both sides, but meanwhile the provinces of Kiangsi, Hunan and Hupeh were almost denuded of Government troops, and this gave the Reds their opportunity. They began to assemble their forces in the mountainous regions. They had never been fully defeated and wanted this chance to come out of hiding.

"These Red armies are made up of many elements, such as remnants of broken and leaderless units, scattered and mutinous Government troops, genuine bandits, discontented students, and many people without jobs. Among the Red leaders there are some clever and well-educated men; some have studied abroad and speak foreign languages. But the greater number of the rank and file are ignorant farmers and labourers, forced in by intimidation. Besides this, there is a small percentage of zealously sincere believers in the Communist teachings who believe that these contain the solution for all of China's ills.

"The Reds' methods have been surprisingly efficient. By attacking isolated police-stations and small parties of Government troops they have gradually increased their supply of weapons. In certain sections their posters announced 'Pay no taxes—Pay no rents—Pay no debts.' Wherever they got into control they drove out or killed the Nationalist officials. Land was nationalised by tearing up boundary stones and burning deeds. In the rural areas controlled by the Reds each village was required to furnish a certain number of men for fighting. The taking of towns and cities was usually attended by the looting of the larger shops, banks and pawn-shops, and the well-to-do classes of people were hunted down and either fined heavily or carried off into the hills and held for large ransoms. Government post-offices, telegraph offices, railroad stations, school and official residences as well as agencies of foreign firms, churches and mission buildings were attacked, looted, sometimes burned or else confiscated for use by Red troops and leaders.

"The Government troops were handicapped on every hand; usually unfamiliar with the locality and often disliked by the common people, they made little headway. In many areas the lower classes

are secretly in sympathy with Reds or they dare not, because of fear of future eventualities, give any information to Government troops. It is also a fact that often Government forces have been untrustworthy because of being unpaid for long periods of time. In other cases commanders of Government units who were personally acquainted with Red leaders entered into agreements which simply meant a temporary withdrawal on the part of Red groups.

REIGN OF TERROR.

"The province of Kiangsi has suffered terribly from the Red menace and at times more than two-thirds of the whole province has been in the hands of the Reds. This was especially the case during 1930, when the Government with difficulty held a few of the larger cities. In fact in the summer of 1930 the British and American Consuls advised their nationals to withdraw entirely because of the Red danger. The great porcelain producing centre of Chin Teh Chen was looted three times; hundreds of the leading merchants were robbed, many tortured, others carried off and held for ransom. Pawn-shops were looted and several hundred catties of gold and silver ornaments carried off, as well as tens of thousands in silver; the city was compelled to provide enough tailors and cloth to furnish uniforms for 5,000 men; many people were cruelly and wantonly done to death and a reign of terror continued for weeks while the provincial government was so hard pressed that no help could be sent.

"The Christian mission work suffered severely. Missionaries of all groups have been either driven out or held for ransom, and a number have been murdered. Church property has been confiscated by Reds; Chinese pastors abused and driven out; congregations scattered and in some regions such as I-Yang-Hsien there has been a general killing of native Christians."

There is no doubt, concludes the missionary quoted, that the National Government is sincerely determined to stamp out Communism, but in addition to military measures it is necessary to do many other things—disband troops and provide work for the men thus left without resources, give effective protection to Chinese and foreign capital, encourage native industries, make available the vast natural resources of the country, and put a stop to the abuse of authority by local Party organs which is sometimes the cause of popular resentment.

"Whether all this will or can be done depends upon the ability, sincerity and honesty of the Nationalist leaders and their readiness to sink personal grievances and jealousies and unite in the common task of co-operation in the work of national reconstruction."

CHAPTER VII FOREIGN COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES.

Simultaneously with the military operations which have been described, the Government undertook a campaign of searching for and suppressing active Communist elements in other parts of the country. Numerous secret organizations were discovered and broken up, their members being arrested in accordance with the provisional law of March 7th, 1928, dealing with the suppression of counter-revolutionary activities. (This law was revised on March 1st, 1931). By a lucky chance, in addition to the rounding-up of many Chinese engaged in Communist propaganda-work, plans of foreign agitators in China were also revealed, and a mass of evidence seized which showed how actively these activities were being pursued. Detailed reference to these sensational revelations will be made presently, meanwhile it may be noted that in Shanghai Ku Chen-Chang, member of the Central Committee, and Shang Chung-Fa, Secretary-General of the Communist Party, were arrested on June 3rd and 22nd, 1931, tried, and executed. The party was considerably weakened by its loss of these men, for it was Ku Chen-Chang's duty to move the Communist leaders about to escape the attention of the police. His death made that part of the Red activities less efficient and less sure, and seriously diminished the mobility of the leaders.

The arrest at Singapore of an agent from the Comintern who was proceeding on an inspection tour of Communist organizations of the Far East, and examination of the documents found in his possession enabled the authorities of Shanghai to locate in that city on June 15th, the Far Eastern Bureau of the Comintern and the Bureau of the Secretariat of the Pan-Pacific Labour Union, which directed all Communist movements in the Far East, and through which the Red organizations in various colonies of the Pacific, etc. maintained contact with the Executive Committee of the Communist International at Moscow. At the head of this bureau was a person of uncertain civil status and of unknown nationality, who, after having assumed several different names, called himself Noulens (or Ruegg), and who was arrested together with his wife and delivered under that name to the Chinese authorities. Both were convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for life.

Owing to this sensational turn of events, most members of the

Central Committee of the Communist Party left Shanghai to seek refuge either in the interior or in Canton. Members of the Special Committee of Shanghai were also dispersed. Following the discovery of secret printing-offices and a large amount of subversive literature, the propaganda section of the Provincial Committee of Kiangsu ceased all activities. By July, 1931, not only were these three organs rendered impotent, but several district committees, various auxiliary organizations, and the Pan-Chinese Trade Unionist Federation were put out of action.

At Tientsin, in the same month of July, the police arrested about twenty influential Communist agents, among whom were the Secretary-General of the Committee for Hopei Province, the members of the Central Committee of the railwaymen of the Tientsin-Pukow Railway, etc. At Hankow, an attempt by Communists to capture the city by surprise with a flotilla of junks failed, the plot having been discovered in time (September 2nd, 1931), and numerous arrests were made.

In all, 1,549 arrests were effected in 1930, of which 572 were made in Shanghai, 426 in Chekiang, and 158 in Kiangsu; while there were 964 arrests made in 1931, of which 345 were effected at Shanghai, and 320 at Hankow. The complete disorganization of the local committees of the party which was caused by these arrests was clearly shown on the Red anniversaries during the months which followed. These occasions, usually marked by public parades and demonstrations, passed in absolute silence and it may be taken for granted that the reactions following the arrest in Shanghai of two foreigners actively engaged in organising Communistic propaganda were responsible for the complete collapse of this branch of the Party's work in China.

CLUES FROM SINGAPORE.

Among the papers in the possession of a suspect arrested by the Singapore police were certain documents whose contents were promptly communicated to the police authorities of the International Settlement in Shanghai. On the strength of this evidence observations were made of the movements of a foreign couple, man and wife, and on June 15, 1931, they were arrested. Examination of letters, books, and other documents found at the man's office indicated that the premises were being used as the headquarters of the Pan-Pacific Trade Union Secretariat and the Oriental Bureau of the Third International. The prisoners claimed Belgian nationality, but the Belgian Consulate refused to recognise the claim, whereupon Swiss nationality was claimed and again repudiated by the local consular authorities. It was discovered that about a dozen different names had been used by the accused, and as it was impossible to establish their nationality they were brought up before the

Kiangsu Second Branch High Court (which has jurisdiction in such cases), and charged in August with having been "concerned together in propagating doctrines irreconcilable with the form of Government in China, with intent to subvert the Republic of China." In due course an order of extradition was made, and the prisoners were taken to Nanking for trial, and sentenced to life-imprisonment.

ACTIVITIES OF THE "NOULENS" COUPLE.

Evidence was submitted by the Shanghai Municipal Police showing that the accused had five different residential addresses in the city, had used four different telegraphic addresses and eight post-office boxes for receiving mail. Accounts were held in seven different Chinese banks, where nearly \$48,000 was deposited, and large sums of cash in different currencies were found in their possession, together with passports of dubious origin. Over 1,200 letters, documents, papers, and books were seized, written or printed in English, German, Russian, Japanese, and Chinese, dealing with Communist activities in China, Korea, the Philippines, Indo-China, Straits Settlements, Formosa, and Netherlands India, and it appeared that the expenditure of this Communist centre in Shanghai amounted to about \$130,000 a month.

About 70 of these documents dealt with Communist activities in China, and covered a wide range of subjects. There was an outline of an election to the First National Soviet Conference of Representatives of Chinese Workers, Peasants, and Soldiers, plans for the organisation of peasants' unions, reports on the activities of Red labour-unions in Shanghai and of the Communist Party in North China, reports on labour agitations in Shanghai and activities among the workers in silk and cotton mills, plans for the organisation of unemployed workers, reports on the establishment of Soviet organisations in various provinces, plans for creating Communist "cells" in the army, and a host of other subjects.

PROPAGANDA AMONG WORKERS.

In one document Red labour-unions were instructed to carry on propaganda work among factory and shop workers, who were to be encouraged to agitate for more favourable conditions, and in the country farmers should be encouraged to refuse to pay taxes and rent, and decline to meet their debts, while efforts should be made to induce soldiers to desert with their arms and join the Red army, where they would get better treatment. In one document the interesting admission is made that "there are over 3,000,000 industrial workers in China, and we have connections with only 2,000—3,000. This shows the need for intensive work." Another document referred to the difficulty of transporting a wireless outfit to a Soviet-centre in Fukien. "Small merchants are

very willing to bring to our districts matches, salt, and petroleum from the White district, because of the high prices of these products in the (Soviet) districts. But the militarist forbids it. Therefore they examine all weights very thoroughly, and it is very difficult to bring the radio there. The machineries are packed in 12 packages, for each of them we need two coolies. It is impossible to avoid the examination, it means confiscation."

ASSOCIATION WITH BANDITS.

Another interesting sidelight on Communist activities is thrown by a reference in another document to doubts as to what should be done in the matter of utilising the services of bandits, of whom there were "very many" in this particular district. "Comr. Mosk. Spir. and Siang think it possible sometimes to allow the bandit groups to act in the name of the Red army and under our slogans. Gudkow was against it, stating that it was not allowed. . . . The question must be decided by the FEB/" (Far Eastern Bureau?).

PAID ATTENDANCE AT MEETINGS.

In a document relating to activities among the industrial workers of Shanghai, it is stated that "the Party paid before one dollar to each worker for presence on the party-meetings. Now it has been stopped. And therefore the women-workers of the textile fabrics refused to come to the meetings. We could not do a thing during the strike."

Later on mention is made of the fact that "our work among the tramway-workers in the (Foreign) Settlement (Shanghai) is developing very well. We started to organise there brotherhoods."

Other documents found by the police described in great detail the efforts being made in the country to organise Soviet districts and win over the "poor peasantry" by the immediate confiscation of the soil and all means of production in the hands of feudal landowners and officials, reduction of the possessions of the "kulaks," and the free provision of the land and agricultural implements confiscated from their owners.

PLANS FOR "TERRORIST POLICY".

The following is a translation of a document in German referring to the 4th Red army in Anhwei, Hupeh, and Honan, the strengthening of Party organs, and the institution of new Soviet districts:—

"Proposals to the PB (Political Bureau?) after studying the news from Hupeh, Honan and Anhwei (4th Army District):—

"1. For the present the most important task of the Party, the 4th Army, and the Independent Division is to organise a compact Soviet District on the borders of Hupeh, Honan, and Anhwei (at Loshan and

Kwangchow on the Southwest of Anhwei and the northeast of Hupeh). To effect this the Red Army and the masses of peasantry should liquidate the White troops in this District.

"Until this is done the main forces of the Red army should not be sent to the Peking-Hankow Railway.

"The peasants and labourers along the railway should be organized for class struggle, and small Red army units along the railway should also be organised to execute the 'terrorist policy.' The peasants should be encouraged to exercise their landowning right and thus enhance the Soviet influence. The Red army's sphere of activities should be in the region between Sinantien and Tienanfu.

"Should the enemy forces leave the above-mentioned places, the Red army should start a general pursuit with the ultimate object of disarming the enemy forces. If the Red army is outnumbered and attacked, it should remain on the defensive and, if necessary, withdraw to its original position in order to avoid losses to its strength."

POLITICAL ACTIVITIES.

"2. The Z.K. (the Central Committee) should pay special attention to the strengthening of the political organs, the Institute of Commissars in the regiments and divisions and of Political Directors (Politruks) in the companies. The most reliable and experienced comrades should be selected for this work, and the Z.K. should give every assistance to the political organizations of the Red army and thus increase its fighting ability. The Z. K. should assist the masses in the Red territory as well as those working for the interest of the Communists in the territories of the enemy. (Detailed instructions are appended).

"3. Special sections should be established in the Army to combat agents of the counter-revolutionaries in the Red army and among the peasants.

ENLARGING THE RED ARMY.

"4. As soon as the Red army receives additional arms and ammunition, its organization should be enlarged in the following way:—

"A division should be composed of three regiments, and two to three divisions form a divisional corps. Each regiment should be composed of three battalions, each battalion three companies, each company three sections, each section three squads, and each squad from ten to eleven persons, in all 1,000 to 1,500 rifles.

"5. When the strength of an army exceeds that of a divisional corps, a Commander-in-Chief's headquarters should be organized with all necessary auxiliary institutions, after the model of the 'M'. corps.

"Should the aforementioned circumstances be lacking, then the duties of the Chief of Staff may be discharged by the Fourth Army Corps (i.e. 4th Red army).

"6. The Z. K. should instruct the armed comrades on the borders of Honan, Anhwei and Hupeh to organise a Revolutionary Military Council to assume command of the Red armies in those provinces namely, the First Divisional Corps, the Independent Division, the Ninth

Divisional Corps, and the Red Peasant and Labour Guards.

"In case communication between the Military Council and the Red troops is cut off, the Ninth Divisional Corps, the Independent Division, and the Red Peasant and Labour Guards should take orders from local Communist Party branches.

"To avoid misunderstanding, the strength of the Independent Division and the Ninth Divisional Corps should not be stronger than that of the Fourth Red Army, since the latter is composed of the First Divisional Corps, the Independent Division, the Ninth Divisional Corps, and other Red Army units of that region.

RUSSIAN LEADERS NAMED.

"The following persons should be appointed members of the Revolutionary Military Council:—

"Spiridonow, Chairman; Komkow, Commander-in-Chief, Corps; Clowkom, member of the divisional; Gudkow, Secretary of the Party Branch; Other members (either one or two) are to be appointed by the Z. K.

SECRET SOCIETIES.

"7. The organization of secret peasant societies in the White areas of these three provinces is very important, and therefore the Z. K. should instruct the Party offices to pay thereto special attention. Such work is especially important in Honan, because the peasants should be utilized to settle all important questions, such as the distribution of land, the extension of Soviet influence, and the disruption of White forces, in order to secure a political victory.

"8. The Z. K. should assume fullest responsibility and maintain constant communication with Shanghai in accordance with the instructions.

"9. It is further proposed to the P. B. that the resolution adopted on February 10th, 1931, that 'the Independent Division is to be placed under the Fourth Red Army' should be deleted, while the Resolution that 'The 4th Red Army and the Special Soviet Districts should be subject to the control of the Soviet Government' (of China) should be qualified by the following provision: 'Such arrangement should not come into force until the entire territory of China has been placed under the control of the Soviet Government' (of China).

COMMUNIST "CELLS" IN CHINESE ARMY

The following is a translation of a document in German, proposing the organization of Communist "cells" in the Kuo-Min Tang army, with a view to undermining their fighting power.

"*Proposals for our Work in the Army.*—The offensive against the S-district and the situation of the Kuo-Min Tang army—namely, the increasing unrest of the soldiers placed between the Revolution and the Kuo-Min Tang regime, the growing revolutionary tendency among the troops, and the more and more frequent mutinies and uprisings—have made the disintegration and political surrender of the




Photo by H. S. Wong.

MOTOR TRANSPORT FOR ANTI-COMMUNIST FORCES.



Photo by H. S. Wong.

TROOPS ADVANCING OVER RECAPTURED TERRITORY.

Kuo-Min Tang Army one of the most urgent problems of the K.P. in such a situation. Whether or not we shall be able to resist the attacks on the S-district depends on our political tactic and organization work in the army. According to the present scope and standard of our work in the army, we can hardly hope for success. Such work is especially intended for the M-Department and not for the whole party. In time of civil war the work in the army is totally different from our work in ordinary circumstances. It seems we have not sufficiently realised the distinction. The work of the Red army is to exterminate the Kuo-Min Tang troops—to cause them to surrender and give up their arms. This work cannot be fulfilled unless our Party co-operates with revolutionary organization in White China.

“DISINTEGRATION” WORK.

“We must at once change our technique in relation to the above work. We have to organize the various Parties and Youth organizations, not only for activities among the peasants and labourers but also among the Kuo-Min Tang troops with a view to securing the disintegration and political surrender of the Kuo-Min Tang army.

“We think the following measures should be immediately carried out:—

“I. A special session of the P.B. should be called to consider the reports of the M-Department of the Z.K. and the Kiangsu Provincial Committee regarding activities in the army.

“The P.B. should ask the Kiangsu Provincial Committee to organize activities among those troops in Shanghai, Soochow, and Nanking, etc., so that they may be won over by means of political propaganda. To carry out this plan the following steps are necessary:

“(a) The M-Department should have 5 or 6 additional true comrades to be trained for instruction and organization work.

“CELLS” AMONG SOLDIERS.

“(b) We should send special comrades (whether party or non-party members) to the different troops. These comrades must first be thoroughly trained. It will be their duty to organize cells from revolutionary soldiers among these troops, to train them for military intelligence, to enlist new members, and to direct the soldiers in their daily struggles.

“While remaining outside the troops, our instructors must maintain their connections with, and direct the work of, the cells among the troops.

“(c) Special training classes should be organized for those who are to undertake the work in the army. The period of training should be limited to two or three days, and the members of each class should range from 10 to 70. Such training classes should be permanently maintained.

“(d) A weekly publication should be issued in Shanghai, Soochow, and Nanking, etc., for circulation among the troops.

"SEDUCTION" OF THE AIR FORCE.

"(e) A special comrade should be despatched to Nanking to make connections with the soldiers, mechanics and pilots of the Aviation Department and organize seduction work. He should not be given other concurrent duties.

"(f) Only our party members and members of the Youth Party should form cells in the Shanghai Arsenal.

"(g) Special members (10-15) should be sent to General Chiang's newly-recruited troops and gendarmes, as well as to the garrison forces in Nanking. The original number of cells there should be increased.

"II. Our provincial committees in Hunan, Hupeh, Anhwei, Fukien, Chekiang and Honan should be given detailed instructions regarding methods for carrying out their work among the troops. Such instructions should be issued together with general instructions which have not yet been despatched.

INCITEMENT TO MUTINY.

"For the above item the following steps are necessary:—

"(a) In each of the above-named provinces there shall be one comrade responsible for the work, who shall be assisted by five or six comrades. They shall be stationed in the following places: Hankow, Yochow, Changsha, Nanchang, Fukien, Chengchow, Kaifeng, Tsinan, Anking, Swatow, Taipu (?), and Canton, etc. If there are no suitable comrades in any of these places, such shall be sent there from Shanghai, Tientsin, Peking, Hongkong, and other places.

"The nature of work in these provinces shall be the same as that in Kiangsu—to wit, to incite troops to mutiny. Local circumstances, however, must be carefully taken into consideration.

"(b) The various party committees should be ordered by the M-Department to carry out seduction work among the troops, and especially among those in the front. To hamper troop movements it is necessary to destroy railways, railway bridges telegraph and telephone lines.

"(c) Guerilla groups (from 2 to 10 persons) should be organized among labourers of farmers to do espionage work and engage in guerilla tactics during the transportation of troops. Such work is especially important in Hankow, Changsha, Nanchang, and Chengchow, etc.

"(d) Should any of the masses refuse to serve as carriers or guides for the Red troops or refuse to carry them across any water, they should be left alone. Such kind of work is most important to our party.

"(e) Cells should be established among the garrison forces in Honan to seize arms and ammunition and to carry on seduction work.

"(f) In our Party organizations there are comrades who were former officers in the Kuo-Min Tang Army. These comrades should be given suitable work in our Army.

"(g) The Peking, Shenyang and Tientsin Committees must in

a few weeks send at least 30 comrades to Shansi and Shensi to work among the troops. The Z.K. must also send a responsible comrade to southern Shensi to work among the troops there.

"III. The direction, control and technical organization of the above plan fall within the functions of the Z.K. and should be carried out by the M-Department. The latter must therefore have from 5 to 7 additional able men to serve as instructors.

"The M-Department should pay special attention to the 33rd and 52nd Divisions and the Shantung troops. It seems comparatively easier to organize uprisings among these troops within the shortest possible period. (The 33rd Division is already in revolt). The same thing is true as regards the Fukien troops and those troops referred to in the Plan for the Second Attack. We should also organize to do better work among the principal divisions in Nanking.

WORK FOR SHANGHAI COMRADES.

"The provincial organizations have so far proved to be very weak. The Z.K. and the M-Department must immediately send comrades from Shanghai to work among the above-mentioned troops. It is important that the Z.K. should re-establish our provincial organizations; otherwise, it would be difficult to organize activities among the troops.

"IV. Our work being exceptionally arduous and complicated, it is necessary that our party organizations, the Youth party organizations, and the Red troops must effectively co-operate with the masses—the labourers and peasants—in order to realize the disintegration and political surrender of the Kuo-Min Tang Army and to defend the (Soviet) district against attacks. These are our important tasks. The question regarding our work in the army must be thoroughly discussed by the Z.K. of the K.J.V. in order to devise methods for carrying out the necessary plans.

"Questions regarding the methods and details of the above work will not be discussed in this outline. They should be discussed together with concrete plans for the work of the M-Department and the Red troops.

At the end of the above document, which was typewritten, was the following postscript, written in ink:—

"P.S. (1) For work in the army, women should be used.

"(2) All seduction work must be kept most secret.

"(3) We must send special comrades to work among the troops and marines of the imperialistic Powers."

The contents of the two documents above quoted are sufficient to show the extent of the activities which were being carried on by Communist agents, foreign and Chinese, established in the International Settlement in Shanghai, through their representatives of different nationalities scattered about in different parts of the country. There were over 70 documents seized by the Municipal police dealing with Com-

munist activities in China, and as these two translations show, their work ranged from inciting peasants to refuse to pay rent to mutiny in the Chinese army and the forces of the foreign Powers stationed in China.

RECENT ACTIVITIES IN SHANGHAI.

In spite of the fact that with the arrest of the two foreigners in 1931 by the Municipal Police subversive activities in the International Settlement received a very severe check, there is still a certain amount of Communist agitation going on in that part of Shanghai which is under foreign administration. The police are constantly on the alert to get on the track of these persons, and keep in close contact with the Chinese authorities with a view to co-operative action in suppressing such activities in the International Settlement and French Concession. It is not known definitely whether there are any foreign Communist agents now in the foreign areas of Shanghai, as this work is obviously done with the greatest possible secrecy, but of the continued presence of Chinese agitators in the International Settlement there is no question. The activities of Chinese Communists during 1933 included the removal by assassination of officials considered dangerous to party plans, attempts to hold street demonstrations, the dissemination of anti-capitalist literature among labourers, the circulation of hand-bills explaining the significance of Red anniversaries, the furtherance of anti-authority propaganda among foreign and Chinese troops and police of the three Municipalities, and attempts to prevent the conduct of propaganda unfavourable to the party.

Efforts to suppress these activities in the Settlement by the Municipal Police, who received generous co-operation from the Chinese authorities, states the Commissioner of Police in his annual report for 1933, resulted in the prosecution of 223 persons for promoting Communism and the discovery of 174 of the bases from which they and others had operated. Ninety-one of the accused, including five sentenced to the death penalty, were extradited to the Chinese authorities, one was handed over to the French Police, and five to the Consular authorities concerned. Of the others, 34 were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment, 91 were released on security, and one was on remand at the end of the year.

Communist literature seized comprised 338 different kinds, and totalled 71,607 copies.

The most important of the Communists arrested belonged to three sections of Chinese Communist organisations, known as "Dog Beating (Assassination) Corps", the National Labour Federation, and the Military Committee.

Searches at the addresses of officials of the National Labour Federation, of whom four were arrested, resulted in the seizure of about 2,000 conspiratory documents belonging to its archives. Some of these records related to the progress of the Communist movement in various parts of the country, while others contained instructions on the conduct of military movements and propaganda.

The breaking up of the Military Committee, of whom ten members were arrested and successfully prosecuted, paralysed for the time being the organisation of this branch of the Communist Party, which constitutes the greatest menace to the safety of the Settlement.

The members of the organisation arrested included nine Chinese and one Annamite, and evidence found showed that they were co-operating with people of various other nationalities. Searches at the addresses used by the members of the Military Committee led to the discovery of samples of different kinds of literature, including 368 copies in Chinese, 30 in English, 24 in French, 30 in Annamese, 26 in Japanese and sixteen in Gurmukhi.

CHAPTER VIII COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION IN CHINA.

The Communist Party of the Far East is under control of the Oriental Secretariat of the Third International at Moscow through the intermediary of the Far Eastern Bureau, which was established at Shanghai at the time the "Noulens" couple were arrested in 1931.

The party is represented in the Comintern by six delegates. The Comintern is in constant touch with the Communist Party of the Far East through the constant coming and going of these members, who thus establish close contact between China and Moscow. Since 1920 about a hundred influential agents of the Comintern have passed through Shanghai, including Borodin, Earl Browder, Serge Dalny, Jacques Doriot, Tom Mann, Musso, Heinz Neumann, M. N. Roy, etc.

The Communist Party in China is directed by a Central Committee, which co-ordinates the following four branches of activity:—

1. Political activity (determining the course of action).
2. Military activity (Red armies).
3. Administrative activity (Government of the Sovietized areas).
4. Trade-Unionist activity (labour movement).

The Central Committee is divided into 12 departments:—

1. The Political Bureau, directing organ of the Party.
2. The Secretariat, technical executive organs for the instruction of the Political Bureau.
- 3 and 4. Departments of Organization of the Party and of Propaganda.
5. Information and Counter-spy Service.
6. Department of Sovietized Districts.
7. Military Department.
8. Department of the Labour Movement, which supervises the activity of the Pan-Chinese Trade Unionist Federation and its secret organs.
9. Department of Communist Youths.
10. Department of Feminine Movement.
11. Department of Peasant Movement.
12. Committee of Control, which has the power of controlling and censuring the activity of individual members of the Party.

Under the Central Committee are placed the Regional Committees, of which there are five:—(1) Manchuria, (2) North China, (3) The Yangtse Valley, (4) South China, (5) Kiangnan, sitting respectively at Harbin, Tientsin, Wuhan, Canton, and Shanghai.

In principle, each Regional Committee has under it as many Provincial Committees as there are provinces of which the region is composed. Under the Provincial Committees are the District Committees, as well as Communist "cells" organized in factories, schools, camps, etc. The most important Regional Committees are those of Kiangnan and the Yangtse Valley—the Committee of Kiangsu, Chekiang, and Anhui, and four special committees for Northern Anhui, Southern Anhui, the Region of Pengpu-Hsuchow (the Tientsin-Pukow Railway), and Shanghai.

Dependent also on the Central Committee are the "Communist Cells" organized within the Chinese branches of the international revolutionary organizations affiliated to the Third International, such as the International Red Relief, the League against Imperialism and for Colonial Independence, the International Workers' Relief, etc. It is through the intermediary of these sections that the Central Committee controls the activity of these auxiliary organizations. Among auxiliary organizations, the Communist Youths, the Alliance of Leftist Authors, and the League against Imperialism deserve special mention.

The Communist Youths. Chang Tai-Lai, who perished in 1927 in the Canton insurrection, organized the Union of Young Socialists, which afterwards became the League of Chinese Communist Youths. Hsiao Tsou-Mi founded in 1923 a Union of Marxist Youths for the study of the doctrines of Karl Marx. In 1926 this Union was affiliated with the League of Chinese Communist Youths. The League is an independent organ of the Communist Party, but under its political tutelage. Its activity, limited at the beginning to students, has to-day been extended to all young workers. It has eight important centres: Shanghai, Tientsin, Peiping, Tangshan, Hongkon, Canton, Hankow and Wuchang. It encourages the formation of societies of young people, and its members meet in booksellers' shops or other places which serve as refuges to Communists when the police are in search of them.

Alliance of Leftist Authors. At the beginning of 1930 the Communists launched in China what they called the movement for proletarian literature. This literature came to China from Russia by way of Japan, where a well-known novelist, with extremist tendencies, Kuo Moh-Toh, who left Canton after the failure of the *coup d'état* of December 1927, found this branch of activity in a most flourishing state. Kuo Mo-Toh introduced proletarian literature to China, and with about fifty of his countrymen founded in March, 1930, the Alliance of Leftist Authors, aimed at the spread of Red propaganda in literature and art. The alliance has been rapidly developing, consists of numerous divisions, and publishes three reviews.

The League against Imperialism. The Chinese section of this League is the former Revolutionary Association of China in revised form. It participated in the Exposition of Oppressed Peoples organized at the time of the Colonial Exposition of Paris in 1930.

Following the outlines given of the organisation of the Communist Party in theory, it must be pointed out that measures of suppression taken by the Government on the one hand, and lack of experienced Communist agents on the other, have not permitted the complete realization of these theories. The actual situation appears to be as follows:

Kiangsu Province. The Communists attach the greatest importance to this territory, because it is the most highly industrialized part of China, containing two-thirds of the total number of Chinese factory workers. Shanghai and the foreign Settlements in that city are particularly attractive to the leaders, because in the midst of the moving population of the port (third in the world by annual tonnage), it is easy for them to pass unnoticed. The majority of the Communist organs have their centres in Shanghai.

Since the arrest of Shang Chung-Fa the Provincial Committee of Kiangsu seems to have disappeared. The Special Committee of Shanghai, which was once dissolved, was reformed into eight sub-sections, consisting of about 220 members. There are also committees at Soochow, Nantung, Wusih, Liaochiang. Chu Eng-Lai, an important member of the party, was appointed in August, 1931, Secretary-General, replacing Shang Chung-Fa.


Chekiang Province. The Provincial Committee was dissolved in 1929, since when there has been only one agency at Hangchow, with two District Committees at Hangchow and Wenchow.

Hupei Province. The Wuhan region is most coveted by the Communists, because it gives them mastery over the middle Yangtse Valley, providing a possibility for threatening Nanking, and controlling a vast hinterland whose trade concentrates at Shanghai. This explains the desperate efforts which the Red armies have always made to cut the Peiping-Hankow Railway and to seize Wuchang, Hankow, and Han-yang.


Northern Provinces. In 1929 there existed in Peiping a Regional Committee for the nine northern Provinces, later transformed into the Provincial Committee of Hopei. The Committee of the Metropolitan District of Peiping, dissolved in 1930, was reorganized after the events of September 18, 1931. The Committee at Tientsin was dissolved in 1930, so also that at Tangshan, which organized a strike among the miners



BLOCKHOUSE AT PING-AN PAO.



BUILDING A BLOCKHOUSE.



TROOPS ABOUT TO PROCEED TO THE FRONT.



LOOK-OUT ON BLOCKHOUSE.



A GOVERNMENT TRENCH.



THE RED FLAG USED BY CHINESE COMMUNISTS.

of the Kailan Mining Administration. There are other important Communist centres at Paotingfu, in Hopei, and at Tsinan, in Shantung.

Kwangtung Province. In spite of the measures of suppression taken after the Canton insurrection, the Communists in Kwangtung Province still retain their Committee.

Szechuen Province. Chungking at one time was an important centre of Communist propaganda, but in 1931 the local authorities enforced firm measures of control and arrested about forty ringleaders, thirty of whom were fined. At Chengtu, on receipt of news of the Canton insurrection, the Governor rounded up and imprisoned all Communists. There still remain some scattered elements in the districts of Changchu, Pali, etc.

Yunnan Province. The centre of Communist activity in this area is at Kwen Nien. They tried to spread propaganda among workers on the railway which connects the Province with French Indo-China, but the arrest of their leader, Li Kuo-Chou, put an end to their activities.

THE RED ARMIES.

The Red Army in China is not organized strictly in accordance with Communist principles. It is not, like the troops of the U.S.S.R., an army of the proletariat, drawn from among the classes which it desires to set free, organize, and protect. As already indicated, its nucleus consists of former Government troops and those associated with them. Detachments with extremist tendencies rallied under the Red flag in groups, together with their commanders, after the Kuo-Min Tang and the National Government had proscribed the Communist Party. The leaders may have definite revolutionary ideas, but the mass of the troops under them have vague impressions rather than strong convictions. The majority of the soldiers under Ho Lung and Chu Teh on the whole have displayed good discipline. With them are a number of ex-bandits, attracted by the prospect of comparatively regular pay and of plunder after a successful expedition. Then there are recruits from peasants, ruined by civil war, drought, or flood. Lastly come those who are recruited on the spot, who, one can be quite certain, do not enter the Red ranks out of any sympathy with or understanding of the principles of Communism, but are pressed into service. With all these different elements in the same ranks, it is not surprising they are so heterogeneous.

The higher officers are better organized, because a good number have received and continue to receive training in the different military schools of the U.S.S.R., and among them are such non-Chinese elements as Koreans, Formosans, Annamites, Mongolians, Bouriates, etc. Associated with the regular Red army are three auxiliary organizations: the Red Militia, the Young Vanguard, and the Boy Scouts.

The Red Militia is recruited (in principle) among able-bodied men of from 18 to 45 years of age, and it is divided (always theoretically, however) into active and territorial groups. The active group are treated like soldiers, but have no arms, while the territorial group are reservists who are called up for service when necessary.

*The Young Vanguard*s are composed of young men from 16 to 18 years, and are in fact crack troops who form the front line in attack, and whose duty it is to do the "mopping-up" work in conquered areas.

The Boy Scouts are employed as scouts, distributors of circulars and announcements, and general propaganda agents.

TACTICAL METHODS.

The tactical methods of the Red Armies is described in their manuals of military instructions, and includes the following main features:—

1. Attack Government forces in Sovietized regions, or in country where there are dense forests, or mountains, and lead them into an ambush.
2. Separate these troops in making them pursue you, then turn and strike them on the flank or rear.
3. When Government forces are concentrated in force, avoid contact by dispersing; when they are in an inferior position, converge attacks upon them or surround them.
4. Utilize the population of the Sovietized districts to harass the Government forces (for example, by planting large numbers of red flags on the hills which surround them or by continually repeating bugle-calls) or put the peasants in the van and do not attack with the main body of the Red Army until the enemy is tired or on the point of exhausting his munitions.
5. Do not attack permanent defence works, nor be drawn into planned engagements. Avoid fighting in regions where the population is not yet Sovietized.
6. Undermine the morale of the Government forces with propaganda agents, and utilising farmers, workers and women.

The Communist armies follow these instructions very closely and so effectively that it is difficult to join issue with them. As soon as Government troops arrive in any great number, the Communist detachments which do not wear uniforms quickly disperse, hide their arms, and assume the appearance of innocent peasants, but ready to combine again and attack the regular forces as soon as the latter, deceived by the quiet appearance of the district, are no longer on their guard. Furthermore, the Communist armies operate only in mountainous and wooded regions which are difficult of access and lacking in means of communication.

The Communist armies engage in pitched battles only for the possession of cities which they need, because it is from these communities they

raise a portion of their revenue and obtain their supplies. Moreover, these cities serve as meeting centres and points of strategic support. When such points are threatened by the regular army, detachments are left to protect them, and assume the responsibility of defensive fighting while the main Red force retires.

The Red Armies are naturally raised from the Communist Party, but the Military Department of the Central Committee concerns itself only with propaganda among the militarists and with the establishment of *liaison* with the Communist sections which exist in all regiments.

The technical centralized military organ of the Red Armies is the Committee for Military Affairs, under the Central Committee. It is this Committee which deals with questions of organization and recruiting, and matters relating to operations fall within the competence of the Military Revolutionary Council and the General Staff of the Red Armies.

The General Political Department controls the political life of the Red Armies. With the General Staff of each Army is a Political Department; and each division, and each regiment has its political chairman. The chairman of the regiment directs the political life of that unit and controls the activity of the Communist sections in the companies.

In the course of the operations during 1931, the Committee for Military Affairs established bureaux for the Yangtse Valley and South China. The first of these bureaux was established in the neighbourhood of Hankow and the other in south Kiangsi. It is the duty of these bureaux to maintain connections between the Committee for Military Affairs and the regions of operation, and to receive arms and munitions transported from the central supply to the Red districts.

Nothing is more difficult than to ascertain the strength of the Red Armies. Even their composition (already described) is subject to constant variation. As a portion of the force is recruited among local farmers, their members swell when the Sovietized areas extend and diminish as soon as certain regions are evacuated.

Then again the figure varies according to whether certain auxiliary formations are included or excluded. The estimates of January, 1932, gave the strength of the Communist armed forces, in round figures, at 200,000 men with 150,000 rifles, but these figures are manifestly more than the actual number. The figures for 1930, May 1931, and the spring of 1932 (which will be found on another page) generally agree, and approach the real strength of the forces. The figures for January, 1932, include some interesting details on the technical grouping of the Communist units and their geographical divisions. The campaign which the Government is conducting against the Red Armies in order to reoccupy

the Sovietized areas does not permit the disclosure of the latest information available concerning the position and strength of these forces.

The Red troops are badly armed, and not every soldier is supplied with a rifle, and ammunition is scarce. The Communists are not in control of any port, and so cannot import munitions or arms. So far as one can judge, 30 per cent. of their arms were supplied to them by the Government detachments which joined the Communist ranks in 1927 and by bandits incorporated into the Red Armies; 25 per cent. was purchased in Foreign Concessions in China; 20 per cent represent confiscations and requisitions; 10 per cent is of local manufacture; 15 per cent comes from various other sources.

CHAIN-GANGS MAKING ROADS.

Some interesting details of the methods followed by the Red Army are obtained from prisoners taken by the Government forces. Near Nanchang (where General Chiang established his headquarters in prosecuting his campaign against the Communists) there was a camp of about 1,000 officers and men formerly with the Red forces, and among them was a young man who started his military career with the regular army, got captured by the Communists, and was with them for about two years before getting a chance to desert and return to the army. For the first four months of his captivity with the Communists this young man was in a road-gang, engaged in making and mending highways. Members of these gangs had their feet chained together in order to make it impossible to run freely, though they could move their limbs sufficiently to drag a heavy stone-roller under the watchful eyes of armed guards.

Heavy losses at the front made it necessary to send up reinforcements, and members of the gangs whose conduct had been satisfactory and were physically fit were taken off the road-making job and drafted into the Red army. This young man, who was known to have been a military officer, was soon promoted to a staff position in the First Division of the Red Army, and held that position for 14 months, during which time he was able to obtain a very close insight into the general working of the military system. From the information given by this observer it appears that all males between 16 and 35 are forced to join the army in Sovietised areas, but it is not unusual to see boys under 16 and men well over 50 in the ranks. The peasants are constantly told of the honour attaching to military service with the Reds, and if eloquence fails to obtain the necessary number of recruits, bayonets and guns are used by way of persuasion. The women are also organised into "laundry brigades," "sewing brigades," and "cooking brigades," and none of these

recruits to the Red forces appear to receive any pay. The ex-officer himself received one dollar note during his two years service with the Communists!

HOW FUNDS ARE OBTAINED.

It appears that the Communist armies are not too well supplied either with money or food and clothing. The troops consider themselves lucky if they get one good meal a day, and winter clothes are not served out until late in December (instead of early October, when padded uniforms are served out in the regular Army), and even then there is very little cotton padding in the clothing issued. Commodities of this kind are scarce, and while one district may have cloth for uniforms they have no padding, while another may have cotton padding but no cloth. The war-chest is replenished by the confiscation of private property or "donations" by concerns with capital exceeding \$3,000 of 60 per cent of their resources. Crops are commandeered and sold to the people at absurdly low prices through "State" agencies—presumably with a view to demonstrating the advantages of Communism, but the unfortunate farmers thus robbed of their crops are allowed to keep only enough for food and for seed. Re-distribution of property is done by "exiling" the victim to a strange place, where the Soviet authorities will give him a plot of land upon which he can start life afresh—his own farm property meanwhile being disposed of in whatever way seems right to the authorities entrusted with such work. Bond-issues are constantly made, and everybody with the price of a bond in his possession is expected to buy one. Refusal to purchase bonds, and refusal to accept notes issued by the Soviet banks at their face-value, are regarded as "anti-revolutionary acts," similar to refusing military service, and the penalty for all such acts is death.

THE SOVIETIZED AREAS

The occupation of a district by the Red Army, when it appears likely to last, is followed by the Sovietization of the surrounding territory. After the first wave of violence which accompanies the seizure of possessions, killing, plundering, burning, and which have for their object the terrorization of the population and the breaking-down of all possible resistance, the Communists proceed with the creation of a "Soviet Government" for the district, and call an assembly of soldiers, workers and farmers. The local gentry, the propertied classes, are excluded from this assembly, which is composed entirely of proletarians, who then elect a Committee composed of a certain number of "People's Commissars." Each "Soviet Government" is generally composed as follows:—

1. Commissariat for the Interior.
2. Commissariat for fighting the anti-revolutionaries (G.P.U.).

3. Commissariat of Finance.
4. Committee for Military Affairs.
5. Commissariat of Rural Economy.
6. Commissariat of Education.
7. Commissariat of Hygiene.
8. Commissariat of Posts and Telegraphs.
9. Commissariat of Communications.
10. Committee of Labour and Peasant Control.

It is only in the Soviet districts which are stabilized that all the departments indicated above actually function, and even then the backward conditions of the population in the more distant parts of the country do not allow of the effective functioning of the entire machinery.

The selection of Commissars is, in practice, a duty imposed upon the assemblies by the Intelligence Service of the Party. Control of the new organs is assured by the sections which are introduced in such a manner that the Soviet Governments are offshoots of the Party rather than representatives or delegates of the population electing them. As soon as these organs are established, the Soviet puts into force the rules dictated by the Communist Party with regard to finance and agrarian reforms.

According to the principles promulgated in 1928 by the 6th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, held in Moscow, all existing taxes should be abolished and replaced by a special and progressive duty drawn from the revenue of the soil. The pecuniary difficulties of the rural population in the Sovietized regions hardly permits them to pay taxes in specie. These are therefore paid in kind, each producer placing at the disposal of the Soviet a fixed proportion of his harvest.

These resources, however, were found inadequate, and the Soviet has imposed other levies in kind or "fines" on the gentry, bourgeois, business men and others, who have thus been reduced to poverty. The small craftsmen and retailers are not spared, and gradually become itinerant merchants, who are tolerated because of their democratic character.

The Soviets in China would like to follow the example of the U.S.S.R., and nationalize commerce and industry, but without possessing the necessary means for organizing a monopoly, this policy has not been carried out. The "capitalist" banks have been replaced in certain regions by labour and agricultural banks, which issue "Communist" notes bearing portraits of Lenin and Karl Marx.

"AGRARIAN REFORMS".

"Agrarian reforms" have been introduced in conformity with the general rules formulated in 1930 by the Party, which are:—

1. To overthrow the political power of the gentry of the country¹ and the official class, to disarm the counter-revolutionary forces, and to furnish farmers with weapons so that they may uphold the political power of the Soviets in the villages.

2. To confiscate all the lands and properties of the gentry and big proprietors and place them at the disposition of the local Soviets in order that they may be divided among peasants who do not possess land or who do not possess land in sufficient quantity.

3. To deliver to the local Soviets, with a view to eventual distribution, the immovable property of the ancestral temples, of monasteries, churches, and other places of worship as well as other immovable property of a public nature.

4. To reserve in each district a certain quantity of land to be distributed to the soldiers of the Soviet army, farmers, and workers in order to assure their subsistence.

5. To declare null and void all contracts bearing a high interest as a result of borrowing on security, etc.

6. To destroy or declare null all title-deeds of land property and leases.

7. To improve agriculture by the reconstruction of farms, the development of irrigation, the adoption of measures for the prevention of droughts and floods, by emigration, by the establishment of agrarian banks and other co-operative enterprises and by giving credits at reasonable interest.

This programme has been applied in Kiangsi under the following conditions:

1. All land in the territory, all the property belonging to ancestral temples and other places of worship, and the landed property of the gentry has been confiscated without any reserve or exception; the land register, title-deeds and leases kept in the archives of the local administration have been burned, and boundaries have been removed so as to eliminate all traces of the rights of the original proprietors.

2. The local Soviets then re-divided the land among all able-bodied inhabitants without distinction of sex.

3. Children under 16 years of age, the aged and invalids have no claim to land, but the family or house which takes care of them can claim a portion of the land corresponding to their needs. This portion must not exceed one-quarter of the land which the family or house nominally has the right to claim. (This proposition is calculated to reduce, by elimination, the number of persons who constitute a burden upon others and who, from the point of the view of the Red Armies, are useless individuals).

4. When a region is over-populated, the excess population is to be transported to districts less densely populated.

¹The Communists include in this category big and middle class land-owners whose families have established themselves for a long time in the country and exercised a semi-feudal, semi-patriarchal influence. It might be called the "small landed nobility" as nobility was understood by European 18th century society.

5. The land assigned to the families of men in the Red Army is cultivated by other families under the control of the local Soviets.

The Communist Party, through the execution of its agrarian programme, hopes to obtain the support of the masses. It is especially interested in organizing the poor peasants, i.e. agricultural labourers, because they constitute the reserve from which can be drawn the necessary elements for organizing armed insurrections. With that aim in view, the Soviets often forbid the export of rice and other food products in order to bring down prices. This measure is naturally very popular with the urban proletariat, but is not equally appreciated by the producers whose profits are thereby reduced. The disparity between the price of rice in the Sovietized regions and the normal, higher prices obtaining in the rest of the country affords the Communists an argument which they have made the most of in attacking the Government.

ORGANISING CLASS WAR.

A class war is thus organized in the Sovietized regions, where the Communist Party makes use of the lessons gained through the experience of the Russian Revolution. Farmers of moderate means are tolerated, but the well-to-do are exposed to all kinds of attack. They are excluded from civil or military organizations, for fear they might plot against the poor peasants for whose benefit they have been ousted, and thus create among the farming class internal dissensions which would weaken its strength and deprive the Revolution of its principal support.

The policy of excluding well-to-do farmers who form the gentry of the country has been adopted by the Chinese Communist Party not without difficulty. On account of the unique organization of the Chinese family, the gentry are not like the Russian *kulak*, a proprietor who has extended his lands through his own efforts or the exploitation of farmers less active than himself, and who employs a proletariat composed of agricultural labourers. In China the country gentry are chiefs of a family, heads of a clan. They administer for the benefit of the members of the clan or family the undivided patrimonial property which has been transmitted from generation to generation since time immemorial, and of which they consider themselves trustees rather than the owners. The men who work under them for the common benefit are very often descendants, subordinates or relatives of those in the household. Now it is from among this class of servitors that the Red Militia and Communist Youths are recruited, and tradition gives the gentry a patriarchal form of authority over them. Thus it is observed that even the military element of the Chinese Communist Party has hesitated to



CARRYING BOMBS TO LOAD ON PLANES.

Photo by H. S. Wong.

break the ancient bond which has been the foundation of the social structure of China.

ANTI-COMMUNIST REACTIONS

Apart from these considerations, however, the propaganda for class war in the country—necessary for co-ordinating the Communist movement in the cities and villages—has led to the formation of an opposition force which bears the name of the Anti-Communist Party, under the direction especially of once well-to-do farmers who have been ruined by the economic and administrative measures adopted by the Soviet authorities. In certain regions this opposition has manifested itself in anti-Communist propaganda. In others, dissatisfaction among part of the rural population is transformed into armed conflict with the Communists in districts already Sovietized, sometimes aided by the Red troops themselves. These, as already mentioned, contain elements which are Communist only in name, and which at heart are inclined to maintain the old traditional rural economy and social structure.

Thus, in December 1930, the 20th Red Army, fighting in southern Kiangsi, revolted against their commander, Mao Tse-Tung. They released the members of the Provincial Committee who, owing to their sympathy for the Anti-Communist Party, had been arrested by order of the Political Committee of the army. They arrested at the same time the instructor of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, disarmed the cadets of the Military School and part of the 12th Red Army. The Political Bureau of the Party and the Military Revolutionary Council had to employ big forces to suppress this rebellion.

Up to this time the Sovietized districts, all politically under the control of the Department for the Sovietized areas of the Central Committee of the Party, were administratively independent of one another, having no common or superior governmental organ. This arrangement was frequently found to be inadequate, and so it was decided to remedy the situation at a conference of representatives of Sovietized areas held in May 1930, where they agreed to raise the question at an All-China Congress of the Soviets, meeting on November 7th, 1930, the anniversary of the Russian Revolution.

Being unable to complete the necessary preparations, the Congress was postponed first to December 11th, (commemoration day of the Revolution of Canton), and then to February 11th, 1931. Next came the question of the elimination of Li Li-Shan and the campaign of suppression launched by the Government. The Congress was adjourned on November 7th, but met again the same day at Juichen.



AERIAL VIEW OF COMMUNIST STRONGHOLD.

Photo by H. S. Wong.

PROVISIONAL "SOVIET GOVERNMENT" FORMED.

The Congress voted upon the constitution of a provisional Central Soviet Government of China, with Mao Tse-Tung as President and Shang Ying as Vice-President. Mao Tse-Tung was formerly a student in the University of Peiping, being in 1919 a member of the group for the study of Marxism. He organized the union of coal-mine workers at Pinghsiang which was the centre of Communist activity in Kiangsi and Hunan, and assumed political control of the Red Armies of Hunan, Kiangsi and Fukien for a long time. He is an orthodox Communist, carrying out strictly the orders of the International, and is opposed to the coalition of the Communist Party with any other political group.

With the formation of the Central Soviet Government, the Conference of Juichen created six sectional or regional governments for the following regions: (1) South-west Kiangsi, (2) the border districts of Fukien, Kiangsi and Kwangtung, (3) North-east Kiangsi, (4) the border districts of Hupeh, Hunan and Anhui, (5) the border districts of Hunan, Hupeh and Kiangsi, (6) the border districts of Hunan and Hupeh. The distribution of these regions indicates that the Communists know how to take advantage of the difficulty with which the provincial militia and authorities combine their efforts at the suppression of the movement. The border regions between two provinces, and especially between three provinces, are areas where police control is least effective.

The sub-divisions of the local Soviets in the six regional governments are not known. Furthermore, it is not certain if the decisions of the Conference have been put into force, or if the Central and regional governments have been effectively organized with branches and proper resources. In 1930, at the time when the Sovietized areas were most extensive, it was estimated that 181 districts (sub-prefects) in the interior were under Soviet administration. One hundred of these districts, the equivalent of nearly two provinces, were then outside of the control of the National Government, but the number has diminished considerably since then, particularly after the campaign of 1931-33.

CHAPTER IX

COMMUNISM AND THE LABOUR MOVEMENT.

The first labour unions in China were organized in Canton in 1917, but came under the influence of the Communists in 1922 after the first conference of labour organizations at Canton in May of that year, attended by 160 delegates representing 300,000 trade unionists.

The second trade union conference, composed of 250 delegates representing 570,000 trade unionists, was held in May, 1925, also at Canton, and created the Pan-Chinese Trade Union Federation as the supreme organ of labour organizations, the direction and control of which was entrusted to the Chinese Communist Party. Since that time the influence of the Party on the trade unions had been growing from day to day reaching its zenith in February, 1927, on the eve of the capture of Shanghai by the National-Revolutionary troops. At that time there were 289,000 trade unionists in Shanghai.

At the head of their industrial organizations was the General Union which, desiring to forestall action by the Government forces, put to flight the Northern troops and tried to organize a local government. This plan, the success of which would have placed the whole of Shanghai in the hands of the Communists, was frustrated by the National Government. The local government was dissolved, and its leaders (all influential members of the Communist Party) were either executed or fled. The General Union was suppressed, and the trade unions re-organized by effecting the expulsion of Communist elements. This re-organization was effected in conformity with labour laws promulgated by the National Government, and the "purified" labour unions were registered and recognized by the competent authorities. These alone have a legal standing.

The majority of the Communist leaders in the movement having been expelled from the labour organizations, the party was obliged to create Red unions, (which were not recognized by law and were consequently secret organizations) or sent their spies into the recognized trade unions. The first Red trade unions were formed at the beginning of 1928, and from that time on have played an important part in the strikes and other labour disputes which have occurred at Shanghai.

According to official statistics of the party, the number of trade unionist Communists at Shanghai had increased at the end of 1929 to 60,000, out of a total of 262,000 union members. The figures for the Red unionists in other industrial centres of China are not known, but it is surmised that they vary between 15 and 20 per cent of the total number of unionist workers.

The policy of Li Li-Shan, who aimed at transforming the Red trade unions into committees of action, had from June, 1930, a disastrous influence on the work and even the existence of the Red trade unions. Engaged in matters of a purely political nature, these trade unions ceased to occupy themselves with the organization and education of labour groups, which caused them to lose the sympathy of the masses and reduced their strength considerably.

THE RED LABOUR MOVEMENT.

The Red labour movement in China is directed by the Pan-Chinese Trade Union Federation, which, though under orders of the Secretariat of the Red Labour International in Moscow, co-ordinates its activities with the Labour Movement Department of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

The Red labour movement in China, as in all other countries where it has been started, is based on the "industrial" principle, according to which all workers engaged in any enterprise or industry whatever must form a union for that enterprise, irrespective of their real profession, and without taking into consideration the kind of occupation ("corporative" principle) to which they belong. Thus the mechanics of mills, factories, tramways, etc., do not form a corporative union of mechanics, but are divided into industrial trade unions of mills, factories, municipal employees, etc. The trade unions of different enterprises forming part of the same industrial branch compose the General Federation of Trade Unions of the industry in question.

From the administrative point of view, the Red trade unions are based upon the territorial principle, that is, all the labour unions of a province, city, district, etc., are controlled by the local council.

In Shanghai, which is the most important labour centre in China, the Red trade unions are divided into four principal groups: (1) workers in metallurgical factories, (2) mill workers, (3) maritime transportation workers, (4) municipal employees. As to the trade unions recognized by law, the Communists exercise influence over them through the intermediary of secret groups or bodies. All the members of the Red unions are affiliated with the official unions, and this facilitates the activity of the Chinese Communist Party within the ranks of the

recognised unions. All this organization, however, has undergone changes as a result of the schism of Li Li-Shan and of the Government's punitive campaign of 1931.

The Pan-Chinese Trade Union Federation according to latest Communist statistics does not consist of more than 34,380 members of Red unions, about 25,000 of whom are in the Sovietized areas, where they are mingled with the organized local Soviets. In May, 1931, the Secretariat of the Pan-Pacific Union estimated the number of Red unionist workers in Shanghai at 2,492. On each of the twelve principal Chinese railways there was a Red union of railwaymen. The most important was that of the Peiping-Mukden line, consisting of seven local unions with more than 500 members, but recent events in Manchuria probably have dissolved them. Next comes the union of the Peiping-Hankow line, one of the earliest and most active, with about 400 members. The union of the Tientsin-Pukow line does not number more than 70 members, and altogether the railwaymen's unions may have about 2,000 members.

The Federation of Labour Unions of Maritime Transport Workers consists of five unions, (Shanghai, Tientsin, Hongkong, Canton, Hankow), with about 400 members, but as members are for the most part at sea, these unions are not particularly active.

The figures given above agree with the remarks already made in regard to the present condition of the Communist Party, and show that labour activities have decreased during recent years, indicating that the Red labour movement in China is subsiding.

COMMUNISM AND CHINESE SOCIETY.

The Communist danger in China assumes a special form. The Communists here are not like those in countries outside of Soviet Russia who simply form a political party, spreading propaganda, seeking to increase their membership, presenting candidates at parliamentary elections, succeeding sometimes in getting a majority in the local councils, but (with a few exceptions) confining their activity within legal limits, and seeking to realize their policy by constitutional methods.

In China, the Communist Party is in open rebellion against the Constitution, against the laws, against the National Government, and against the constituted provincial authorities. It has its own army or armies, which oppose the regular forces, and sometimes even baffle them. It has its own Government, its own administration organized in conformity with its own principles; its own laws, perverted imitations of those of the U.S.S.R. In the regions brought within its authority, it puts into practice at least part of its Communistic theories. It is in these

respects that the Communist problem in China differs from those in other parts of the world, and is altogether unique.

Its development has been due to the particular conditions through which China has been passing for some twenty years. On the one hand, the growing consciousness in the minds of the Chinese people of their technical inferiority as compared with Western nations caused them to abandon some of the venerable traditions upon which their social system was founded. A stream of new ideas spread over the country. Ideas of emancipation, liberty, democracy, often ill-understood and ill-digested by the mass, have developed with great rapidity. The reactions of the Great War, and the famous 14 Points of President Wilson, raised great hopes in China. At the same time Dr. Sun Yat-Sen and the Kuo-Min Tang was popularizing the triple idea of national independence, democratic government, and economic re-organization. The result of all this was an enthusiasm, an ardent desire, to reform, to reconstruct, to revolutionize, and the Chinese Communists quickly utilized this psychological moment for the spread of impractical ideas.

On the other hand, the march of political events has not fulfilled the expectations of the masses. The Manchu Dynasty fell because it failed in its mission; its political conceptions and administrative machinery could no longer respond to the new requirements. Unfortunately, most of the Governments at Peking established after the creation of the Republic tried to govern by the same old feudal methods, allowing the cupidity of military Governors of provinces to get beyond control. Then came a series of civil wars which have devastated the country during the past ten years. The National Government has not been able to give the Three Principles of Dr. Sun Yat-Sen a fair trial, and recalcitrance on the part of what remains of militarism and differences of opinion within the Party have resulted in further armed conflicts, and the unrest in the country has been prolonged. These conditions furnish the Communists with unexpected opportunities both for propaganda and action, and they have profited and been aided by the counsel, agents and subsidies of the Third International.

CHINESE AVERSION TO COMMUNISM.

Fortunately, from the practical point of view, the Chinese have not been slow in perceiving that the millenium which the Communists promise is a mirage. If the Soviet Governments of certain regions have sometimes adopted measures which were welcomed by the population, these advantages cannot be regarded as compensating for the widespread ruin caused by the Soviet dispensation through its various military activities and the establishment of Soviet administrations.

In a report presented to the People's Convention on May 5, 1931, the Government made the following estimate of the damage inflicted by the Communists upon the population of Kiangsi:—

Persons massacred	186,000
Fugitives taking refuge in non-Sovietized regions...	2,100,000
Houses burned	100,000
Personal property destroyed or confiscated.....	\$630,000,000
and in Honan:—	
Persons massacred	72,000
Houses burned	120,000
Personal property destroyed or confiscated.....	\$300,000,000

The Provincial Government of Kiangsi has given out information to the effect that there are in the province more than 500,000 "refugees of war," in other words, more than 500,000 persons who have fled from Sovietized areas. One can easily imagine the effect of such an exodus upon the population, for the Chinese farmer can hardly distinguish the Communist from the ordinary bandit, and for that matter the Communist is often an ex-bandit and behaves as such.

If the new distribution of land by the Communists has helped in certain respects to solve an acute agrarian problem, it has on the other hand, by the fierce persecution of well-to-do farmers, deprived the country of some of its best elements. The area of land under cultivation has diminished, the general output has been considerably reduced, while the power of production and consumption among the farming class has decreased, as the export and import figures for these regions, given by the Maritime Customs may testify statements.

But there are other more profound causes which account for Chinese aversion to Communism. At first, Communism had a certain mystical halo around it. It is a belief, and for some of its followers is a religion, but the Chinese, brought up in the positivist and pragmatic philosophy of Confucius, are not mystical at all. The human element always ultimately triumphs over the speculative element. Mysticism is an innate spiritual disposition. It cannot be created in a milieu unfavourable to it. Even when a Chinese is carried away by a fit of passion, his strong commonsense comes back to him after a period of mental unequilibrium, and he again lives in his traditional concepts.

What is more, the Chinese is very individualistic in his opinions, and it is necessary to appeal to his reason in order to make him change them. He is not inclined to follow the ways of others by the simple influence of discipline, but that and subordination of individual criticism to dictation by the Party are the essential characteristics of Communism.

Communism considers society as being formed of individuals grouped according to their social functions, but not according to personal sentiments or affections. This idea is alien to the Chinese, who regard family duties as of great importance. Communism tends to destroy the family by relaxation of conjugal bonds, by entrusting the State with the care and education of children, and by the abolition of private property. Tradition and respect for ancestors are important Chinese social characteristics. It is the family which for the Chinese is at the base of the social structure. Even in the most modern cities, like Shanghai, many of the great Chinese enterprises, corporations, banks, etc. are either owned or managed by families or groups of families. Participation in a business on a joint-stock basis, and appeals to prospective shareholders, who are not conjugally related, for support in starting a business, are Western ideas which have only recently been introduced into China. The ideal of the average Chinese is to work for the prosperity of his family and the continuation of his line.

INDUSTRIAL WORKERS IN MINORITY.

Economically, China is still in a backward state: she is still in the stage of agricultural life and family industry. Large-scale manufacture and mass-production have hardly begun to take root. The industrial proletariat which constitutes the foundation of Communist organizations represents only the smallest percentage of the population. The strong organization of the corporations presents a bulwark which makes it almost impossible for the penetration of Communism into family industry. Furthermore, landed property is very well partitioned. The majority of farmers possess either personally or through the family the land they cultivate. There they work with their children and with one or two wage-earners who form, so to speak, a part of the family. Like farmers all over the world, they have simple and clear notions about individual property, a love for the bit of land upon which their ancestors and themselves have lived, and a strong conviction that they should not be deprived of it.

THE GOVERNMENT ATTITUDE.

The Kuo-Min-Tang responded adequately to the political conceptions of the Chinese people when, from the beginning, it pitted itself against the Marxist idea of class war and the dictatorship of the proletariat, and made every effort to realize the programme of the Three Principles of Dr. Sun Yat-Sen. It has never deviated from its original stand. It has always professed hostility towards Communism, and if in its fight against the movement it has not always achieved the success




GENERAL CHIANG KAI-SHIH WATCHING DEPARTING TROOPS.




DEMONSTRATING MACHINE-GUN OPERATIONS.



LAYING FOUNDATION OF BLOCKHOUSE.



BLOCKHOUSE NEARING COMPLETION.



GENERAL CHIANG ADDRESSING THE TROOPS.

desired, the fault was not due to the Kuo-Min Tang but to circumstances.

In spite of renewed efforts in the course of the last few years to effect its destruction, Communism in China remains a serious danger because it has threatened the country during one of those crises of social and political evolution which always leave a nation in a state of temporary weakness, and because this internal crisis was complicated, in and since 1931 by an external crisis of the greatest gravity and magnitude.

It would not be easy for any Government in similar circumstances to face grave domestic difficulties in the political, administrative, and financial domain, aggravated by the disaster of a flood of unprecedented proportions, and at the same time stem a tide of foreign aggression, as unjustified as it was unexpected, while still having to devote attention to the solution of the Communist problem with the firmness required.

It is not to be doubted, however, that unless a prompt remedy be found, the Communist danger may continue to extend to the point of threatening the very foundations of the social organization of China. From what has been said in regard to the relationship which exists between the Chinese Communist Party and the Third International, and the discipline which the majority of the Chinese Communist leaders receive in the execution of instructions from Moscow, it can readily be seen what the political orientation in China would be if the influence of the Comintern should really dominate the situation.

Such an orientation the National Government is determined to suppress by means of the campaign which it has launched against the Sovietized areas in the central portions of the country. But in order to ensure a successful conclusion, it is clear that China should not be handicapped by any complications on the North-eastern horizon and elsewhere, whether foreign or domestic.

Finally, the real success of the campaign against the Communists depends, perhaps, less upon military operations against the Red Armies than upon the rehabilitation of the Sovietized regions as they are reconquered, and upon the economic relief of the regions which Communism has devastated. The Government has prepared a programme of public works, particularly in regard to the construction of means of communication, which would provide employment for the impoverished population, increase the productivity of the country, re-establish peace and order, facilitate necessary administrative reforms, and prevent the return of the demoralizing conditions which those regions previously experienced and which explain the success of Communist propaganda in certain areas.

CHAPTER X

LAND POLICY OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT.


On December 18, 1933, Mr. Wang Ching-Wei, President of the Executive Yuan, issued an important statement on the Government's agrarian policy, which is quoted in part below. About a week later a long message from General Chiang Kai-Shih to Mr. Wang was published, giving his views on the same subject, and dealing in some detail with the Communist method of handling the land problem. These two statements of policy may be taken as representing the attitude of the Chinese Government on this most important question, upon the successful solution of which depends that restoration of rural prosperity which must be the foundation of the larger work of national reconstruction. Mr. Wang Ching-Wei's statement reads in part as follows:—

“‘Enforcement of the Agrarian Policy’ is a very attractive slogan, but we must not merely look at its name but also take into consideration its implication and repercussions on society in the light of realities.

“The late Party Leader was the first and most far-sighted advocate of an agrarian policy. In his lecture on *The People's Livelihood*, he made a clear and thorough exposition of his principle that all who till should be given land. From the bequeathed teachings of the late Party Leader, we see that in his Revolutionary Programme he advocated a Revolutionary policy in solving all political questions, but a peaceful policy for the gradual solution of the various economic problems. Why? Simply because he had a clear idea of the economic condition of the country.

EVOLUTION IN SOLVING ECONOMIC PROBLEMS.

“Should drastic methods be adopted for the solution of economic ills, the result would only be the shaking-up of the economic edifice of the nation and its precipitate collapse. We can improve economic conditions only by peaceful and gradual measures, so that the nation will be ushered into a new economic era step by step until it is prepared for a new economic system. It is an indisputable principle in sociology that while political changes take place suddenly, economic changes are always brought about gradually. Should this principle be ignored



MR. WANG CHING-WEI

and drastic methods adopted for the improvement of economic conditions, the inevitable consequence would be total collapse of the social structure. Such economic distress as Hunan and Hupeh experienced in the 16th Year of the Republic and Kiangsi has been experiencing since the 17th Year is known to the entire nation. In the 16th Year Communists in Hunan and Hupeh attempted to enforce an agrarian policy by tyrannous methods, with the result that murder and arson were committed and peace and order disappeared. Our comrades at Wuhan could not but launch a Party purgation movement.

"Since the 18th Year, Communists have been attempting to enforce their agrarian policy in Kiangsi, with the result that thousands of miles of farmland are laid in ruins and the distress of the people considerably intensified. The military and civil authorities thus cannot but launch a bandit-suppression campaign to exterminate them. Those who in former days advocated the Party purgation movement at Nanking have now forgotten their principles and allied themselves with the Communist bandits. Those who in former days were determined to purge the Party of Communists in Wuhan, have now demeaned themselves and are making friends with thieves. Those who have personally visited the bandit-ravaged areas, are now working, for the sake of realizing their personal ambitions, for the Sovietization of Fukien, nay, of the entire country.

COMMUNIST POLICY OF MASSACRE.

"On what ground do we state that the drastic methods adopted by the Communists for the enforcement of their agrarian policy will only bring about the collapse of the entire social structure? Because their only method is by means of massacre. At first, they incite the destitute peasants to murder their landlords. Later, they instigate strife among the peasants themselves. They used to justify their methods on the precedents of the French and Soviet Revolutions. As a matter of fact, however, they have taken a mistaken view of the history of both Revolutions. The definite number of people killed during the French Revolution is not available, but according to an acknowledged authority 2,607 persons were sentenced to death during the Reign of Terror in the 14 months from October 17, 1793, to June 11, 1794, and another 1,051 persons during the 46 days from June 11 to July 27, 1794.

"One thing worth noting is the fact that of this total number of people killed during the French Revolution, one-fifth were people with titles, the rest being middle-class people. Such being the facts concerning the French Revolution, the same may also be said of the Russian Revolution. But the land situation in China today cannot be compared

with the situation in France or Russia. Moreover, we do not have the so-called aristocratic landlords that France and Russia had during their Revolutionary days. Before the Revolutions, the lands in France and Russia were mostly owned by a small number of aristocrats. Besides imposing heavy burdens on the poor peasants, these aristocrats cared for nothing else except hunting and merry-making.

NO COMPARISON WITH FRANCE AND RUSSIA.

"In China, however, there are very few large landowners. Most of the lands are owned by the small bourgeoisie, who outnumber the aristocrats of France and Russia of former days a million times. Besides, the Chinese landowners are usually engaged in some industrial or commercial enterprise. Should the peasants be persuaded by the Communists to rob their landlords of their lands, the number of people to be killed will be ten thousand times that during the French and Russian Revolutions, and the terror and distress will also be considerably more acute than in France or Russia. With the extermination of the middle-class, our commerce and industry will be simultaneously ruined, and the entire economic edifice destroyed. Even if they got the land from their landowners, the peasants would only have gained waste lands, and they would have no means of livelihood. The policy of the Communists is to make people destitute and desperate, and so force them to follow. Once they start killing people, they will continue to kill. Such methods were employed during the Taiping Rebellion. Did they meet with real success?"

TWO STAGES OF COMMUNIST PROGRAMME.

"We can view the Communist programme in two stages. At first they may succeed in instigating peasants to follow them in creating disturbances. But later, when the economic structure has collapsed and there is neither commerce and industry nor arable farmland, the peasants cannot but fight among themselves. It will be recalled that the Communists during the Wuhan disturbances tried to fix a definite standard regarding capitalists. A conference was later held at Puchi when it was decided that a man with \$50 should be considered a 'small capitalist.' The 'capitalist class' and the 'small capitalist class' are created gradually in accordance with the progress of social differentiation. They are of special significance in Europe and America, where social differentiation has reached a high degree. In disregard of the economic situation of China, however, the Communists are applying the same terms in this country, with the result that their definition can only be determined arbitrarily. Since a man with \$50 is regarded as a small capitalist and is therefore to be exterminated, then the peasants who possess oxen

(worth \$50) are also to be exterminated. It is therefore no wonder that over six million people in Kiangsi have been sacrificed. This is the tragic result of the enforcement of the Communist agrarian policy. Proletarian periodicals, however, claim that the massacres have been perpetrated in the interests of the people, hoping thereby to gain the support of the peasants. Some people even urge that the massacres in Hunan and Hupeh in the 16th Year and in Kiangsi in the 18th Year are not yet sufficient, and should be extended to Fukien—nay, to the entire country. No idea can be more disastrous than this.

MASSACRE OF THE INNOCENTS.

"During the first stage of their programme, the Communists may disseminate their land policies in the name of the Communist Party. Later on, however, they may discard their mask and come out openly as the successors of Chang Hsieh-Chung and Li Tzu-Cheng. The massacre of innocent people is the direct result of the drastic methods employed by the Communists. The policy adopted by the Communist Party and its tools is similar to that adopted by Imperialists towards their colonies. It is the same poisonous, though sugar-coated, pill. We must not allow the Communists to further disorganize the country, any more than we tolerate the existence of poisonous snakes and ferocious beasts. The world must understand that in spite of the horrible methods and agrarian policy of the Communists and their tools, our faith in our policy will not be affected. In spite of the disturbances created by Communist agents and their tools, we are not at all worried. The greater the internal disturbances and the more acute the foreign aggressions, the more fully do we realize our responsibilities and the greater our confidence in the bequeathed teachings of the late Party Leader. We must strive in union for the attainment of our objective. We must mark out a path to Equality and Liberty by enforcing our settled policy, which consists in bandit suppression and economic reconstruction as, respectively, the emergency and the fundamental means of overcoming the national difficulties."

GENERAL CHIANG KAI-SHIH'S EXPOSURE OF COMMUNIST POLICY

In the course of a lengthy telegraphic despatch addressed to Mr. Wang Ching-Wei from the military headquarters of the forces engaged in anti-Communist operations, General Chiang Kai-Shih dealt at length with certain criticisms of the Government's attitude on the general subject of land policy. In this despatch, General Chiang said:—

"The so-called agrarian policy of the Red bandits is merely their weapon of war and nothing else. Young military commanders may at

first be lured by the attractive propaganda of the Reds, but on further observation they always come to the conclusion that the so-called land policy of the bandits is sheer robbery. There are still some members of the Party who are aggrieved at the failure of the Government to emulate and enforce such a land policy. Even if the Red bandits had a land policy, it would have to be determined by their political creeds. If we wanted to adopt their policy, we would have to discard our Party principles and adopt a new name for our Party, like the Fukien insurgents.

"The land policy of the Red bandits is merely a strategic means, but it is not a political policy. At first the bandits may hold out the redistribution of land as a bait to the peasantry. Later, however, when their object is attained, they will so distribute the land that the more fertile plots will be given to members of their own Party (the Communist Party), and the rest will be re-distributed entirely on the basis of personal likes or dislikes. Moreover, the Red bandits also tolerate the system of vicarious farming with the result that a new class of landowners soon rises to replace the old who have been ruthlessly murdered.

"In order to counteract the tendency on the part of the peasants to save and hoard the fruits of their labour, the Red bandits therefore often carry out their so-called farm-investigation movement, during which the new landowners are again dubbed 'rich or wealthy' and persecuted. When the land was first redistributed, the landowners and their families were often murdered. During the farm-investigation movement, the new landowners are subjected to severe persecution and their grain and belongings are taken away by force. This is done in order to get rid of personal ownership of land, and to prolong the period of 'Red Pauperism' so as to force the poor to join the ranks of the Red bandits and fight their battles. Such being the strategic tactics of the bandits, many peasants have fallen victims to their cajolery. The consequences of such tactics have been most pathetic and terrible to the peasants, who often leave their farms and later face starvation. To hide their intentions, the Reds have adopted the slogan of agrarian policy. Their crime is therefore ten thousand times more serious than that of those who masqueraded in Europe in the name of Liberty. Is our Party's programme for the equalization of land to be compared to this?

"The so-called agrarian policy is two-sided, dealing as it does with, firstly, the question of redistribution, and secondly, the exploitation and readjustment of land. There is no want of arable land in this country, which is more than sufficient for distribution among the population. Our land is, however, in urgent need of readjustment. Even in densely

populated provinces, there are few landowners holding more than several hundred or several thousand mow of land; the majority being small landholders owning about thirty or forty mow. The question of exploitation and readjustment is, therefore, in my opinion, more urgent than that of redistribution.

KUO-MIN TANG POLICY EXPLAINED.


"As regards the question of redistribution of land, it is the settled policy of the Party to realize the system of equalization of landownership. The ultimate object is to give land to all tillers of the soil. The exploitation and readjustment of the land should be carried out through cooperation and collective cultivation, so that rural revival may be realized. It is the settled policy of our Party to oppose class strife. The redistribution of land should thus be achieved by peaceful means, so that all tillers of the soil may gradually be given their share of the land. According to the Regulations, promulgated last year by the Commander-in-Chief's Headquarters for the Honan-Hupei-Anhui Bandit-Suppression Forces, governing the readjustment of land, private ownership of land is recognized and protected. It is however subject to two restrictions, namely, (1) that landowners must give all persons in the village capable of tilling the soil an opportunity to work on their farms; and (2) that the maximum land holdings are to be limited—those holding land of an area in excess of the maximum limit to be subject to graduated taxes. Revenues derived from these taxes are to be employed for financing agricultural enterprises. In this manner, not only will the landowners be induced to invest their capital in other than agricultural enterprises, but those capable of tilling the soil will be given land to cultivate, and bloodshed avoided.

"In order to ensure sufficient land for the peasants, landowners, owner-farmers and peasants are encouraged to form co-operative societies for the exploitation of land. Whenever a piece of land in the village is offered for sale, these societies will be given priority in acquiring such land. This will result in the gradual acquisition by these societies of all farms in the village. Those who are not capable of tilling the soil will not be made members of the society, while those who are capable in this regard will be given land to cultivate until they choose to quit the society. At the same time, there will be no need for the sale or purchase of land, and all injustices in connection with the redistribution of land will be avoided. The farms acquired by the co-operative society will be distributed to members for cultivation; with ownership remaining however in the society. For this privilege, members are required to pay to the co-operative society a farm rent which will be used for the

improvement of methods of cultivation. The organization of such societies will thus not only facilitate the development and exploitation of the land, but also lead to the gradual elimination of persons who own but do not cultivate the land.

"Moreover, the purchase of land by such societies is likely to be effected through loans from banking interests, so that the Government need not either float loans or take forcible measures for the acquisition of land. The redistribution of land will also be determined by the societies themselves, in accordance with the needs of their members, so that there will be no injustice, which is inevitable in the Soviet system. The exploitation and readjustment of land may be so effected that co-operation and collective farming may be finally attained.

"These plans have been enforced in the various bandit-suppression areas by the Bandits-Suppression Headquarters. Though they are not perfect, yet they are systematically devised and suit the conditions peculiar to this country. At least, they are practicable and may form the agrarian policy of our Party. I have expressed these views on the land problem for the reference of our Party comrades who are interested in the problem. I hope that our comrades will not forget the stand of our Party *vis-à-vis* this particular question, nor allow themselves be misled by Communist propaganda regarding the so-called agrarian policy. Not only will the success of these plans in bandit-suppression depend on your efforts, but the future of the State and the Party is also in your hands."



TROOPS IN FRONT-LINE TRENCHES SOUTH-WEST OF NANCHANG.
Photo by H. S. Wong.

Whoever, having committed the crime specified in the preceding paragraph, immediately and voluntarily reports, shall receive an attenuation or exoneration of the penalty.

Article 5. Whoever, with a view to subvert the Republic commits one of the following acts, shall be punished with death, or life imprisonment or imprisonment for more than ten years:

1. Obtaining or transporting military supplies for rebels,
2. Revealing or transmitting to rebels military and political secrets,
3. Destroying means of communication.

Article 6. Whoever, with a view to subvert the Republic organizes associations or unions or spreads doctrines incompatible with the "*Three Principles of the People*," shall be punished by imprisonment of from five to fifteen years.

Article 7. Whoever commits one of the crimes specified by the present law in a region under a state of siege shall be tried by the highest military organ in that region: If he commits the crime within the limits of the suppression of banditry, he shall be tried by a provisional court composed of the magistrate of the district and two judicial officials.

The provisional court shall be established in the district and the magistrate shall be designated as the president of the court.

Article 8. In case a suspect is tried by a military organ in conformity with the present law, that organ shall submit a statement of the trial to the competent superior military organ and the sentence shall be executed only after approval by the latter. If the suspect is tried by a provisional court, the court shall submit a statement of the trial to the superior court and the sentence shall be executed only after approval by the latter; the case shall also be reported to the provincial government for reference.

The competent superior military organ or the superior court, if it doubts the judgment passed by the organ which is its subordinate, can give to that organ an order for re-examination, or designate a special delegate to be present at the reconsideration of the judgment.

Article 9. The military organ or police which arrests a person suspected of having committed one of the infractions specified by the present law, shall report the matter immediately to the interested competent authorities.

Article 10. To all offences that do not fall within the limits of the present law, the provisions of the Penal Code are applicable.

Article 11. The duration of the application of the present law and the date of its enforcement shall be fixed by ordinance.

The provisional law suppressing anti-revolutionary plots shall be repealed from the date of the enforcement of the present law.

(II)

STRENGTH OF THE RED ARMIES IN THE FIELD.

For obvious military reasons, the latest information in the hands of the Government relating to the strength and positions of the various bodies of armed Communist-bandits cannot be disclosed, but the following figures are of interest as showing the state of affairs as existing in earlier stages of the campaign:—

STATE OF THE RED ARMIES IN 1930.

Division	Rifles	Commander	Area of Activity
1	9,000	Hsu Chi-Shen	Border districts of Honan & Anhui
2	4,000	Ho Lung	Border districts of Hunan & Hupeh
3	5,000	Huang Kung-Lai	East of Kiangsi
4	3,000	Chou Teh	Center of Kiangsi
5	7,000	Kwang Chi-Hsun	West of Kiangsi
6	6,000	Peng Te-Huai	Border districts of Hunan & Hupeh
7	9,000	Chang Yun-Yi	West of Kiangsi
8	2,000	Ho Cheng-Tang	North-west of Kiangsi
9	7,000	Tsai Chen-Si	North of Hupeh
10	1,000	Fang Chih-Min	North-east of Kiangsi
11	1,000	Kuo Tao-Tsou	North-east of Kwangtung
12	2,000	Lin Pia	Border districts of Honan & Kiangsi
13	2,000	Hu Kou-Mien	West of Chekiang
14		Li Chao-Shih	Nantung
15		Cheng Tse-Ping	Su-Chow
16	3,000	Li Shih-Sin	Border districts of Hunan & Kiangsi
17			
18			
19			
20	2,000	Liu Ti-Chao	West of Fukien
21	2,000	Tuan Kan-Nin	West of Fukien
22	1,000	Chen Yi	West of Kiangsi
Total	66,000		

STATE OF RED ARMIES IN MAY, 1931

Unit	Commander	Political commissariat	Men	Rifles	Machine-guns	Cannon	Trench-mortars
1st Army	Hsu Chi-Shen	Tsao Ta-Ching	5,000	3,000	32	1	4
2nd Army	Ho Lung	Fen Tai-Ying	5,800	4,100	113	2	8
3rd Army	Chou Teh	Mao Tse-Tung	14,000	8,800	157	10	16
4th Army	Siao Fang		5,000	3,000	45	2	6
5th Army	Peng Te-Huan	Ten Tai-Yuan	15,000	8,500	61	3	4
			1,000	800			
6th Army	Kuang Chi-Hsun	Lih Ke-Ming	5,900	4,500	60	4	5
			2,800	1,200			
7th Army	Chang Yun-Yi	Teng Hsi-Hsien	3,000	2,000	52	2	8
Detachment of Li Ming-Jui			2,800	1,300	26		3
8th Army	Huang Kung-Lai	Teng Chien-Yuen	5,000	3,200	25	1	2
10th Army	Fang Chih-Min	Shao Shih-Ping	13,000	4,800	30	1	1
12th Army	Wu Chung-Hao	Tan Tseng-Ling	5,000	3,000	31		4
Army of Tuan Te-Chang			2,500	1,500	38	1	2
16th Army	Kung Ho-Chung	Wu Tien-Yi	6,800	100	30		5
20th Army	Mao Tse-Tung		19,200	5,850	48	2	4
22nd Army	Chen Yi		5,500	2,100	20		2
			117,400	57,750	768	29	74

STATE OF THE RED ARMIES IN JANUARY, 1932

Unit	Commander	Centre of Operations or General Headquarters	Men	Rifles
1st Group of Armies (3rd, 4th & 12th armies)	Chou Teh	Jouikin	50,000	50,000
3rd Group of Armies (5th, 8th & 22nd armies)	Kuang Kung-Lai	South-west of Fukien	50,000	50,000
7th Army	Li Ming-Jui	Lienhwa-Kanchow	10,000	5,000
1st "independent" Division	Liu Wan-Tseng	Lienhwa	2,800	1,300
16th Army	Kung Ho-Chung	Hsiuhui	9,500	4,000
10th Army	Fang Chih-Min	North-east of Kiangsi	5,000	3,000
19th Army	Li Seng-Ying	Border districts of Kiang-		
Red Army of the Kiangsi-				
Hunan border districts	Cheng Chao	si, Hupeh, Hunan	3,500	2,100
6th Army	Tuan Te-Chang	Chaling	4,500	2,300
2nd Army	Ho Lung	Region of Hungku late	10,000	5,300
4th Group of Red Armies	Hsu Chi-Shen	West of Hupeh	12,500	8,600
1st Army	Hsu Chi-Shen	Border districts of Hupeh,		
9th Army		Honan, Anhwei	10,000	7,000
14th Army	Kuang Chi-Hsun	North-east of Hupeh	15,000	8,000
	Tong Fang	South-east of Honan	18,000	6,000
Total			200,800	125,600

STATE OF THE RED ARMIES IN JUNE, 1932.

Army				Army			
Corps	Strength	Rifles	Commander	Corps	Strength	Rifles	Commander
1	21,000	12,000	Chou Teh	9	5,000	5,000	Li Keh
2	9,000	6,000	Ho Lung	10	4,500	2,000	Chou Kien-Pei
3	12,000	9,000	Peng Te-Huai	11	4,000	3,000	Lo Pin-Hui
4	6,000	2,000	Li Nien-Hui	12	2,000	1,200	Tou Chen-Tan
5	7,000	5,000	Ki Chen-Tou	13	2,200	2,100	Tien Tse-Huei
6	8,000	6,000	Hsu Chi-Shen				
7	5,000	4,000	Ling Piao	Total	92,900	63,300	
8	7,200	6,000	Tuan Te-Chang				

(III)

PROGRAMME OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REHABILITATION IN CONNECTION WITH THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE COMMUNISTS.

It has been already stated that the real success of the campaign against the Communists depends more upon the rehabilitation of the Sovietized regions, either actually recovered or in course of being re-occupied, and upon the economic relief of regions which Communism has devastated. The following is the political and economic programme which the National Government has adopted for this purpose:

POLITICAL REHABILITATION

Realizing that in the regions devastated by the Communists in Kiangsi the people usually have little corporate organization, Central Party Headquarters has devised and adopted schemes for reorganizing popular bodies in the Sovietized region, and for the re-adjustment of the methods of popular training in order to curb the efforts of the Communists to delude the people.

In 1929 the National Government passed laws for the suppression of banditry by the National Army and for the maintenance of peace in the villages. It also adopted measures for census-taking, drew up forms for house-numbers, and regulations governing joint responsibility of neighbours when crimes are committed. Apprehending that the people may still lack effective organization, the Government has modified the old practice and passed regulation of *Pao-chia* in the Sovietized regions for the purpose of mutual supervision, so that there may not be any misprison of felony. There have also been promulgated regulations for the examination of householders in the Sovietized regions. Families are investigated according to their order in the system of *Pao-chia* in every ward,¹ are re-examined once every month, and examined by lot once every three months. This is to make it difficult for undesirable elements to mix among the inhabitants, and so lessen the danger of the latter being led into improper ways of thinking and acting. The measures enumerated have been enforced in Kiangsi Province.

¹In this system, each family is given a plate setting forth the name of its head and other male members therein. Ten families compose a *Pai*, ten *Pai* form one *Chia*, and ten *Chia* make one *Pao*.

In all the regions devastated by the Communists and since the establishment of the local Party Political Affairs Committees, the district magistrates, as regards the areas in their respective districts in which villages had been pillaged by the bandits, houses destroyed, or large numbers of able-bodied men had died or fled away so that agricultural fields had been laid waste, immediately investigate into the actual conditions of the land and the taxes and report to the Party Political Affairs Committee with a view to reducing their amount or to postponing their collection in order to relieve the hardship of the inhabitants.

ENFORCEMENT OF RELIEF MEASURES.

The haunts of Communists are usually high in the mountains, rendering punitive expeditions exceedingly difficult, and as able-bodied men in regions devastated by the Communists who are suddenly deprived of their means of livelihood are easily misled by pretentious and voluble Communists, the Central Government has established (as a means of coping with demoralizing forces) Road Construction Labour Relief Bureaux in the Sovietized regions in Kiangsi province, to which are sent by the Political Affairs Committee labourers selected from the able-bodied men in the districts under its jurisdiction, and who are employed in the construction of public highways. On the one hand this plan facilitates the campaign against the Communists, and on the other supplies afflicted people, especially those who are young and vigorous, with food and clothing so that they are not tempted to have recourse to banditry.

If any great number of refugees who have been harassed by the Communists should gather in one locality without food and shelter, Bureaux of Urgent Relief are established in the districts concerned to keep a record of these people and give them shelter, the refugees being sent back to their native villages within a fixed period. Those whose villages are still menaced by bandits or who are unwilling to return home though their villages are not within the Sovietized regions, are sent to the Road Construction Labour Relief Bureaux for work.

Inhabitants who have been coerced by the Communists into joining their ranks, on the latter being dispersed or routed by the National Army or surrendering, are escorted by troops to designated places to be interned in quarters specially established for them.

Labour relief for the Sovietized regions is mainly in connection with the construction of highways. There is established in each locality a relief office attached to the Road Construction Labour Relief Bureau from which as many technical experts or managers as necessary may be detached for service, who draw no additional salary for their concurrent post.

Labourers employed on the roads are supplied by the district magistrate concerned from the Internment Quarters for Bandit Prisoners.

The Road Construction Labour Relief Bureau, according to the projected roads decided upon, is commencing work in sections. The Bureau has also designated certain places to which labourers are sent from the nearest Bureau of Urgent Relief of designated districts. The Bureau of Urgent Relief in each district supplies labourers in accordance with Article 9 of the "*Regulations for Urgent Relief*." The Quarters of Internment supplies labourers in accordance with Article 5 of the "*Regulations Governing the Disposal of Bandit Prisoners*."

Labourers employed on road construction in connection with labour relief are each given an allowance of 40 cents a day in lieu of wages which is distributed by the Road Construction Labour Relief Bureau on the spot. This Labour Relief will be suspended with the completion of the projected roads. If by that time the Bureau of Public Highways requires to construct other public roads, all the labour will be supplied by the Road Construction Labour Relief Bureau from amongst those who have established the best record or who are willing to continue this work. These labourers will be accorded the same treatment as ordinary working men. The labourers not so engaged will be sent back to their respective native places.

As a measure of encouragement, the Political Affairs Committee strictly supervises and from time to time, decides upon matters relating to the activities of the local Party headquarters and popular organizations, the administration of local authorities or special organs, the actual state of services rendered by the Party and political workers, the form and contents of the petitions of local popular bodies concerning Party or political affairs, and the measures of reward or discipline of the Party or political workers.

POLITICAL MEASURES AFTER THE RECOVERY OF SOVIETIZED REGIONS.

After reoccupation of a district within regions where a campaign against the Communists has been conducted, the magistrate concerned issues proclamations inviting refugees to return to their homes without delay. Those refugees who are without means of returning to their native places may petition the magistrate of the district where they happen to be with regard to the state of their affairs, so that they may be assisted at his discretion in their homeward journey. On the other hand, the magistrate of the reoccupied district selects several persons of good reputation among those inhabitants who have remained in their native city or village, who are charged with the duty of ascertaining independently the location and number of refugees, and to advise the clansmen,

neighbours or those who are related to the refugees to arrange for their speedy return. The district magistrate also communicates to the people the measures adopted by the Government for re-assembling refugees.

With regard to the enforcement of these measures, there has been promulgated the procedure to be followed by the Party Political Affairs Committee of the Headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief of the Land, Sea and Air Forces¹ governing the re-assembling of refugees.


Inhabitants who had been coerced into submission by the Communists may file, with the magistrate concerned, and subject to his approval, bonds of sincere penitence to be attested or guaranteed by their fathers, elder brothers, chiefs of clans, or reputable gentry and elders of their ward. Those who are really penitent and return home on their own accord, and had not received any important appointments from the Communists or committed any serious crimes, may furnish bonds of sincere penitence to be guaranteed by their fathers, elder brothers, and five neighbours, such bonds to be submitted to the magistrate of the district for approval.

With regard to the enforcement of this measure, there have been passed regulations of the Party Political Affairs Committee attached to the Commander-in-Chief of the Land, Sea and Air Forces relating to the reconciliation of people coerced into submission or penitent in the regions where campaigns against the Communists are being conducted.

Inhabitants of districts within the regions of suppression activities, in the event of discovering Communists lurking in the locality or any underhand dealings with them, must secretly report the fact to the competent authorities to be dealt with according to law. Those who have brought false accusations out of spite (or malice aforethought) are subject to the same penalty for the offences charged. The judge who sits in trial of persons suspected of associating with rebels, must be particularly careful during the examination and not involve others. If relatives of inhabitants in the various districts have drifted into the Sovietized regions and are rendering services to the Communists or holding bogus offices under them, the authorities concerned, upon discovering the relatives who remain as residents in the localities to be innocent of any conspiracy, shall treat them as peaceful citizens and not involve them in any joint criminal liability.

With regard to the enforcement of this measure, there have been promulgated regulations of the Party Political Affairs Committee

¹The post of Commander-in-Chief of the Land, Sea and Air Forces has been abolished with the Reorganization of the National Government in December 1931, and instead the post of Chairman of the Military Affairs Commission established, the present incumbent being General Chiang Kai-Shih.



CARRYING BOMBS TO LOAD ON PLANES.

Photo by H. S. Wong.




Photo by H. S. Wong.

GRADUATES AND PUPILS, HANGCHOW AVIATION SCHOOL.

attached to the Commander-in-Chief of the Land, Sea and Air Forces with respect to the prohibition of false accusation and joint liability for crimes in the different districts within the regions for the suppression of Communists.

RESTORATION OF RURAL ECONOMICS

1930

Farmers banks have been established, of which the organization, capital and business are as follows:—

Organization.—Farmers' banks are divided into provincial and district banks. Provincial banks are established in the provincial capital, and district banks in different districts. Prior to the establishment of district banks, the provincial banks may establish branch offices in districts for the transaction of business.

Capital.—The capital of the banks is temporarily fixed at \$5,000,000, but business will be commenced upon \$2,500,000 being paid in full out of relief funds. The balance will be subscribed by credit co-operative societies in the various localities within five years of their formation, the aim of such banks being their ultimate operation by the people.

Business.—The business of the banks is to make loans to credit co-operative societies for short terms (within 8 months) or medium terms (within three years); to take fixed deposits; to transact rural remittances; to collect and transmit funds for farmers; to issue loan bonds (the amount of issuance shall, in accordance with the general regulations governing farmers' banks, not exceed so many times the total amount of paid-up capital); and to issue notes in exchange for subsidiary coins in order to meet local requirements.

Delegates are sent to areas recovered from the Communists to give advice to land-owners, farmers cultivating their own land, and tenant-farmers in rural communities regarding the formation, in accordance with regulations governing co-operative societies, of co-operative societies concerning credit, farm products, consumption, transportation and other matters. As a beginning, credit co-operative societies will first be organized, while other kinds of societies will be taken up only as actual requirements arise. As to the order of precedence of the various rural communities, those nearest to the city of a district will be given priority for the purpose of showing encouragement.

The organization of a credit co-operative society is briefly as follows:

- i. Its business is to make loans to members at a low rate of interest with the object of effecting farm rehabilitation.
- ii. Its liability is unlimited and shared jointly by all members.
- iii. All land-owners, proprietor-farmers and tenant-farmers are entitled to membership, but each household is limited to one member only. Each society has at least nine members, and in case there are less

than nine men in a village, a society can be formed out of two or more villages.

iv. Capital stock is \$10 per share, to be paid in instalments covering a period of five years. Each member subscribes for at least one share. The rights of shareholders are in conformity with the units of membership.

v. The purpose of loans is temporarily limited to supplying requirements actually indispensable to farm rehabilitation.

vi. Interest shall not exceed a definite low percentage per month.

The organization of a rural co-operative society is briefly as follows:

i. Its business is to promote mutual benefit and increase production by setting-up equipment for common use in a rural community, such as public stores, water-wheels, etc.

ii. It assumes the responsibility of a surety.

iii. Membership consists of all those engaged in agricultural pursuits.

iv. The shares of the Society are \$5 each, to be paid in instalments covering a period of five years.

The organization of a consumers' co-operative society is briefly as follows:

i. The business of the society is the supply to members of daily necessities, and tools required for farm production, particularly farming implements, buffaloes, seeds, etc.

ii. It assumes the responsibility of a surety.

iii. Membership is open to anyone in the village who has a lawful calling.

iv. Shares are \$5 each payable by instalments during a period of five years.

The organization of a transportation co-operative society is briefly as follows:

The business of the society is to facilitate the movement and sale of farm products of its members.

It assumes the responsibility of surety.

Membership is open to all who have farm products for transportation and sale.

Shares are \$5 each payable by instalments during five years.

ESTABLISHMENT OF RURAL REHABILITATION COMMITTEES.

Rural Rehabilitation Committees are established to take charge of districts and villages where lands have been distributed by the Communists. The chief duty of such committees is the distribution of farming rights and the adjustment of proprietary rights on agricultural lands. Prior to such adjustments being definitely made, the agricultural lands in a district are placed under the control of the Rural Rehabilitation Committee of that locality for the purpose of distributing

them for farming, so as to meet the emergency of the case and avoid non-cultivation. Such a committee is known as the Rural Rehabilitation Committee of a certain village or of a certain town. Its organization and functions are as follows:—

Organization.—The committees are of three kinds; namely the district committee, ward committee, and village or mart committee. On a district committee the magistrate is chairman, with chiefs of divisions of his office and representatives from different wards as members. On a ward committee the chief of the ward is chairman, with a representative from each of village in the ward as members. On a village committee the chief of the *pao* (1,000 families) is chairman, with four inhabitants of the village who have lawful business as members, such members to be elected by householders and chiefs of *chia* (100 families). Regulations governing organization in detail will be promulgated separately. In dealing with affairs the Rural Rehabilitation Committee is guided by the rulings of the village or mart committee. Matters which cannot be decided by the village or mart committee are passed upon by the ward committee, and matters which cannot be settled by the ward committee are finally disposed of by the district committee.

Functions.—The functions of such committees are of four kinds. The following is a brief account of functions in connection with the disposal of farming rights, leaving the others out of consideration.

DISPOSAL OF FARMING RIGHTS.

The committee, in its management of lands under its control, apportions farming rights according to the number of persons to be supported. An adult can undertake to cultivate so much land as its products are sufficient for his support, the area to be decided by the committee of a locality in accordance with its fertility or otherwise. A minor shall be allowed to cultivate one-half of this amount. The rent payable for each mou of land, that is to say, the share of its product to be contributed by the farmer to its owner, is decided by the committee in accordance with local custom. The rent realizable for land the ownership of which has not been definitely settled is appropriated by the committee for use in the reconstruction of the village or other public utility.

If the family to which farming land has been given to cultivate should consist of only the old and weak and women, without any able-bodied male to undertake cultivation, the family can employ farmhands to do the work, or the committee can do so on its behalf and attend to all matters relating thereto.

Farmers who have had land distributed to them during the period of Communist occupation, (excepting those who, having undertaken

important work for the Red bandits, shall be tried and punished separately), uniformly enjoy the right of undertaking to farm according to the number of persons to be supported. Products through cultivation of the land harvested prior to the formation of the rehabilitation committee, excluding the portion which the farmer is entitled to keep, is disposed of as land rent according to the procedure stated above.

If owing to the decrease of population in a village or owing to the inhabitants having taken refuge elsewhere and having not all returned, there should be surplus land left after apportioning for cultivation according to the number of persons, such land may be cultivated by farm-hands employed by the committee or by farmers from another village. These lands may be redistributed from time to time upon the return of refugee inhabitants. Lands under the control of the Rural Rehabilitation Committee of a certain village or mart, irrespective of their being cultivated by the proprietors themselves or by tenant-farmers, or distributed for cultivation at the time of Communist occupation, are, after the formation of the committee, reported to it, with full particulars of the number of mou under cultivation, the location, the number of persons in the cultivators' household, whether aged, young, or able-bodied. In the same locality inhabitants who have not at the time any definite land for cultivation should also report on the number of aged, young and able-bodied persons in their respective households.

ORDER OF PRECEDENCE.

Though the Rural Rehabilitation Committee, in the distribution of lands for cultivation, is guided by the principle of apportionment according to the number to be fed, it also acts upon the following rules to decide upon order of precedence in awarding such farming lands:—

With the exception of those who are willing to exchange with each other lands for cultivation, the following order of precedence is observed:

(1) The original cultivator before the land was distributed by the Red bandits shall have first choice in the apportioning of farming lands.

(2) The original owner whose title has been definitely established and who is willing to cultivate his own land shall have priority of claim.

(3) When neither the proprietor-farmer is definitely ascertained, nor is the original cultivator to be found, the one who has cultivated the land after being re-distributed by the Communists shall be accorded order of precedence.

(4) When the proprietor-farmer, the original cultivator, and the farmer who has undertaken to cultivate after the land having been distributed by the Communists, are all difficult to ascertain, the land shall be assigned anew for cultivation by the committee.

(5) If pieces of land cultivated by the original cultivators, proprietor-farmers, or those who have undertaken to cultivate after the distribution by the Communists should exceed the standard of area measured by the number of persons in their respective families, the excess portion shall be redistributed by the committee among those who have no land to cultivate, or whose lands are not sufficient.

REPLENISHMENT OF LIVESTOCK.

If farmers in the different districts within the regions of anti-Communist expedition, who have suffered heavily through the ravages of the of the Red bandits, are really devoid of the means of purchasing farm buffaloes, such animals are supplied by the Government at a moderate price, which may be paid for by loans obtained from the farmers' banks.

With regard to the enforcement of this measure, there have been promulgated regulations governing the replenishment of farm buffaloes in districts within the regions of Communist suppression in Kiangsi.

REGULATIONS ON LAND TAX, LAND RENT, AND FARMERS' DEBTS.

The following principles have been adopted for the settlement of disputes arising out of the question of land tax, land rent, or farmers' indebtedness:—

(6) In assigning lands for cultivation the committee should take into consideration the distance between the habitation of the prospective cultivator and the land to be cultivated.

Land tax—Land tax may either be totally remitted, reduced, or reprieved under the following circumstances: Taxes in arrear before the 19th year of the Republic (1930) shall be completely remitted. Taxes in arrear after the 20th year of the Republic (1931) leviable in districts where land-distribution had been made by the Communists shall be remitted for two years; but in districts where though land-distribution had not been made by the Communists, extensive devastation has been committed by them, resulting in the fields being laid waste, the taxes shall be remitted for one year. In districts which have been devastated by the Communists to a less extent, whether the tax should be reduced by half or a reprieve of half a year be given is decided on reports being made by the magistrate of the district concerned.

Land rent.—Rents in arrear before the 19th year of the Republic (1930) shall be remitted. Rents due during the year shall be remitted if the land is not under cultivation, and shall be proportionally reduced if the land is being cultivated, the rate of reduction to be agreed upon between the land-owner and the tenant-farmer, or to be decided for them by the co-operative societies of the various villages. The owners of more than 100 mou shall contribute three-tenths of the rent accruing to them individually for the purpose of defraying the expenses in the formation of co-operative societies of the various villages, or to serve as foundation funds of such institutions.

Debts of Farmers.—Debts of farmers in districts where land-

distribution had been made by the Communists shall all be granted a moratorium of two years, and the unpaid interest of the past shall be reduced or remitted. The highest rate of interest during the moratorium shall not exceed 12 per cent, and interest above that rate shall be invalid.

